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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Scope of Study 
This report investigates tendencies towards integration and towards 
fragmentation in the world economy. This perspective has been chosen in 
view of the research programme of the Scientific Council for Government 
Policy to support decision making on a new design of foreign policy of 
the Netherlands. 
The Scientific Council has underlined that international relations are 
increasingly dominated by economic factors and that this should be 
reflected in the recommendations regarding the Netherlands' foreign 
policy. 
Within this framework the present study has been commissioned to report 
on major developments in the world economy. This study analyses in 
particular: 
1. globalization of investment and production; 
2. regionalization and bloc formation in world trade; 
3. fragmentation of production processes and markets. 
From the viewpoint of foreign policy, including security, the degree of 
stability in the world economy is of considerable importance. In this 
perspective the Scientific Council has chosen the analysis of integrating 
tendencies and fragmenting forces in the world economy as the guiding 
principle. This study reports on developments in the world economy from 
this perspective. The main findings are summarized below. 
Globalization of Investment and Production 
Globalization of investment and production represents the cross-border 
activities of firms in production, sourcing and marketing. Empirical 
evidence on globalization is that the outward stock of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) of the industrial countries rose from nearly 5 percent 
of their GDP in 1967 to over 8 percent recently. Furthermore, since 1986 
the outflow of FDI from the industrial countries rose with 5 percent per 
annum, twice as fast as their domestic investment. 
Globalization of investment and production proceeds with the extent of 
the market. Income growth and declining costs of transportation and 
communication expand the market. The expanding world market enables the 
fragmentation of production processes into separate parts, distributed 
across countries according to locational advantages. This type of 
hternational fragmentation is common in manufacturing and recently 
spreading into services. 
Globalization of investment and production increases specialization and 
interdependence among national economies, and therefore represents a 
factor of integration in the world economy. In principle, the benefits of 
globalization extend to all countries involved. Evidence shows that 
increasing global competition and imports from low-wage countries are not 
important factors in the rise of unemployment in Western Europe. Indeed, 
unemployment cannot be addressed adequately by attempts to isolate the 
economy from international economic developments through protectionist 
and other measures. 
Government policies are instrumental to the attractiveness as a host 
country for FDI. Political and economic stability, are of prime import- 
ance, next to infrastructural provisions in law, education, transport and 
communication. Trade related investment measures (TRIMS), such as local 
input requirements and export requirements and other policies may 
restrict inward FDI. From the perspective of international specialization 
and economic interdependence, it is a positive development that since the 
Uruguay Round TRIMs are dealt with multilaterally under GATT and WTO. 
m e  Network of World Trade 
Iln the period 1960-1992 the pattern of world trade changed considerably. 
The share of Japan in world trade rose from 3 to 8 percent, that of Asia 
and Oceania (except Japan) rose from 10 to 17 percent. The share of 
Central and Eastern Europe declined from 10 to 3 percent and of Africa 
from 4 to 2 percent. Nort America continued to hold a share of around 17 
percent in world trade, while Western Europe continued to have by far the 
Xargest share (including intra-area trade) that even rose from 40 to 45 
percent. 
The network of trade relations in the world economy among the eight 
regions considered did not attain a substantially higher degree of 
cohesion in the period 1960-1992. In 1960 only 28 of the possible 63 
trade relations attained a level of some importance with more than 0.5 
percent of world trade, this figure having risen to 31 only by 1992. 
Throughout the period Western Europe entertained the maximum number of 14 
important trade relations in the world network; North America has a 
second position with 9 such relations in 1992. For Japan this number 
increased from 4 in 1960 to 7 in 1992. 
Foreign trade of Africa is concentrated on Western Europe for more than 
50 percent, and after 1990 the same is true for Central and Eastern 
Europe. In contrast, by 1992 foreign trade of Asia and Oceania was evenly 
spread among Western Europe, Japan and North America. This is one of the 
main reasons why countries in Asia and Oceania favour an open multilat- 
eral trade system under GATT and WTO. 
Bloc formation in world trade can be defined as the concentration of 
trade among countries bound by a formal agreement on economic cooper- 
ation. 
With respect to the EU, the index measuring bloc formation in trade rose 
threefold in the period 1960-1992; for products related to the Common 
Agricultural Policy the index rose even twice as fast. For road vehicles 
the index doubled. In contrast, the corresponding figures for NAFTA were 
much lower and declining in the same period. The comparison between bloc 
formation in the EU and in NAFTA is made notwithstanding that the US- 
Canada free trade agreement is of much later date (1988) than the 
founding of the EC (1957). However, US-Canadian economic cooperation 
dates back from the previous century. 
To evaluate these observed tendencies up to 1992, it is important to 
consider the policies designed and implemented by the potential trading 
blocs on economic relations in trade and investment with the outside 
world. In NAFTA and East Asia policy trends are towards liberalization 
and deregulation, internally but also externally. The same is true for 
the EU, where liberalization and deregulation are at the core of the 
1992-programme. The supply of public utilities is opening up to competi- 
tion, from within the EU and from outside. 
In conclusion, the network of world trade has not decreased in cohesion. 
Bloc formation of trade with diminishing access from outside the bloc, is 
highly unlikely to develop in East Asia, is not born out by the evidence 
on NAFTA, and would contradict the rationale of the 1992-programme in the 
EU . 
Globalization and Economic Coordination 
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system the International 
Monetary Fund has identified two other key structural changes in the 
international financial system: 
1. the rapid expansion of private international financial markets; 
and 
2. the removal of capital account restrictions in the industrial 
countries. 
The globalization of financial markets has led to a more explicit 
international evaluation of the creditworthiness of individual countries. 
This in turn has led to an increased incentive for countries to adopt 
maco-economic and monetary policies appropriate from that perspective. 
With respect to the EU the convergence of economic policies is 
strengthened furthermore by the conditions set for participating in the 
EMU. 
At the same time, and in particular since the mid-1970s, specific 
developments in trade policy embody a tendency towards fragmentation of 
the world market. These developments include: 
1. The use of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as quota, applied for 
instance against imports of textiles and clothing under the Multi 
Fibre Arrangements (MFAs). Quota and other NTBs, unlike tariffs, 
discontinue the functioning of the price system, and fragment the 
market. 
2. The protection of the agricultural sector. The Common Agricultural 
Policy has led among others to increased self-sufficiency of the 
EU in agricultural products. Similar developments elsewhere have 
led to an increased isolation of the agricultural sector from a 
world market. 
3. Bilateralism in trade relations. This tendency is apparent from 
the excessive attention of the USA on its trade deficit with 
specific trade partners, especially Japan. The EU entertains a 
network of preferential trade agreements with specific countries 
and groups of countries, in the industrial world (with EFTA, 
succeeded by the European Economic Area), in Central and Eastern 
Europe (the Europe Agreements) and among developing countries 
(under Lome Agreements, and with the Mashreq and the Maghreb). 
Bilateralism in trade relations undermines the multilateral trade 
system, based on the principle of non-discrimination, as embodied 
in GATT. 
4. Unilateralism in trade relations. Section 301 of the 1974 US Trade 
Act and later provisions such as Super 301 and Special 301 allow 
the USA to take unilateral actions against policies of a particu- 
lar country, deemed unfair or restrictive to US commerce. Thus, 
the rules for conducting foreign trade are decided upon unilat- 
erally, leaving the system of multilaterally agreed rules 
weakened. 
The above tendencies to fragmentation of the world market have been kept 
in check by the succesful conclusions of the Uruguay Round in December 
1993, or at least are given less leeway. Protection in the sectors of 
agriculture and of textiles and clothing are brought under GATT and its 
successor, the WTO. The agreement includes the tariffication of non- 
tariff barriers and the procedures for the settlement of disputes are 
strengthened. 
Evaluation and Main Recommendations 
Tendencies towards integration in the world economy are embodied in the 
activities of multinational firms, in the network of world trade and in 
economic cooperation among countries. Developments in direct foreign 
investment, the fragmentation of production processes across countries, 
and expanding trade relations all increase the interdependence among 
countries. Furthe,rmore, the globalization of financial markets and 
agreements on economic integration enhance the coordination of economic 
policies among nations. 
Tendencies towards fragmentation in the world economy are represented by 
protection of the agricultural sector, by the use of non-tariff barriers 
to imports, by policies fending off direct foreign investment, and by 
undermining the multilateral system of world trade by focussing on 
bilateral trade and by setting rules unilaterally. Bloc formation in 
world trade with high protection against other blocs would represent 
another tendency to fragmentation. Such bloc formation was found unlikely 
to develop, given the policies of liberalization and deregulation 
underlying NAFTA and the 1992-programme of the EU. Furthermore, ten- 
dencies towards fragmentation will meet restrictions through the succes- 
fml conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
On balance the tendencies towards integration in the world economy are 
found to outweigh the forces of fragmentation. 
At present the Netherlands ranks eighth among countries in world trade 
aind sixth in foreign direct investment. An open multilateral system of 
world trade and investment is of considerable importance for the Nether- 
lands, as it is for the EU. 
In this perspective, it is recommended, in general, that foreign policies 
od the Netherlands would support integration in the world economy and 
check tendencies towards fragmentation. More concretely, this can be 
achieved by supporting the GATT IWTO and its further development, 
strengthening the tendencies of liberalization and deregulation in the EU 
underlying the 1992-programme, and supporting the coordination of 
economic policies within the framework of the EU, the OECD and the UN. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Scope of Study 
In 1995 the Government of the Netherlands is considering a new design of 
its foreign policy. To support decision making the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (WRR) is engaged in the preparation of a number of 
studies; the entire project has been labelled 'Security and stability in 
Europe' and comprises three main areas: 
1. defense and security; 
2. foreign economic relations; 
3. other areas of foreign policy. 
The WRR underlines that international relations are increasingly domi- 
nated by economic factors and that this observation should be reflected 
in the recommendations for a reconsideration of foreign policy of the 
Netherlands.. 
Within this framework the present study has been commissioned to report 
on major developments in the world economy. This study analyses in 
particular: 
1. Regionalization and bloc formation in the world economy; 
2. Globalization of investment and production; 
3. Fragmentation of production processes and markets; 
4. strategic trade policies; 
5. The level of decision making. 
Developments in the world economy can be interpreted from various 
perspectives. To illustrate, such perspectives may include: 
- the activities of transnational corporations, including strategies 
for marketing and cooperation; 
- international economic development, including intercountry differ- 
ences in prosperity and economic growth; 
1 WRR stands for 'Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid', 
the Scientific Council for Government Policy. 
2 WRR, Veiligheid en stabiliteit in Europa, Rapporten aan de Rege- 
ring nr. 48, 's-Gravenhage, Sdu Uitgeverij, 1995. 
- sustainability of economic development, including interrelation- 
ships between economic growth, the use of energy, and the preser- 
vation of the environment. 
Given the variety of possible perspectives the WRR has chosen a particu- 
Par perspective as a 'constituting principle', namely the presence and 
s.ignificance of 'fragmenting forces' and of 'integrating forcesf in 
international relations. Obviously, this perspective has been chosen by 
the WRR in view of the process of reconsidering foreign policy of the 
Netherlands in general, that is including security as well as economic 
relations. A survey and an analysis of economic forces of integration and 
of fragmentation and their effects on the world economy, are particularly 
relevant from the viewpoint of international stability. 
As a consequence the present study will analyze the five topics mentioned 
&ove from the same perspective, namely that of integration and fragmen- 
tation in the world economy. The next section will present more detail on 
the content of each of the five issues. 
1.2 Content of the Study 
Bloc formation in world trade is the subject of Chapter 2. In the 19th 
century the conclusion of a free-trade agreement became controversial as 
the preferential treatment involved would violate the principle of most- 
favoured-nation treatment, that was generally accepted as the main 
principle to govern international economic relations. It is reviewed 
briefly how this controversy was solved (section 2.1). Likewise, any 
agreement on economic integration with limited membership is a departure 
from the principle of non-discrimination, ruling international trade 
relations since the second World War, under GATT. An overview of GATT 
legislation and its interpretation is presented (section 2.2). More in 
general, there is a fear that regionalization of world trade poses a 
threat to the multilateral trade system. In this respect the successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December 1993 is of importance 
(section 2.3). The OECD has investigated bloc formation in world trade in 
the period 1961-1989 for the four main regional trade agreements in the 
OECD area (section 2.4). Recently various studies have been made regard- 
ing the question whether a trading bloc in East Asia is emerging, of 
which the main findings are reviewed (section 2.5) . Empirical investiga- 
tions regarding regionalization in world trade benefit from a clear 
conceptual distinction between bloc formation, regionalization and 
polarization in international trade (section 2.6). As an introduction to 
the empirical analysis the network of world trade is investigated first, 
presenting an overview of the main trade flows in the world economy and 
their development over time since 1960 (section 2.7). Tendencies toward 
possible concentrations in world trade are investigated next, covering 
the. period 1960-1992. Investigated are polarization in world trade 
(section 2.8), regionalization in world trade (section 2.9), and bloc 
formation in world trade (section 2.10). A policy evaluation of the main 
findings concludes the chapter (section 2.11). 
The globalization of investment and production is the subject of Chapter 
3. The phenomenon is approached from the perspective of Adam Smith's 
basic insight about the division of labour, which process is limited by 
the extent of the market (section 3.1). The extent of the market enabling 
the division of labour or specialization can be enhanced by a variety of 
factors; the role of technology in transportation and communication is 
dealt with in particular (section 3.2). One of the main vehicles of 
globalization is foreign direct investment (FDI), of which the general 
trends and characteristics are presented (section 3.3), its country 
distribution (section 3.4) and its sectoral composition (section 3.5). 
The major factors explaining international production are reviewed with 
specific attention to locational factors (section 3.6). The relationship 
between FDI and trade is another important aspect of the process of 
globalization. This relationship however is not straightforward but 
rather complicated, in which commercial policies and trade related 
investment measures play a role as well (section 3.7). The consequences 
of globalization for employment in the OECD and in Western Europe in 
particular are investigated next (section 3.8). 
The recent concentration of international trade of the countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe on Western Europe renders this economic 
relationship of specific interest within the context of this study. In 
this perspective an overview is presented of recent economic developments 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) , including international trade, 
investment and policies in these areas both in the CEE countries as well 
as in 'the EU (section 3.9). 
Recently, also the financial markets have become more internationalized. 
Various aspects of this process of globalization of financial markets and 
its implications for economic policy coordination are presented (section 
3.10). 
The chapter concludes with a general description of the likely conse- 
quences of globalization on economic policies of the countries partici- 
pating in this process (section 3.11). 
Fragmentation in the world economy is the subject of Chapter 4. Two major 
aspects are considered: the fragmentation of production processes and the 
fragmentation of markets induced by recent measures of trade policies. An 
increasing extent of the market will also lead to increasing specializ- 
ation among firms. This specialization may take different forms, one of 
which is the fragmentation of .a particular production process into 
separate industrial operations, which may be distributed among countries 
allowing less compromise in the exploitation of locational advantages 
(section 4.1). Illustrations of this process are given for the industries 
of textiles and clothing, electronics, and services (section 4.2). 
Recent trade policy measures tend to fragment the world market into 
bilateral trade relationships; examples are the rise of unilateralism in 
US legislation and anti-dumping procedures adopted by the EU in particu- 
lar (section 4.3). Fragmentation of the world market may also rise from a 
tendency to bilateral balancing of a country's foreign trade; this 
phenomenon was studied in particular by the League of Nations in the 
1930s (section 4.4). 
Securing the production in high-technology sectors for the domestic 
economy by means of a strategic trade policy is the subject of Chapter 5. 
Traditional trade theories underlining the mutual benefits of interna- 
tional trade are briefly reviewed first (section 5.1). Including the 
elements of economies of scale and imperfect competition, the new 
international economics provide a case for a strategic trade policy which 
is correct in theory, the implementation of which in practice, however, 
is beset with problems (section 5.2). In this context, the case of Airbus 
is analyzed in particular (section 5.3). In addition, the scope for a 
national strategic trade policy is greatly reduced from the viewpoint of 
economic integration (section 5.4). 
A major determinant of the balance between integrating and fragmenting 
forces in the world economy derives from the choice of the level of 
decision making. This is the subject of C h a p t e r  6. The case for the 
choice of a proper level of decision making in accordance with the 
globalization of production is discussed first (section 6.1). The 
criteria for this choice also in connection with the discussion on 
subsidiarity in the EU are presented next (section 6.2). Some refinements 
are presented as well as the role of democratic control (section 6.3). 
The criteria are applied to the functioning of concrete institutions 
subsequently (section 6.4). An evaluation of the main findings concludes 
the chapter (section 6.5). 
C h a p t e r  7 gives an overview of the main findings of this study and, based 
on these, presents recommendations with respect to government policies. 
2. REGIONALIZATION IN WORLD TRADE 
2.1 The Customs Union Issue 
Long before the beginning of the 19th century the principle of most- 
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment had been accepted as a general principle 
which should govern international economic relations (Viner, 1950). The 
MFN-principle stipulates that a country, A, that is obliged by treaty to 
give MFN-treatment to another country, B, must admit imports from B on as 
favourable terms as it admits similar imports from a third country, C. 
As a consequence, in case country A had concluded a MFN-treaty with 
country B, a customs union between countries A and C, would violate the 
MFN-treaty between countries A and B. The 19th century is full of 
conflicts in international economic diplomacy on this issue 3 .  For 
instance, upon the conclusion of a new constitution of the Zollverein 
among German states in 1867, the French emperor, Napoleon 111, claimed on 
the basis of the MFN-clause in the French-Prussian commercial treaty of 
1865 that French products should have free entry into Prussia. The French 
claim was denied however (Henderson, 1939). 
The apparent incompatibility of the conclusion of a customs union with an 
existing MFN-treaty with a third country, was solved by the acceptance of 
customs unions provided they were complete, or in other words, would act 
as a single entity in their relations with outside states (Ito, 1930). 
The result was that customs unions were promoted where otherwise less 
complete forms of preferential arrangements would have been chosen. 
In the 20th century, the League of Nations followed this point of view 
and urged repeatedly the general acceptance of compatibility between 
customs unions and MFN-obligations. In 1933 the Economic Committee of the 
League of Nations suggested a model for an MFN-clause by which the 
founding of a complete customs union was exempted 4. 
3 An overview is given in Chapter 2 of Viner (1950). 
4 League of Nations (1933). 
2 . 2  Economic Integration and the GATT 
During' the 20th century the principle of most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
obligation has been replaced by the more powerful principle of non- 
discrimination, in ruling international relations in trade. The principle 
of non-discrimination provides .the main foundation on which the GATT 
construction is built 5. 
By their nature, any form of economic integration among a select group of 
countries discriminates against external imports and thus violates, in 
principle, the GATT rule of non-discrimination. 
The GATT has dealt with the issue of economic integration in the follow- 
ing way. The GATT permits departures from the non-discrimination prin- 
ciple for the formation of Customs Unions (CUs) and Free-Trade Areas 
(FTAs) and therefore sanctions preferential trade barrier reductions 
among a subset of GATT members as long as they eliminate barriers for 
'substantially all trade'. 
As described in Article XXIV, paragraph 8 and 9 (GATT, 1994b): 
8. (a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution 
of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, 
so that: 
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce 
(except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles 
XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect 
to substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories of the union or at least with respect to sub- 
stantially all the trade in products originating in such 
territories, and 
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the 
same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied 
by each of the members of the union to the trade of terri- 
tories not included in the union. 
5 Contrary to popular belief, the GATT is foremost not on free trade 
but on non-discrimination in international economic relations. The 
reason is that only a multilateral setting of rules, rather than a 
bilateral or a unilateral setting of rules, would ensure the 
openness of the market among the contracting parties as far as 
possible, thus enhancing the prospects for specialization and its 
economic benefits. 
( b )  A f r e e - t r a d e  a rea  s h a l l  be understood t o  mean a  group of two 
o r  more customs t e r r i t o r i e s  i n  which the  d u t i e s  and o the r  r e s t r i c -  
t i v e  regula t ions  of commerce (except ,  where necessary,  those 
permit ted under A r t i c l e s  X I ,  XII ,  X I I I ,  XIV, XV and XX) a r e  
e l imina ted  on s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a l l  t h e  t r a d e  between the  c o n s t i t u e n t  
t e r r i t o r i e s  i n  products o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  such t e r r i t o r i e s .  
The preferences  r e f e r r ed  t o  i n  paragraph 2 of A r t i c l e  I s h a l l  no t  
be a f f e c t e d  by the formation of a  customs union o r  of a  f r e e - t r a d e  
a rea  bu t  may be e l imina ted  o r  ad jus ted  by means of nego t i a t i ons  
wi th  con t r ac t ing  p a r t i e s  a f f e c t e d  6. This  procedure of negot i -  
a t i o n s  with a f f ec t ed  c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s  s h a l l ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
apply t o  t he  e l imina t ion  of preferences required t o  conform with 
t h e  provis ions  of paragraph 8 ( a ) ( i )  and paragraph 8 ( b ) .  
According t o  Bhagwati (1992b), t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  i nc lus ion  of A r t i c l e  
XXIV i n  t h e  GATT appears t o  be t h r e e f o l d :  
- F u l l  i n t e g r a t i o n  of t r a d e  among any subse t  of GATT members would 
have t o  be allowed s ince  it c r e a t e d  an important element of s ing le -  
n a t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  (such a s  v i r t u a l  freedom of t r a d e  and f a c t o r  
movements) among these n a t i o n s .  
- The f a c t  t h a t  t he  except ion would be permit ted only f o r  t h e  extrem- 
e l y  d i f f i c u l t  case where a l l  t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  would need t o  come 
down, seemed t o  prevent t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a l l  k inds  of preferen-  
t i a l  arrangements would come i n t o  ex i s t ence .  
- A r t i c l e  XXIV acknowledged t h a t  such arrangements could provide a  
complementary, p r a c t i c a l  rou te  t o  un ive r sa l  f r e e  t r a d e ,  which was 
seen a s  t he  u l t imate  goa l .  The general  nego t i a t i ons  of the  many 
Rounds would l ead  t o  a  d i smant l ing  of t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  on a  GATT-wide 
b a s i s ,  while simultaneously a  deeper i n t e g r a t i o n  would be achieved 
wi th in  those a reas  where p o l i t i c s  permit ted f a s t e r  movement t o  f r e e  
t r a d e  under a  s t r a t egy  of f u l l  and time-bound commitment. 
The c l e a r  determinat ion t h a t  only i n t e g r a t i o n  schemes wi th  100 percent  
p re fe rences  were compatible wi th  m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m  and non-discr iminat ion,  
and the  equal ly  f i rm view t h a t  anything l e s s  was not ,  meant t h a t  when 
6 It i s  understood t h a t  the  provis ions  of  A r t i c l e  I would r equ i r e  
t h a t ,  when a  product which has  been imported i n t o  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  of 
a  customs union or  f r e e - t r a d e  a rea  a t  a  p r e f e r e n t i a l  r a t e  of duty 
i s  re-exported t o  the  t e r r i t o r y  of another  member of such union o r  
a r ea ,  t h e  l a t t e r  member should c o l l e c t  a  duty equal t o  t h e  d i f f e r -  
ence between the  duty a l ready  pa id  and any higher duty t h a t  would 
be payable ' i f  the product were being imported d i r e c t l y  i n t o  i t s  
t e r r i t o r y .  
Article XXIV was drafted, its main objective was to close all possible 
loopholes by which it would degenerate into a justification for less than 
I00 percent preferential arrangements (Bhagwati, 1990). 
In practice, the discipline of Article XXIV has fallen into disuse since 
the notification of the formation of the EC, which was not contested in 
Large part due to US interest in fostering a stronger and more united 
Western Europe. With most GATT members involved in some form of preferen- 
tial trading arrangement, members have tended to ref rain from forcefully 
criticizing regional trading arrangements. 
Actually, of the 70 regional trading arrangements (including amendments 
to existing arrangements) notified during 1948-1990 and examined by the 
GATT working parties, only four were deemed by consensus to be compatible 
with Article XXIV. These four cases were: 
I. the South Af rica-Rhodesia Customs Union (1948) ; 
2. the Nicaragua-El Salvador Free-Trade Agreement (1951); 
3. Nicaragua's participation in the Central American Common Market 
(1958); and 
4. the Caribbean Common Market (1973). 
Eowever, none of the 70 agreements, such as the EC or the EFTA, notified 
to the GATT, has been formally declared incompatible with Article XXIV 
Qde la Torre and Kelly, 1992). 
magwati (1990) demonstrates the weakened position of Article XXIV with 
two examples. First, the elimination of 'duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce' with respect to 'substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories' was ambiguous. Issues as whether 
across the board cuts on all trade were required or whether substantial 
sectors could be left out altogether from the scope of the cuts were 
areas of discussions. With both interpretations possible, less than 100 
p.ercent preferential arrangements could not be effectively ruled out. The 
second ambiguity was the problem of the speed with which the 100 percent 
pneferences should be implemented. Article XXIV states that a customs 
union or free-trade area should be fully consummated within a reasonable 
length of time, which left room for laxity in conception and execution of 
tRe CUs and FTAs under Article XXIV (Bhagwati, 1990). 
The implementation of the provisions of Article XXIV was further weakened 
by the 1979 Enabling Clause. Under this clause, arrangements that were 
exclusively among developing countries could bypass Article XXIV alto- 
gether, unless the arrangements contemplate the selective removal of non- 
tariff barriers, in which case approval by other GATT members is 
required. The Enabling Clause is thus substantially less demanding than 
Article XXIV in terms of notification and consultation, 'substantially 
all trade* requirements, and the timeframe for implementation of intra- 
regional trade liberalization (de la Torre and Kelly, 1992). 
2.3 Regionalism and the Multilateral Trade System 
The impression is that regional economic integration is fragmenting the 
world economy into three internally coherent trading blocs: in the 
Americas, in Europe and around the Pacific. Empirical evidence however 
indicates that an increasing focus on internal trade is only a clear 
tendency in the EU, not so much in the NAFTA countries and certainly not 
in the Pacific area (Schott, 1991). 
The threat to the multilateral trade system from regionalism would only 
arise if economic liberalization within the region would be complemented 
with increasing protectionism against the other trading blocs. 
Of course the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1993 will not 
keep in check completely the tendencies towards bilateralism and 
regionalism, but certainly these tendencies would have had more leeway, 
had the Uruguay Round failed. In this respect the clarification, stream- 
lining and strengthening of GATT rules and dispute settlements is of 
great importance. In addition, the agreement on the establishment of the 
new World Trade Organization (WTO) represents a commitment of all 
contracting parties to the multilateral setting of rules of conduct in 
international trade and investment. 
2.4 Bloc Formation in Four Free-Trade Areas: 1961-1989 
Lloyd (1992) investigated in particular whether a tendency towards bloc 
formation could be found among four important regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) in the world economy: 
1. EC (the European Community) '; 
2. NAFTA ( including Canada and the USA) ; 
3. EFTA ; 
4. CER (including Australia and New Zealand) 9 .  
The EC includes the original EC-6, the later EC-12 and the EC-ASAT, 
reflecting the group of countries 'as at' the time of investigation. The 
EFTA includes the EFTA-6 and the EFTA-ASAT, reflecting the group of 
countries 'as at' the time of investigation lo. 
The measure of regional concentration of trade used (Lloyd, 1992) is the 
share of intra-group imports in total imports of the group in the 
commodities concerned. The intra-group share is the measure commonly used 
as an indicator of regionalization. 
The intra-group shares of RTA group trade are reported in Figure 2.1. 
Consider first the EC, EFTA and CER as these three groups have experi- 
enced substantial intra-group trade liberalization over the whole period 
in the case of the EC and EFTA and since 1965 in the case of CER. The EC 
and EFTA have had changing membership over the period. For the EC, the 
most useful definition of the group here is original membership - refer- 
red to as EC-6 - as they have been in the group for the whole period. For 
EFTA, the most useful definition is the original eight (including 
7 The period of investigation includes the years up to 1989; for this 
reason the acronym EC is retained. 
8 The North American Free-Trade Agreement between Canada and the USA 
was formally concluded in 1987 and took effect on January 1, 1989. 
Earlier free-trade arrangements between these two countries 
existed. For ease of reference the various schemes of economic 
cooperation between Canada and the USA are referred to as NAFTA. 
9 CER stands for Closer Economic Relations (between Australia and New 
Zealand). 
10 EFTA-6 includes Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
Finland) plus Iceland less the United Kingdom, Denmark and Portugal which 
have joined the EC. This group will be called the EFTA-6. 
For all merchandise commodities Figure 2.1 shows an upward trend in the 
intra-group share for the EC-6 in the 1960s and early 1970s following the 
Treaty of Rome, and in the CER. In EFTA-6 the trend is upward until the 
early 1970s and then downwards. 
Figure 2 . 1  Intra-area imports as share of t o t a l  group imports (EC, EFTA, 
CER) 
All commodities 
CER (Australia - New Zealand) 
Source: Lloyd (1992) 
The peaking of EC-6 and EFTA-6 intra-group import shares around the time 
the United Kingdom and Denmark moved from EFTA to the EC could be the 
result of the original formation of the EC and EFTA with the effect of 
the new members reducing the intra-EC-6 group. Alternatively, the decline 
in shares after the early 1970s could be the result of global freeing of 
trade andlor the declining competitiveness in some industries. To cancel 
the effects of the shift of members between EFTA and EC, the shares were 
also considered for the group of EC-12 throughout the period. This shows 
an upward trend for all commodities in the intra-EC-12 import shares but 
5t is stronger in the period up to 1973, suggesting that both the change 
h membership of the EC and EFTA and the decline in competitiveness 
contributed to the later fall in these shares. 
Lloyd (1992) concludes that there is only weak evidence that the intra- 
group shares of total group imports for the four RTAs considered have 
increased over the last 30 years, and that the increase applies in 
particular to the years immediately following the agreements. 
An important factor that may explain the contradiction between the 
expected increase in intra-group import shares and the observed trends 
for the OECD RTAs is the countervailing influence of multilateral and 
unilateral reductions in trade barriers. This non-regional liberalization 
may be greater than commonly believed (Lloyd, 1992). 
Lloyd (1992) continues his analysis by considering the question of a 
tripolar view of the world, with the USA, Japan and the EC representing 
tRe three poles. 
The hypothesis that the world is becoming more polarized in terms of 
trade flows is tested in the same manner as the RTA version of the 
regionalization view of the world was examined. 
The intra-area import shares as a measure of the concentration of trade 
within these areas are reported in Figure 2.2. For OECD Europe, this 
masure has tended to increase throughout the period, from 56.4 percent 
in 1964 to a peak of 69 percent in 1987. For North America, this share is 
m c h  lower and has fallen from a peak of 40.5 percent in 1969 to only 
27.5 percent in 1988. For Asia, the intra-region share roughly doubled 
between 1964 and 1988 from 20 to 41 percent. However, this is primarily 
due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t he  t o t a l  ( import)  t r ade  of coun t r i e s  i n  t h e  region 
has grown f a s t e r  than t r a d e  i n  o t h e r  coun t r i e s  and no t  t o  r eg iona l ly  
d iscr imina tory  t r ade  p o l i c i e s  a s  t he re  has been much l e s s  t r a d e  d i sc r imi -  
n a t i o n  i n  the  Asian reg ion  than  i n  Europe and North America. I f  t he re  
were no changes i n  t r a d e  p o l i c i e s  and competi t iveness ,  f a s t e r  growth 
wi th in  a  region would i t s e l f  i nc rease  t h e  share  of i n t r a - a rea  t r a d e ,  even 
i f  t h e  shares  of export  markets were cons tan t .  
Figure 2.2 Intra-area imports as share of total imports (OECD Europe, 
North America, Asia) 
Nonh America 
Source: Lloyd (1992).  
Thus, one may conclude from t h e  evidence i n  Figure 2 . 2  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  
tendency f o r  world t r ade  t o  become more reg ional ized  i n  terms of broadly 
de f ined  regions a s  Western Europe and Asia have tended t o  t r ade  increas-  
i ng ly  wi th in  t h e i r  own a r e a .  However, t he  changes i n  t he  Asian region a t  
l e a s t  a r e  not  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  d iscr imina tory  t r a d e  p o l i c i e s .  
One feature of the more broadly defined regions is the change in the 
definitions of the broad groups themselves. Since 1960 several major 
groupings have collapsed and disappeared. These include the Sterling Area 
countries, the system of British Imperial (later British Commonwealth) 
Preferences and most recently the CMEA. These collapses were associated 
with the decline of the polar power in the grouping, namely, the United 
Kingdom and the USSR, respectively. Similar, some RTA groupings in Africa 
and the Caribbean have collapsed or merged with others. This long-term 
instability in groupings reinforces the conclusion that there is no clear 
polarization of the world economy. 
Lloyd (1992) concludes that the numbers of both RTAs and the countries 
which are members of them have been growing steadily. The extent of the 
intra-area liberalization of trade barriers has also increased for both 
tariffs and non-tariff measures alike. Some RTAs are now addressing non- 
border measures which distort intra-area production and trade and 
harmonizing other policies which affect trade. The second generation of 
RTAs among the OECD members (EC, CER and Canada-United States FTA) are 
evolving towards the achievement of single markets with completely free 
access and a greater degree of coordination of policies within the 
arrangements (Lloyd, 1992). 
The question of regionalization is sometimes put in terms of the growing 
importance of more broadly defined regions. Currently this view is in 
terms of the groups around three poles, the United States, Japan and the 
EC. There has been a tendency for world trade to become more regionalized 
in the OECD Europe and Asian regions but in the case of Asia this cannot 
be attributable to discriminatory trade policies. 
There is a current spate of new arrangements and a number of prospective 
candidates for future RTAs are being considered. There may, therefore, be 
a greater danger of regionalization in the future. The United States in 
particular has abandoned its historical opposition to new discriminatory 
arrangements. Many of these current proposals are defensive, showing a 
concern over the dangers of trade conflicts and seeking economic security 
from largeness. The attractiveness of regional arrangements will depend 
significantly upon the outcome of the Uruguay Round and the future of the 
GATT-based system (Lloyd, 1992). 
2 . 5  The Possibility of a Trading Bloc in East Asia 
Recently several studies have been made investigating whether a trading 
bloc is emerging in East Asia. 
Schott (1991) defines a trading bloc as an association of countries that 
reduces intra-regional barriers to trade in commodities. Regarding 
developments in East Asia, Schott (1991) observes that during the 1980s 
the region's total trade more than doubled; much of the growth was 
generated by sales to the North American market. Because of the strong 
growth in exports to third countries, East Asia has been the only region 
in which the relative share of intra-regional trade to total exports 
remained basically the same in the 1980s. fluctuating from 34 percent in 
1980 to 28 percent in 1986 and back to 35 percent in 1989. Its focus has 
been primarily outward-oriented, particularly to the US market on which 
most of the countries in the region are highly dependent. 
The concept of a potential East Asian trading bloc has been advanced in 
two somewhat related forms. Some see such a bloc emerging because the 
countries of the region seem to be coalescing around the region's 
dominant economy, Japan. Others regard the growing interest in Pacific 
Basin initiatives as the catalyst for a new trading bloc, with the United 
States and Japan at the core (so that the United States blocks Japanese 
economic dominance in the region). Prospects for each are discussed 
below. 
Japanese trade and investment in East Asia has grown dramatically over 
the past decade, but so has Japanese trade and investment in North 
America and Europe. Japanese trade with North America has been larger, 
and grown faster, than trade with East Asian countries (excluding the 
People's Republic of China) during the 1980s. Japanese trade with East 
Asian countries rose from 25 to 29 percent of total Japanese trade during 
the 1980s; however, trade with North America rose from 24 to 32 percent 
(after peaking at, 34.8 percent in 1987). In addition, the EC share of 
total Japanese trade almost doubled to 17 percent during the same period 
cschott, 1991). 
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in East Asia has shown similar 
growth in recent years, albeit from a relatively low base. Outward 
investment to that region quadrupled from 2 billion to 8.2 billion US 
dollars during the period 1985 through 1988, matching the growth rate of 
overall Japanese FDI in North America. However, more money was invested 
in Europe during this period, a cumulative total of 21.1 billion US 
dollars in Europe versus 19.8 billion US dollars in East Asia (including 
the People ' s Republic of China). 
Uhlike the trade flows, FDI in East Asia accounts for only a small share 
of cumulative Japanese FDI. A s  of 31 March 1989, the East 'Asian region 
(including the People's Republic of China) accounted for only 22.3 
percent of cumulative Japanese FDI, compared to 40.3 percent for North 
America and 16.2 percent for Europe. 
The trade and investment data point to a growing internationalization of 
the Japanese economy, but not with the East Asian region alone or with 
East Asia more than other regions. The United States remains the primary 
focus for Japanese trade and investment, and Europe - especially since 
the advent of the 1992 process - has become an increasingly important 
market. Japanese trade with the EC almost tripled from 1985 to 1989 
(albeit from a lower base than trade with East Asia and North America), 
and more than half of Japan's cumulative 30 billion US dollars in FDI in 
Europe took place in 1987-88 (Schott, 1991). 
Could the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative lead over 
the medium term to the evolution of a regional trading bloc? A combina- 
tion of economic and political factors argues to the contrary (Schott, 
1991). 
First, the countries in the Pacific Basin (as defined by the APEC 
membership) are widely dispersed geographically and have diverse levels 
od economic development. Distances between markets in the region are 
quite large, even if one excludes the North American countries. Per 
capita incomes range from poor (Indonesia and the Philippines) to modern 
(Korea) to comfortable (Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and New Zealand) 
to wealthy (United States, Canada and Japan). Integrating such a diverse 
and expansive region would pose enormous physical and adjustment prob- 
lems. 
Second, trade policies and regulatory regimes differ markedly from 
country to country, and there seems to be little political commitment to 
an evolving regional organization. For example, the ASEAN countries have 
long been wary of economic arrangements in the region to the extent that, 
after twenty years, they have not yet even established a free-trade area 
among themselves. It is unlikely that the ASEAN would be interested in 
the development of a regional trading bloc, as long as multilateralism 
remains a viable alternative. 
Finally, the dependence of East Asian countries on the US market argues 
against the evolution of an East Asian bloc, for two reasons. 
First, it is more important for the East Asian countries to maintain 
access to the US market - arrangements with the United States thus take 
precedence over regional trading initiatives (as evidenced by the strong 
interest of these countries in potential FTAs with the United States 
along the lines of the Canada-US FTA). 
Second, and related to the first, these countries have a vested interest 
in the strengthening of GATT disciplines, which they believe provide the 
best safeguards against further encroachments on their access to the US 
and European markets. 
Anderson (1991) corroborates this view. There is no doubt that, if given 
the opportunity, East Asia would continue to grow rapidly, providing both 
increasing export markets for the rest of the world as well as increasing 
import competition, particularly for traditional manufacturing indus- 
tries. But it needs to be recognised that the extraordinary economic 
performance of first Japan's, then Asia's newly industrializing economies 
(NIEs) has been dependent on access to Western European and North 
American markets for manufactures. 
Anderson (1991) considers also the implications of recent and prospective 
developments of economic cooperation in the region. Might the Asian- 
Pacific region, with or without North America, be inclined to form an FTA 
if the global multilateral trading system becomes less open? It seems 
unlikely, for the following reasons: first, the smaller Western Pacific 
countries would be unwilling to form a trade bloc with Japan for fear of 
Japanese domination in the absence of a North American counterweight. 
Second, even if North America were to be invited to join an Asian-Pacific 
FTA (partly as a counterweight to Japan, partly because of the importance 
of America to Western Pacific trade), it would be unlikely to do so. 
After all, political pressures have been such that most of the United 
States' manufacturing trade policies of the past decade or two have been 
aimed -at reducing imports from East Asia, and a further fortressing of 
Europe against East Asian exports would, if anything, intensify that 
opposition to increasing import competition from Asia. Similarly, 
Northeast Asia would find it politically intolerable to remove their high 
barriers to agricultural imports from North America or even just from 
Australasia. In short, the high degree of complementarity between 
resource-rich and resource-poor Asian-Pacific economies works against the 
political feasibility of an FTA in that region, By contrast, the relative 
similarity of the economies of Western Europe allowed an FTA to be formed 
relatively easily, because the gains have been able to come mainly from 
intra-industry trade specialization which has not involved the wholesale 
shrinkage of large sub-sectors of each economy, as would follow the 
formation of an Asian-Pacific or Western Pacific FTA. Instead, the 
interests of Western Pacific countries will continue to be served best by 
a strong open, global trading system. 
Recently, Panagariya (1994) observed that with the creation of trading 
blocs in North America and Europe, policy advisers are beginning to ask 
whether it would be time for East Asia to form such a bloc as well. 
Panagariya (1994) considers first the two economic arguments favouring 
the implementation of a discriminatory trading bloc in East Asia. 
First, an East Asian bloc may serve as a deterrent to the formation of 
closed trading blocs around the world. According to this argument, the 
world is already dividing into blocs. To ensure that they do not become 
overly protective of and limit access to their own markets, East Asia 
should be united and in a position to retaliate. Unilateral actions such 
as those taken by the United States under its Super 301 provisions, for 
instance, would be harder to implement with a united East Asia. 
Second, the formation of regional blocs could facilitate future rounds of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Uruguay Round was 
protracted in part because of the large number of participants and the 
free rider problem such a number generates. One reason for the success of 
past GATT rounds was that the United States could deal with the EC as a 
single unit. This fact has led many to conclude that a small number of 
blocs could make future GATT negotiations more manageable. 
However, Panagariya (1994) observes that a range of potential factors 
render the implementation of a discriminatory trading bloc in East Asia 
very unlikely. 
First, the major players in the region have historically been political 
rivals. 
Second, the East Asian countries have very different levels of protection 
and are at very different stages of development, suggesting that the 
distribution of gains from an FTA would be uneven. 
Third, East Asia comprises a large number of countries, making negoti- 
ations for an FTA a daunting task. It has been difficult for the ASEAN 
countries to make progress with just six members. 
Panagariya (1994) therefore concludes that a discriminatory bloc is not a 
very feasible proposition in light of the above arguments, but there is 
another regional approach - centred around GATT style, non-discriminatory 
liberalization - that could be considered. 
Several arguments can be offered in favour of this approach. First, 
because trade liberalization would be non-discriminatory, there would be 
no trade diversion. One important objection to a discriminatory bloc 
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vould be removed: countries with high initial tariffs would not feel 
threatened by liberalization, since the consumers inside these countries 
would be the winners. 
Second, this type of regionalism would not face a serious challenge from 
the United States, for non-discriminatory liberalization would also 
improve US access to East Asian markets. 
Third, because liberalization would take place simultaneously in all the 
major countries of the region, short-run adjustment costs would be 
minimized. 
These long-term gains make non-discriminatory liberalization an attract- 
ive option. Unfortunately, the short- to medium-term economic effects of 
this approach are unfavourable, for several reasons. 
First, because existing tariff levels, at least in Japan, are relatively 
low, potential gains from lowering this most transparent trade barrier 
are limited. Japan also gives extensive trade preferences to its East 
Asian trading partners under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 
If Japan were to lower its tariffs in a non-discriminatory fashion, these 
developing countries would lose the tariff preferences they currently 
en j oy . 
Second, because tariff levels across the other countries are highly 
variable, the scope for negotiating reduced barriers is limited. 
Third, in any East Asian negotiations, Japan must assume the leadership 
role the United States played during the GATT negotiations. But with so 
few formal trade barriers, Japan may have difficulty. 
In conclusion, Panagariya (1994) observes that given the importance of 
open markets to the region's economic growth, the case for an East Asian 
bloc should be evaluated primarily in terms of the impact such a bloc 
would have on the world trading system. The region's future interests 
will be best served by a strategy that promotes an open world trading 
system. A discriminatory bloc does not fit that bill. 
2.6 Regionalization: Concepts 
Regionalization, as a concept, may relate to various developments in 
world trade: 
1. Bloc formation 
Bloc formation relates to the relative concentration of international 
trade among countries that are members of a formal free-trade agreement 
or another formal agreement on economic integration. 
2. Regionalization 
Regionalization relates to relative concentration of international trade 
among countries that are part of a country group with an informal 
cohesion, for instance in terms of geographical proximity. 
3. Polarization 
Polarization can be regarded as a special case of regionalization, namely 
the case of a relative concentration of international trade among 
countries at different levels of development. More concretely, polariz- 
ation refers to the relative concentration of trade from a group of 
developing countries on a group of industrialized nations with geographi- 
cal proximity. 
It is useful to distinguish between bloc formation, regionalization and 
polarization, because each may have different implications with respect 
to the functioning of the multilateral world trade system. 
In the definitions given above, the aspect of measurement is described in 
terms of relative concentration of international trade. Apart from the 
aspect of development over time, various methods can be applied to 
establish the relative concentration of international trade at any 
particular point in time ll. 
l1 An overview of these methods is not presented in this report. 
2.7 The Network of World Trade 
Before investigating the empirical evidence on the various aspects of 
regionalization in world trade, this section presents a general overview 
of geographical developments in world trade from 1960 till recently. 
TO that end the network of world trade has been investigated, represent- 
ing total exports and imports between 8 countries and country groups in 
the world economy 12: 
1. WE : Western Europe, 
2. JPN : Japan, 
3. N A : North America, 
4. CEE : Central and Eastern Europe, 
5. AFR : Africa, 
6. ASIA : Asia and Oceania (except Japan), 
7. LA : Latin America, 
8. ROW : Rest of World. 
The eight regions and countries are represented as areas of origin and of 
destination of international trade in the Tables 2.1-2.5, displaying the 
network of world trade in the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1992. 
In this period world trade in current prices rose from 128 billion 
dollars in 1960 to 3668 billion dollars in 1992, a nearly 30-fold 
increase. For ease of comparison however, the networks in the Tables 2.1- 
2.5 are in percentages. The share of Western Europe in world trade was 
already high in 1960 with 40 percent of world exports and 42 percent of 
world imports; by 1992 these percentages had risen to 46 and 45, respect- 
ively. 
In 1960 Japan had a share of 3 percent in world trade, both in exports 
and in imports. By 1992 this percentage had doubled for imports and 
increased threefold for exports. 
In the period 1960-1992 North America had a fairly constant share in 
world exports and imports around 17 percent. 
l2 Annex 2.1 provides the details regarding country composition. 
3 9 
The Cent ra l  and Eastern European coun t r i e s '  share  i n  world t r a d e  dec l ined  
cons iderably  - i f  no t  dramat ica l ly  - from 10 percent  i n  1960 t o  3 percent  
i n  1992. 
A s i m i l a r  dec l ine  i s  r e g i s t e r e d  f o r  Afr ica,  whose share of 4 percent  i n  
world t r a d e  was halved by 1992. 
Asia ( inc luding  Oceania, b u t  excluding Japan) saw i t s  share i n  world 
t r a d e  r i s i n g  considerably,  from 10 t o  17 percent  i n  t he  period 1960-1992. 
L a t i n  America a l s o  experienced a  cons iderable  dec l ine  i n  world t r a d e ,  
w i th  an 8 percent  share  i n  world expor ts  and imports i n  1960 being halved 
by 1992. 
I n  summary, i n  the  30 years  s ince  1960 t he  most s i g n i f i c a n t  changes i n  
t h e  shares  i n  world t r a d e  were r e g i s t e r e d  f o r  Japan, with a  share  t h a t  
more than  doubled, and f o r  the Cent ra l  and Eas te rn  European c o u n t r i e s ,  
Af r i ca  and Lat in  America, of which the shares  were halved a t  l e a s t .  
Table 2 .1  Network of world t r a d e ,  1960 (percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n )  
Region 




Cen t r a l IEas t  Eur 
Af r i ca  
AsiaIOceania 
L a t i n  America 
Rest of World 
World 
Source: own c a l c u l a t i o n s  from UN t r ade  da t a  base 
Note: . i nd i ca t e s  t r a d e  flow i s  ' l e s s  than  0.5 percent  of world expor ts  
Region of d e s t i n a t i o n  
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
2 3 4 2 3 3 3 2 
- 1 1 
7 1 5 2 3 1 
2 6 1 
3 
3 1 1 1 3 
3 3 1 
2 
42 3 16 10 5 11 8 4 
The shares  of var ious  country groups i n  world t r a d e  were descr ibed above 
us ing  t h e  row and column t o t a l s  i n  the Tables 2.1-2.5. The inne r  p a r t  of 
t h e s e  t a b l e s  descr ibes  the  network of t r ade  flows between the  country 
groups; only t rade  flows a r e  included t h a t  a r e  above 0.5 percent  of t o t a l  











Total  world expor ts :  128 b i l l i o n  US d o l l a r s  
4 0 
From the viewpoint of stability in the world economy the degree of trade 
inter-dependence between the various country groups would be an important 
element to consider. Since the tables include one country (Japan) and 7 
country groups, there are 63 possible trade flows of which 7 represent 
intra-country group trade. Of these 63 possible trade flows, only 28 are 
above 0.5 percent of world trade in 1960, this number having increased 
only slightly to 31 in 1992. Only in 1980 this number was considerably 
higher, namely 36. This was mainly due to the high oil price, reflected 
in the oil exports from the rest of the world (ROW), that includes the 
oil producing countries in the Middle East, and the correspondingly high 
value of the imports into these countries. This led to 11 trade relations 
a4 the rest of the world above 0.5 percent of world trade, compared to 5 
fn 1970 and 7 in 1992. 
-- - 
11 Table 2.2 Network of world trade, 1970 (percentage distribution) 
World 
Total world exports: 312 billion US dollars 
Source: own calculations from UN trade data base 
Note: . indicates trade flow is less than 0.5 percent of world exports 
The observation that the number of considerable trade flows only rose 
from 28 to 31 out of the possible 63 from 1960 to 1992 leads to the 
conclusion that during this period the network of trade relations in the 
world economy did not arrive at a substantially higher degree of cohe- 
sion. There are however, considerable differences in this respect between 
the various country groups and important changes over time. 
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Throughout t h e  per iod  Western Europe had the  h ighes t  number of important 
t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  i n  the network; excluding intra-Western European t r a d e  
t h i s  number was 12 i n  1960 and 14 i n  1992. Second i n  t h i s  r e spec t  i s  
North America with 9 such r e l a t i o n s  (again excluding intra-North American 
t r a d e ) .  A t h i r d  pos i t i on  i n  t h e  network i s  taken by Asia and Oceania with 
8 important  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  almost throughout t he  per iod .  The f o u r t h  
p o s i t i o n  i s  taken by Japan with 7 important t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  i n  1992, up 
from 4 such r e l a t i o n s  i n  1960. The f i f t h  p o s i t i o n  i s  taken by the  r e s t  of 
t h e  world (ROW, including the  o i l  producing coun t r i e s  i n  t he  Middle 
E a s t ) ,  where s ince  1970 t he  number of important t r ade  r e l a t i o n s  doubled 
t o  reach 6 i n  1992 (again excluding intra-group t r a d e ) .  
Table 2 .3  Network of world t r a d e ,  1980 (percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n )  
Region 




Cen t r a l IEas t  Eur 
Af r i c a  
AsiaIOceania . 
L a t i n  America 
Rest of World 
World 
Region of d e s t i n a t i o n  
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
2 7 2 2 2 2 1 3  
1 - 2 2 1 
4 1 4 2 2 1 
2 4 1 
2 1 
2 2 2 3 1 
1 2 1 .  
5 2 1 2 1 1  
World 
Tota l  world expor ts :  2001 b i l l i o n  US d o l l a r s  
11 Source: own ca l cu la t ions  from UN t r ade  da t a  base 
1 Note: . i n d i c a t e s  t rade  flow i s  l e s s  than  0.5 percent  of world expor ts  
Lat in  America had 4 t o  5 important t rade  r e l a t i o n s  throughout t he  per iod  
(excluding in t ra -group t r a d e ) .  The number of important t r ade  r e l a t i o n s  of 
t h e  Central  and Eastern European coun t r i e s  decl ined s u b s t a n t i a l l y  from 4 
i n  1960 (excluding intra-group t r a d e )  t o  2 i n  1992. Africa throughout t he  
per iod  only had 2 important t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s ,  represent ing  exports  and 
imports both wi th  Western Europe. 
Looking a t  t h e  magnitude of i nd iv idua l  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  Tables 2.1- 
2.5 intra-Western European t r a d e  i s  by f a r  the  most important ,  increas ing  
moreover from 23 percent of world trade in 1960 to 33 percent in 
1992 13.  Among the three regions Western Europe, Japan and North 
- 










Rest of World 
Region of destination 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW World 
Total world exports: 3392 billion US dollars 
Source: own calculations from UN trade data base 
Note: . indicates trade flow is less than 0.5 percent of world exports 
America, the trade relations account for 51 percent of world trade in 
1992, up from 41 percent in 1960. Trade relations between Western Europe 
and North America declined in importance from 11 to 6 percent of world 
trade, but these still dominate the trade relations between Japan and 
North America representing 4 percent of world trade, and those between 
Japan and Western Europe accounting for 3 percent of world trade. 
Outside these three areas, the main trade relations are held by 
AsiaIOceania with 7 percent of world trade within that group in 1992. In 
1960 intra-group trade of the Central and Eastern European countries 
represented still 6 percent of world trade, but has vanished by 1992. 
l3 Considering Western Europe as one country would represent a still 
hypothetical case resembling the factual situation of the USA. This 
would of course reduce the figure for intra-Western European trade 
to zero, increasing the others with a certain factor, which for 
1992 would equal 1.5 (i.e. 1001 (100-33) ) . Such an approach has not 
been followed here, since the countries in Western Europe are still 
independent states. 
- - 









Rest of World 
Region of destination 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LAROW World 
Total world exports: 3668 billion US dollars 
Source: own calculations from UN trade data base 
Note: . indicates trade flow is less than 0.5 percent of world exports 
2.8 Polarization in World Trade 
In section 2.7 it was already observed that the trade relations of Africa 
are exclusively concentrated on Western Europe. To explore this phenom- 
enon further the Figures 2.3.1 to 2.9.2 display the percentage distribu- 
tion of total trade of 7 of the country groups analyzed in the preceding 
section among each other 14: 
1. WE .: Western Europe Figures 2.3.1 - 2.3.2 
2. JPN : Japan Figures 2.8.1 - 2.8.2 
3. N A : North America Figures 2.6.1 - 2.6.2 
4. CEE : Central and Eastern Europe Figures 2.5.1 - 2.5.2 
5. AFR : Africa Figures 2.4.1 - 2.4.2 
6. ASIA : AsiaIOceania Figures 2.9.1 - 2.9.2 
7. LA : Latin America Figures 2.7.1 - 2.7.2 
14 Polarization of trade of the Rest of the World (ROW) is not 
included int this section. The listing of countries according to 
country groups is given in Annex 2.1. 
For each of the country groups, two figures display the percentage 
distribution of total trade for the years 1960 and 1992 15. 
The pattern of trade relations of Western Europe is fairly stable over 
the period 1960-1992. The intra-group trade remained of prime importance, 
hcreasing its share from 55 percent of total Western European trade in 
1960 to 71 percent in 1992. The trade relations with the other country 
groups are all of significance and show a fairly even spread. The 
importance of the trade relations with North America and with Latin 
America declined over time, it increased for Japan. 
mere is a striking resemblance between the pattern of trade relations of 
A f r i c a  and that of Western Europe. In the case of Africa, this means that 
Africa's trade relations are highly concentrated on Western Europe; the 
apposite is not true: for Western Europe the trade relation with Africa 
fs of only minor importance, representing only 7 percent of total Western 
European trade in 1960 and even less (3 percent) in 1992. In that year 
Africa's trade with Western Europe comprised 56 percent of Africa's total 
trade. This figure had been higher in 1960 however, being 67 percent, 
gradually decreasing thereafter. Trade relations of Africa with North 
America and with AsiaIOceania increased somewhat in importance over the 
years. 
The figures for Central  and Eastern Europe show the collapse of intra- 
group trade of these countries, comprising 62 percent of their total 
trade in 1960 and only 18 percent in 1992. This decline has been compen- 
sated by a considerably increased concentration on Western Europe, having 
a share of 54 percent of total Central and Eastern European trade in 1992 
up from 17 percent in 1960. 
l5 In section 2.8 only figures for the years 1960 and 1992 are presen- 
ted. In Annex 2.2 the numerical values of the polarization of 
international trade are given for each of the 5 years under consi- 
deration: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1992. 
Figure 2.3.1 Polarization of international trade - Western Europe, 
1960 
(percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t o t a l  t r a d e )  
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
Figure 2.3.2 Polarization of international trade - Western Europe, 
1992 
(percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t o t a l  t r a d e )  
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
Source : own c a l c u l a t i o n s  from UN t r ade  da t a  base 
Note : t o t a l  t r a d e  i s  represented  by the sum of expor ts  and imports .  
Figure 2.4.1 Polarization of international trade - Africa, 1960 




WE JPN NA CEE ASIA LA ROW 
Polarization of international trade - Africa, 1992 
(percentage distribution of total trade) 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
own calculations from UN trade data base 
total trade is represented by the sum of exports and imports. 
Figure 2.5.1 Polarization of international trade - CentralIEastern 
Europe, 1960 
(percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t o t a l  t r a d e )  
WE J P N  NA CEE AFR A S I A  LA ROW 
Figure 2.5.2 Polarization of international trade - CentralIEastern 
Europe, 1992 
(percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t o t a l  t r a d e )  
WE J P N  NA CEE AFR A S I A  LA ROW 
Source : own c a l c u l a t i o n s  from UN t r ade  da t a  base 
Note : t o t a l  t r a d e  i s  represented by the  sum of expor ts  and imports.  
Trade relations of North America are far less concentrated on the own 
region than in Western Europe. The own group share in total trade was 
only 30 percent in 1960 and rose only to 32 percent in 1992. Trade 
relations with Western Europe declined in importance from 30 percent of 
North American trade in 1960 to 20 percent in 1992. Trade relations of 
North America with Japan and AsiaIOceania increased in importance, 
doubling their shares in North American total trade since 1960. 
Trade relations of Latin America show a substantial concentration on 
North America, representing 42 percent of total Latin American trade in 
1960, dropping only slightly to 40 percent in 1992, far higher percen- 
tages than those indicating the importance of the reverse relationship, 
namely the share of Latin America in North American trade. Another 
interesting phenomenon of Latin American trade relations is the declining 
importance of Western Europe, having a 33 percent share in total Latin 
American trade in 1960 declining to 23 percent in 1992. Trade relations 
a& Latin America with Japan and AsiaIOceania increased in importance 
dbring the years 1960-1992. 
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Figure 2.6.1 Polarization of international trade - North America, 
1960 
(percentage distribution of total trade) 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
Figure 2.6.2 Polarization of international trade - North America, 
1992 
(percentage distribution of total trade) 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
Source : own calculations from UN trade data base 




Polarization of international trade - Latin America, 
1960 
(percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t o t a l  t r a d e )  
WE JPN NA CEE AFR A S I A  LA ROW 
Polarization of international trade - Latin America, 
1992 
(percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t o t a l  t r ade )  
WE JPN NA CEE AFR A S I A  LA ROW 
Source : own c a l c u l a t i o n s  from UN t r a d e  d a t a  base 
Note : t o t a l  t r ade  i s  represented by the  sum of expor ts  and imports.  
Throughout the period 1960-1992 trade relations of Japan were concen- 
trated on North America and on AsiaIOceania. The share of North America 
in Japan's trade declined from 36 percent in 1960 to 28 percent in 1992; 
the share of AsiaIOceania increased from 33 to 38 percent in the same 
period. Western Europe has a less important share in Japan's trade, but 
it rose considerably from 11 to 19 percent in the period 1960-1992. 
Characteristically, in 1960 trade relations of Asia and Oceania were 
concentrated on Western Europe, with a share of 30 percent of 
Asia/Oceaniats total trade. This share has gradually decreased; by 1992 
trade relations of AsiaIOceania were evenly spread, with Western Europe, 
North America and Japan accounting for 16, 17 and 18 percent of 
Asia/Oceaniats trade respectively. The intra-group trade of AsiaIOceania 
rose considerably from a share of already 24 percent of total trade in 
1960 to 41 percent in 1992. 
In conclusion then, trade relations of Africa turn out to be highly 
concentrated on Western Europe, although seen from the perspective of 
Western Europe trade relations with Africa are only of minor and even 
diminishing importance. The similar is true for trade relations between 
Latin America and North America. A different pattern of trade relations 
applies to AsiaIOceania; trade shares are evenly spread over Western 
Europe, North America and Japan, while intra-group trade has the most 
important roie in AsiaIOceania. 
Figure 2.8.1 
Figure 2.8.2 
Polarization of international trade - Japan, 1960 
(percentage distribution of total trade) 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
Polarization of international trade - Japan, 1992 
(percentage distribution of total trade) 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA  LA ROW 
Source : own calculations from UN trade data base 
Note : total trade is represented by the sum of exports and imports. 
Figure 2.9.1 Polarization of international trade - AsiaIOceania, 
1960 
(percentage distribution of total trade) 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
Figure 2.9.2 Polarization of international trade - AsiaIOceania, 
1992 
(percentage distribution of total trade) 
WE JF'N NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
Source : own calculations from UN trade data base 
Note : total trade is represented by the sum of exports and imports. 
2.9 Regionalization in World Trade 
Regionalization in world trade is the subject of this section. It has 
been defined previously (in section 2.6) as the concentration of interna- 
tional trade among countries that are part of a country group with an 
informal cohesion. 
To investigate possible tendencies towards regionalization a variety of 
methods can be applied. The approach taken in this study has been 
developed by Sautter (1974). 
In Sautter's approach, for each of the country groups i considered the 
share of their total exports (Xi,) in total world exports X )  is 
calculated ( y .  Next, again for all country groups, now labelled j, 
their share in world imports is calculated y . Regarding exports 
from country group i to country group j a hypothetical value of this 
trade flow is calculated as: 
That is, the hypothetical value of exports from country group i to 
country group j would correspond to the respective shares that these 
country groups hold in world exports and world imports. More precisely, 
the values of Xij would represent a situation in which the distribution 
of exports over importing country group j would be identical irrespective 
of where these exports would originate: from any country group i or from 
the world at large; and, the distribution of imports over country groups 
of origin would be identical regardless of the destination of the 
imports, be it any country group j or the world at large. 
l6 In Sautter (1974) trade figures used include reported exports only, 
implying equality of world exports and world imports. 
It is easy to show that the thus derived hypothetical trade flows add up 
to total world trade observed ", that is: 
- 
Comparing the hypothetical value Xij in (2.1) with the exports from 
country group i to country group j observed in reality, Xij, a coeffi- 
cient kij can be calculated: 
The value of kij ranges from 0 to X,,; it equals one when the observed and 
hypothetical values of the trade flow considered are identical. According 
to Sautter (1974), values of kij>l are considered as an expression of 
intensive trade relationships between the country groups i and j. 
Strictly speaking the reciprocal relationship only holds if besides kij>l 
also kji>l, that is, the observed trade flows between country groups i 
and j should be larger than the hypothetical values in both directions. 
The approach in Sautter (1974) is based on Savage and Deutsch (1960) and 
Goodman (1963). Alternative measures regarding regionalization are the 
Gini-Hirschman coefficient as applied in Hirschman (1945) and Michaely 
(1962, 1984), and the gravitation index as applied in Linnemann (1966). 
In the latter approach hypothetical trade flows are constructed depending 
on the trade partners geographical distance and national product. These 
hypothetical values are then compared with the actual trade flows to 
arrive at an impression of regionalization. The gravitation model is 
therefore similar to the approach in Sautter (1974). Considering however 
the long term scope of the present study, in which also the development 
of the national product may vary considerably among countries, the 
- 
When i = j for individual country groups obviously Xij should be 
zero; this however will not held in view of relation (2.1) because 
yi, and yej will both be larger than zero. It foll_ows, that a 
correction procedure is required which arrives at Xij = 0 for 
individual country groups. Sautter (1974) provides the details. 
approach in Sautter (1974) provides hypothetical values that are in the 
context of the present study to be considered as more neutral than those 
provided by the gravitation model. 
Empirical findings 
To establish tendencies towards regionalization in world trade the 
approach used by Sautter (1974) has been applied to trade flows within 
and among the eight country groups distinguished earlier in this study; 
the results have been calculated for the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 
1992 and are displayed in the Tables 2.6-2.10. In these tables the 
numbers on the head diagonals represent the tendency to regional concen- 
tration within the country group concerned. It can be seen that between 
1960 and 1992 the concentration of trade within Western Europe increased 
somewhat from 1.3 to 1.6, but by 1992 was lower than in any 'of the other 
country groups considered. In North America the index reached a value of 
2.0 in 1992, up from 1.7 in 1960. In Central and Eastern Europe the trade 
intensity index was 6.8 in 1992, only a bit higher than in 1960. Also for 
internal trade in Africa, AsiaIOceania and Latin America the indices for 
trade intensity in 1992 are 3.0, 2.4 and 4.1 respectively, higher values 
than for Western Europe; the developments over the period 1960-1992 show 
furthermore that the intensity of internal trade has increased in Africa 
and in Latin America, and has remained stable in AsiaIOceania. 
The off-diagonal elements in the Tables 2.6-2.10 represent the intensity 
of trade relations between country groups. 
Regarding the trade relations of Western Europe the figures show a fairly 
constant value of the concentration index for trade with Africa, while 
for trade with Central and Eastern Europe a recent tendency towards 
concentration can be observed. 
The figures for trade intensity between Western Europe and Central and 
Eastern Europe were 1.1 and 1.2 for exports and imports of Western 
Europe, respectively, up from both 0.4 in 1960. Internal trade concentra- 
tion within the Central and Eastern European countries amounted to a much 
higher figure, being 6.2 in 1960 and 6.8 in 1992. At first sight this 
result seems to be at odds with the results reached on the polarization 
of trade of Central and Eastern European countries (section 2.8). where 
it was concluded that in the period 1960-1992, the concentration of trade 
shifted away from within Central and Eastern Europe towards trade with 
Western Europe. It was however also concluded that trade relations 
between Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe are far more 
important seen from the viewpoint of Central and Eastern Europe than for 
Western Europe. Both tendencies are reflected in the values of the index 
of trade concentration. The values of the concentration index for 
internal Latin American trade and for the trade relations between Latin 
America and North America are to be interpreted likewise. 
The figures for AsialOceania show a concentration of trade with Japan 
that decreased recently however, and to a small degree a concentration of 
trade with North America that remained fairly constant however in the 
years 1960-1992. 
According to the values of the concentration index the concentration of 
trade between Western Europe and North America has been weak throughout 
the period, and between Western Europe and Japan has continued to be even 
weaker. Trade relations between Japan and North America have shown some 
degree of concentration, that has remained fairly stable over the years 
II Iable 2 - 6  Regionalization of international trade, 1960 (Sautter index for trade intensity) 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
II Source: own calculations from UN trade data base Note: for explanation of Sautter index see section 2.9. 
Regionalization of international trade, 1970 (Sautter 
index for trade intensity) 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
Source: own calculations from UN trade data base 
Note: for explanation of Sautter index see section 2 . 9 .  
Regionalization of international trade, 1980 (Sautter 
index for trade intensity) 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
Source: own calculations from UN trade data base 
Note: for explanation of Sautter index see section 2 . 9 .  
Table 2.9 Regionalization of international trade, 1990 (Sautter 









Rest of World 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
Source: own calculations from UN trade data base 
Note: for explanation of Sautter index see section 2.9. 
- 
Table 2.10 Regionalization of international trade, 1992 (Sautter 








Rest of World 
WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW 
1.6 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.5 1.1 
0.5 - 1.8 0.4 0.5 2.2 1.0 0.9 
0.5 1.6 2.0 0.4 0.6 1.0 2.8 0.8 
1.2 0.6 0.1 6.8 0.8 0.5 0.3 1.5 
1.3 0.4 1.1 1.0 3.0 0.2 0.3 0.9 
0.4 2.4 1.2 0.6 0.7 2.4 0.5 0.7 
0.6 0.9 2.1 1.0 0.5 0.3 4.1 0.7 
0.7 3.1 0.6 1.1 2.4 1.0 0.5 2.3 
Source: own calculations from UN trade data base 
Note: for explanation of Sautter index see section 2.9. 
2.10 Bloc Formation in World Trade 
Bloc formation was defined earlier (section 2.6) as the relative concen- 
tration of international trade among countries that are members of a 
formal agreement on economic integration. 
Given the scope of this study and the relatively long and successful 
process of economic integration the EC, founded in 1957, is the obvious 
candidate for exploring any tendency towards bloc formation. The analysis 
is carried out for the period 1960-1992. In this period the EC expanded 
i n  membership from 6 t o  12 p a r t i c i p a t i n g  coun t r i e s .  For each of t he  
benchmark years  1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1992 the  composition of t h e  EC 
has been taken a s  it was a t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  po in t  i n  time. 
The c r i t e r i o n  f o r  judging t h e  tendency towards b loc  formation i s  t h e  
r a t i o  of intra-EC t r a d e  over extra-EC t r a d e .  I f  t h i s  r a t i o  r i s e s  wi th  
t ime, t h i s  would r ep re sen t  a  tendency towards higher  s e l f - su f f i c i ency  of 
t h e  EC market;  i f  t he  r a t i o  would go down, t h i s  would imply an increased  
openness towards t h e  ou t s ide  world. 
Obviously, one would expect  a  tendency of the  r a t i o  intra-EC 
tradelextra-EC t r a d e  t o  r i s e  over the  per iod  1960-1992, t h e  process of 
economic i n t e g r a t i o n  having j u s t  s t a r t e d  by 1960 and being i n t e n s i f i e d  
t h e r e a f t e r ,  t h i s  being given an e x t r a  impetus w i th  t h e  s ing le  market 
programme launched i n  1985. 
As a ma t t e r  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  it i s  t h e r e f o r e  t o  be expected t h e  r a t i o  
of in t ra lex t ra -EC t r a d e  t o  r i s e  i n  t he  per iod  considered a s  the EC market 
g radua l ly  became l i b e r a l i z e d  i n t e r n a l l y ,  whereas t h e  EC commercial po l i cy  
r e t a i n e d  a  c e r t a i n  degree of p ro t ec t ion  around the EC market. 
The expec ta t ion  t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  of intra-EC t r ade  over extra-EC t r a d e  
would be r i s i n g  dur ing  t h e  per iod  of i n t e n s i f i e d  economic i n t e g r a t i o n ,  
has  t o  take i n t o  account t he  e f f e c t s  of new membership. I f  a  new member 
e n t e r s  t he  EC, which has  a  r a t i o  of t r ade  wi th  EC members over t h a t  wi th  
non-EC members t h a t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from the  present  EC average, t h i s  would, 
upon en t r ance ,  l e a d  t o  a  change i n  t h i s  r a t i o ,  without  any change i n  
p o l i c y  towards b loc  formation having taken  place.  To t ake  t h i s  f a c t o r  
i n t o  account some of t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  represent  more con t inu i ty  i n  t h e  
composition of t h e  EC than  represent ing  t h e  a c t u a l  EC-membership a t  t h e  
t ime. 
The r a t i o  chosen t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  poss ib l e  tendencies  towards bloc forma- 
t i o n  comprises t o t a l  i n t e r n a l  EC t r ade  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t o t a l  ex t e rna l  EC 
t . rade.  Trade inc ludes  imports a s  wel l  a s  exports  a s  both r ep re sen t  
f a c t o r s  i n  a  count ry ' s  economic r e l a t i o n s  with the  ou t s ide  world. I n  t he  
denominator only e x t e r n a l  EC t r a d e  and n o t  t o t a l  ( t h a t  i s  both i n t e r n a l  
and external) EC trade has been chosen as the former would in combination 
with internal EC trade in the numerator reflect possible tendencies 
towards bloc formation more acutely. 
Finally, the tendency towards bloc formation has been investigated for 
all commodity trade as well as for trade in particular product groups. 
This has been done to allow for differences in EC trade policies with 
respect to different product groups. 
The results for all-commodity trade are represented in Table 2.11. The 
ratio intra-EC tradelextra-EC trade was 55 in 1960, indicating that 
internal EC trade had a value of only 55 percent of external EC trade at 
that time. This figure had risen to 159 by 1992, indicating a 3 times as 
high ratio of internal over external EC trade. 
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The figures in Table 2.11 also indicate that primary products starting 
with a ratio of 76 in 1970 had almost doubled its value by 1992, an 
increase much faster than for manufactures where in the same period the 
value increased from 125 to 167. 
To investigate more in detail the developments for primary products in 
relation to the Common Agricultural Policy Table 2.11 gives the results 
for the combined product group food products 18. In this case the ratio 
increased 6-fold from 41 in 1960 to 252 in 1992. 
On the other hand, for the product group machinery and transportation 
equipment (SITC 7), which includes the modern technology sectors, such as 
computers and telecommunications, the development of the ratio follows 
the EC average for all commodities, reported above, and implies therefore 
a much slower tendency towards bloc formation than for the primary 
products. Regarding telecommunications equipment (SITC 76) and road 
vehicles (SITC 78) Table 2.11 presents some details. The internal EC 
trade of telecommunications equipment has been lower than the external EC 
trade in this product group with a ratio of around 90 in the period 1970- 
1992. For road vehicles the ratio doubled from an already high figure of 
145 in 1970 to 292 in 1992. 
Regarding mineral fuels (SITC 3) the ratio is throughout the period well 
below 100, indicating a continued dependence on foreign supply; the ratio 
was 59 in 1960 decreased to around 50 in the 1970s and continued to rise 
thereafter to 68 in 1992. 
For textiles and clothing (SITC 26, 65 and 84) internal EC trade has 
continued to be more important than external EC trade; the ratio has been 
almost constant at a level of around 160 since 1970. 
The North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) started with the US- 
Canada Free-Trade Agreement signed in 1988 and being effective from 1989. 
It is therefore of a very recent date, but economic cooperation agree- 
ments between the USA and Canada have been concluded already earlier and 
in fact date back from the previous century, with a Reciprocal Free-Trade 
Agreement being concluded in 1854 (Morici, 1989). 
For these reasons the ratio of intra-US-Canada trade over extra-US-Canada 
trade has been calculated for the period 1970-1992 to provide a compari- 
son with developments in the EC. The results are recorded in Table 2.12, 
l8 Represented by the SITC categories 0, 1, 22 and 4. 
and will be referred to as the outcome for NAFTA. There are some marked 
differences between the figures for NAFTA and the EC. 
For all-commodity trade the ratio is much lower for NAFTA than for the EC 
and moreover declining in the period considered from 55 to 42, whereas 
the ratio for the EC rose from 99 to 159 in the same period. Of course 
the figures for 1980 and 1992, being 37 and 42 respectively, show an 
increase, which may be testifying to an increasing bloc formation upon 
the founding of NAFTA (representing the US-Canada agreement) in 1989. 
For textiles and clothing the ratio for NAFTA is 10 times lower than for 
the EC, and declining, where the figures for the EC show a more stable 
outcome. The ratio for telecommunications equipment is also lower for 
NAFTA than for the EC, with a factor 5 in 1992, with again a decline 
recorded for NAFTA and a more stable pattern for the EC. The results for 
road vehicles show an opposite development for NAFTA compared with the 
EC: the ratio started with a value of 237 in 1970 and halved to 125 in 
1992 (though up from 111 in 1980). whereas for the EC it doubled from 145 
- - -- 
Table 2.12 Bloc formation in international trade of NAFTA, 1970- 
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2.11 Policy Evaluation 
Tendencies towards regionalization and bloc formation in the world 
economy cannot be judged on the basis of an analysis of trade flows 
alone. This is already apparent from the discussion in section 2.2 about 

















economic integration and the multilateral GATT framework of rules for 
international trade based on non-discrimination. For the evaluation of 
bsloc formation and regionalization it is of importance what policies are 
designed and implemented regarding trade relations with countries and 
country groups that are outside the region or bloc considered, or more in 
general, policies regarding the openness of the bloc or region concerned. 
In this perspective, Pelkmans (1993) observes that in the three regions 
the EU, NAFTA and East Asia there are strong undercurrents of deregula- 
tion, privatization and liberalization. This is abundantly clear in the 
case of '1992' which boils down to a massive programme of deregulation, 
regulatory flexibility, regulatory competition and internal liberaliz- 
ation. Deregulation is impressive in services sectors such as telecom, 
adr transport and banking, insurance and securities trade. The way market 
participants in these sectors think and act today places them in a 
totally different class than the same players (if they have not merged or 
split up) less than a decade ago. Regulatory flexibility is clearest in 
the 'new approach' to technical barriers. EU regulatory activity remains 
limited to a broad formulation of the health and safety objectives (the 
'essential requirements'), with a reference to European standards 
fulfilling these requirements; great flexibility and hence room for 
innovation or alternative solutions is achieved because (1) EU and non-EU 
suppliers alike can get around the standard, subject to certification, 
(2) the standards are not design but performance oriented which tends to 
lead to fewer restrictions of commercial freedom. Regulatory competition 
in services (beyond a jointly agreed minimum of harmonized rules) and 
fiscal competition (again, within jointly agreed limits for indirect 
taxation, but neither such limits nor an agreed minimum rate is applied 
for corporate taxation, let alone income taxation) are themselves a 
recognition by the EU member states that a new competitive climate may 
adso apply to the activities of the state. This is even more true for the 
notion of 'mutual recognitiont in the case of unjustified technical 
barriers within the Community (when Art. 36 does not apply or the 
essential requirements are 'equivalent ' )  . Liberalization is found in 
',1992' in the opening up of supplies to utilities, telecom networks and 
public transport to competitive procurement; in the removal of national 
quotas especially in consumer electronics, footwear, cars and textiles 
and c l o t h i n g ;  and i n  t he  removal of a l l  exchange and c a p i t a l  c o n t r o l s .  
The password of '1992' i s  t he re fo re  ( g r e a t e r )  competit ion, engendered by 
whatever i s  t h e  most s u i t a b l e  means given the na tu re  of the  s e c t o r  and 
r egu la to ry  s t a r t i n g  pos i t i on .  The pervasiveness  of t h i s  d r ive  f o r  g r e a t e r  
competi t ion and 'more market' should be we l l  understood by o u t s i d e r s  (and 
indeed t h i s  has  markedly improved s ince  th ree  years  ago) .  Rather than  
being governed by f e a r s  one should at tempt  t o  grasp '1992' i n  terms of 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  (Pelkmans, 1993).  
But t h e r e  a r e  reasons t o  be p o s i t i v e  a s  wel l  about t he  o t h e r  two 
in s t ances  of ' reg iona l i sm' .  It i s  q u i t e  c l e a r  t h a t  Mexico i s  f i rm i n  
f i t t i n g  NAFTA i n t o  i t s  o v e r a l l  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  s t r a t e g y ,  i n t e r n a l  and 
e x t e r n a l .  Mexico has s taged an impressive programme of t r ade  l i b e r a l i z -  
a t i o n ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  having become a  GATT member. It i s  o f t e n  suggested,  
without  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  t h a t  the t r u e  s ign i f i cance  of ' reg iona l i sm'  f o r  
Mexico i s  t o  enhance confidence f o r  fo re ign  d i r e c t  i nves to r s .  Also the  
USICanada FTA i s  genera l ly  pro-competit ive.  Indeed, f o r  a  while t he re  
were f e a r s  about i t s  p o l i t i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  i n  Canada p rec i se ly  because 
t h e  FTA tends t o  weaken the  regula tory  powers of the  provinces.  To a  
degree the  intra-Canadian market fragmentation ( e .g .  f o r  beer )  may be 
overcome v i a  t h e  agreement with i t s  l a r g e  neighbour. It i s  a l s o  u s e f u l  t o  
put  t h e  USICanada agreement i n  a  proper perspec t ive :  Canada and the  US 
were a l r eady  one another ' s  l a r g e s t  t r ade  pa r tne r s  f o r  decades, when the re  
was no FTA (except  f o r  a  spec i a l  arrangement f o r  c a r s  s ince  1965);  
moreover, US ownership of Canadian indus t ry  i s  very h igh;  f o r  s eve ra l  
Canadian provinces it i s  q u i t e  appropr ia te  t o  say t h a t  de f a c t o  they  a r e  
more i n t e g r a t e d  wi th  the  US economy ( c a l l e d  North-South t r ade  i n  Canada) 
than  wi th  the  Canadian economy (East-West t r a d e ) .  The FTA w i l l  l i b e r a l i z e  
t r a d e  i n  some d i f f i c u l t  s ec to r s ,  a s  we l l  a s  i n  s e rv i ces  ( t o  some ex ten t  
on ly ,  however) and it w i l l  he lp  t o  tame the US app l i ca t ion  of t r ade  
remedy laws t o  Canada i n  exchange f o r  l e s s  government i n t e rven t ion  
( s u b s i d i e s )  i n  Canada (Pelkmans, 1993).  
I n  E a s t  A s i a  t h e  unambiguous t rend  i s  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n .  This i s  t r u e  
f o r  Japan i t s e l f ,  a s  indeed recognised by the  EU. For Indonesia,  Malaysia 
and Korea t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  has l e d  t o  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  opening up of 
t h e i r  markets.  I n  a l l  t h r ee  coun t r i e s  t h i s  has been accompanied by 
(domestic) deregulations in financial services, for instance. With Hong 
Kong and Singapore being already free traders, and Thailand and Taiwan 
embarking on external liberalization as well, the old and new NIEs in 
East Asia seem to be driven by the same urge to spread the reach of 
competition to areas and sectors sheltered thus far (Pelkmans, 1993). 
In this more realistic perspective the relevant question becomes: does 
the recent trend, if any, of greater regionalism negatively affect market 
access? This question can be split into two sub-questions: first, does 
the formation of the formal arrangement affect market access negatively?; 
second, will new stronger blocs raise new trade barriers? Before address- 
ing these two sub-questions, it should be noted that market access ought 
to be distinguished from the effect of bloc formation or bloc strengthen- 
ing on trade flows. 
The answer to the first question hinges essentially on the type of 
regional arrangement sought. The EU's move from a customs-union-plus to a 
'completed' common market is so unique that no GATT or other worldwide 
rules apply for the large majority of '1992' decisions. One therefore has 
to engage in the tedious exercise of checking such decisions one by one, 
spread over many different fields, often not comparable to product trade 
(Pelkmans, 1990, 1991). On the whole, market access improves or remains 
unaffected (dependent on the case), and not a single instance could be 
identified where market access actually worsens. One important qualifica- 
tion might be thought to consist in a number of reciprocity clauses (e.g. 
financial services and public procurement in the 'excluded sectors'). 
This is certainly not correct for the Utilities Directive: as the 
Cecchini report shows, (foreign) EC and non-EC suppliers alike were 
excluded from these national markets, sealed off as they were - hence, 
the 50 percent clause is an unambiguous improvement in access and can be 
effectively exploited with, say, a local partner. The reciprocity clause 
in the three financial services is harder to evaluate since it is far 
from clear how to define ex ante market access. To begin with, Art. 58 
(EEC) applied national treatment to subsidiaries. This shifts any 
question about access back to that of (first) establishment; once in, 
they are EC firms. Authorization policies for establishment of financial 
services companies (from third countries) differed widely among the EC 
member states before the 1992 process began. So, effective access 
differed. Moreover, access to what? As the regulation, product scope and 
internationalization of the national financial services markets diverged 
greatly, it is arbitrary to push the access issue too far now that a 
single market for financial services with different rules emerges. 
Finally, the grace period in the Second Banking Directive, the exceptions 
(for developing countries) and the link with the Uruguay Round impart a 
liberal slant, to say the least. (Pelkmans, 1993). 
The question cannot be answered for the East Asian bloc as there is none 
in any formal sense. The Singapore Summit of January 1992 decided to 
establish an ASEAN free-trade area (AFTA) over a period of 15 years. It 
will be a classical free-trade area in the end, hence lacking a common 
external access policy. Origin rules are likely to be liberal for 
outsiders so as to take the high imported value-added of local production 
of multinationals into account. ASEAN is eager to practice what is 
denoted as 'open regionalism'. Surprisingly, however there is a strong 
current among decision makers not to notify under Art. 24 (GATT pro- 
cedures), but under Chapter IV (arrangements for developing countries) 
(Pelkmans, 1993). 
This leaves the USICanada FTA. It is a classical FTA, supplemented by 
some specific sectoral provisions (e.g. energy, wine, cars), national 
treatment fdr services companies (with exceptions and ' grandfathering') 
and for investors (again with 'grandf athering' ) , including a prohibition 
on performance requirements (called TRIMS in the Uruguay Round). A very 
special instance of preferential treatment is the dispute settlement 
about anti-dumping and countervailing duties (AD-CVD), in the form of a 
binding review of a binational panel. Surely Canada, in obtaining the 
latter, is better off than all other trading partners which would no 
doubt wish to subject US AD-CVD practices to bilateral or multilateral 
surveillance. But in and by itself it does not worsen the access of 
outsiders to the two countries. The entire FTA appears not to impact on 
market access for outsiders. Whether this can be maintained once NAFTA is 
formed with Mexico remains to be seen but, as free-trade areas do not 
engage in a common trade policy, this would appear possible. The only 
case of doubt might be in origin rules of NAFTA. 
The answer to the second sub-question - new barriers? - is straightfor- 
ward if one studies the USICanadian FTA and '1992': no new barriers are 
proposed or implemented. In a difficult sectoral EU case - cars - access 
is improved over an 8 years transition period, after which free trade is 
elstablished. The Commission proposed the 1992 solution for textiles and 
clothing as the total removal of national quotas, with the retention of 
existing EU quotas. The details are not yet on table, however, and in the 
case of textiles and clothing there is always some devil in the detail. 
Of course, the EU supports MFA abolition so that the EU quotas will grow 
and eventually disappear. The Council has politically accepted the 
principle (Pelkmans, 1993). 
The Common Agricultural Policy, restrictive regulation or 
hterventionism, represent the exact opposite of what '1992' is all 
about: competition. This is not to say that EU trade policy cannot be 
drastically improved as the GATT (1991) report has amply demonstrated. At 
the same time it is hard if not impossible to discover any relation 
between '1992' and the reporting on VERs and anti-dumping cases in the 
GATT report. There is no trend in the number of dumping cases and the 
sectoral composition would appear to be unrelated with the sectoral 
emphasis in '1992'. Most of the reported VERs predate the 1992 process. 
mere is only one clear '1992' case amongst those VERs and that is 
footwear (VERs with Korea and Taiwan); it is part of the transition to 
free trade in footwear which is now almost completed (Pelkmans, 1993). 
3. GLOBALIZATION OF PRODUCTION 
3.1 The Division of Labour 
One of the most important insights in economics dates from Adam Smith 
(1776) and is represented in his analysis of the division of labour. In 
his well-known example of a small pin-factory he observed that 'a 
workman, not educated in this business, nor acquainted with the use of 
machinery employed in it, could scarce make one pin a day. (But that 
when) making a pin is divided into about eighteen distinct operations 
( . . .  carried out by ten men), those ten persons could make among them 
upwards of 48,000 pins a day.' This would equal the manufacture of 4,800 
pins a day per worker, an improvement with nearly 480,000 percent 
compared with the situation without division of labour and the use of 
specialized machinery. Smith (1776) shows furthermore that the invention 
and application of specialized machinery to save time and to increase 
efficiency is induced by the division of labour as well, concentration on 
a specific task leading to a specific focus on efficiency improvements. 
Having demonstrated in this way the powerful force of a division of 
labour behind economic growth Smith (1776) deals with the question why 
then the division of labour is not instantaneous or evolving at a much 
quicker pace than economic history has shown this to be the case. The 
well-known answer by Smith is, that the division of labour is limited by 
the extent of the market. If society needed only 10 pins per day, it 
would not be economic to have a factory set up with 10 workers applying a 
division of labour in 18 tasks, let alone the employment of specialized 
machinery. 
3.2 Globalization and Technology 
The extent of the market has been identified in the previous section as 
the main element enabling the division of labour, while at the same time 
limiting it. In general the extent of the market is determined by two 
main factors: 
1. the amount of buying power; 
2. the costs of transportation and of communication. 
The first factor, the amount of buying power, by definition consists of 
the size of the population and income per capita. The extent of the 
market is determined in the second place by the costs of transportation 
per unit weight of cargo transported. Costs of communication play a role 
as well. Among these elements raising the costs of bridging geographical 
distances should also be mentioned the measures of protection. Tariffs 
raise the price of traded goods; the effects of non-tariff barriers are 
more harmful to the extent of the market, since they fragment the latter. 
In this perspective Dicken (1992) analyses the role of technological 
development in transportation and communication. 
A fundamental prerequisite of the evolution of international production 
and of the transnational corporation is the development of technologies 
which overcome the frictions of space and time. The most important of 
such enabling technologies - and the most obvious -are the technologies 
of transport and communications. Neither of these technologies can be 
regarded as the cause of international production or of the Transnational 
Corporation (TNC); rather, they make such phenomena feasible. But without 
them, today's complex global economic system simply could not exist. 
In terms of the time it takes to get from one part of the world to 
another there is no doubt that the world has 'shrunk' dramatically 
(Figure 3.1). For most of human history, the speed and efficiency of 
transport were low and the costs of overcoming the friction of distance 
high. Movement over land was especially slow and difficult before the 
development of the railways. Indeed, even as late as the early nineteenth 
century, the means of transport were not really very different from those 
prevailing in biblical times. The major breakthrough came with two 
closely associated innovations: the application of steam power as a means 
of propulsion and the use of iron and steel for trains and railway tracks 
and for ocean-going vessels. These, coupled with the linking together of 
overland and ocean transport and the cutting of the canals at Suez and 
Panama, greatly telescoped geographical distance at a global scale. The 
railway and the steamship introduced a new, and much enlarged, scale of 
human activity. The flow of materials and products was enormously 
enhanced and the possibilities of geographical specialization were 
greatly stimulated. Such innovations were a major factor in the massive 
expansion in the global economic system during the nineteenth century. 
The twentieth century, and especially the past few decades, has seen an 
acceleration of this process of global shrinkage. In economic terms, the 
most important developments have been the introduction of commercial jet 
aircraft, the development of much larger ocean-going vessels (super- 
freighters) and the introduction of containerization, which greatly 
simplifies transhipment from one mode of transport to another and 
increases the security of shipments. Of these, it is the jet aircraft 
which has had the most pervasive influence, particularly in the develop- 
ment of the TNC. It is no coincidence that the take-off of TNC growth and 
the take-off of commercial jets both occurred during the 1950s. As a 
consequence, in terms of time, New York is now closer to Tokyo than it 
was to Philadelphia in the days of the thirteen colonies. 
The far more complex global transport system of the present day depends 
fundamentally on telecommunications technology. Indeed, communications 
technologies should now be regarded as the key technology transforming 
relationships at the global scale. Global communications systems have 
been transformed radically during the past twenty or thirty years through 
a whole cluster of significant innovations in information technology. 
Probably the most important catalyst to enhanced global communications 
has been the development of satellite technology. 
Figure 3.1 Global shrinkage: the effect of changing transport technol- 
ogies on 'real' distance 
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Source : Dicken (1992) . 
Satellite technology, together with a whole host of other communications 
technologies, is making possible quite remarkable levels of global 
communication of conventional messages and also the transmission of data. 
In this respect, the key element is the linking together of computer 
technologies with information-transmission technologies over vast 
distances. It has become possible for a message to be transmitted in one 
location and received in another on the other side of the world virtually 
simultaneously. 
Not only are transmission costs by satellite insensitive to distance but 
also the user costs have fallen dramatically. In the 1960s the annual 
cost of an Intelsat telephone circuit, giving a connection from one point 
on the earth's surface to any other, was more than 60,000 dollar. In the 
late 1980s the same facility costs only 9,000 dollar. Satellite communi- 
cations are now being challenged by a new technology: optical fibre 
cables. Optical fibre systems have a very large carrying capacity, and 
transmit information at very high speed and with a high signal strength. 
3.3 Foreign Direct Investment: General Trends and Characteris- 
tics 
One of the important aspects of the globalization of production is, of 
course, the development in foreign direct investment (FDI) . This can be 
illustrated by the growth of FDI relative to other economic phenomena. 
Table 3.1 presents growth rates of FDI in the 1980s relative to the 
growth in GDP, trade and domestic investment. Quite clearly, after 1986 
growth rates of the phenomena mentioned increased considerably with FDI 
growing at least twice as fast as GDP, trade and domestic investment. 
Especially the differential growth rates of FDI and domestic investment 
testify to an increasing globalization 19. 
19 In 1990 FDI of all countries was 225 billion dollars, or 5 percent 
of gross domestic investment. 
- 
Foreign direct investment and selected economic indicators 
(Growth rates for 1981-1985 and 1986-1990) 
Indicator Growth rates 
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Source: United Nations (1993b). 
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As a share of GDP the outward stock of FDI of the industrial countries 
rose from nearly 5 percent in 1967 to 8 percent in 1988 (Dunning, 1993a). 
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The link between FDI, trade and technology flows implies that the growth 
of FDI is increasingly related to the growth of the other two types of 
flows. For example, it is estimated that intra-firm transactions in 
royalties and licence fees (which include mostly receipts for the use of 
trademarks, processes, techniques, copyrights and patents) between firms 
related by ownership account for over 80 percent of the total value of 
these transactions. Intra-firm trade between TNCs is also substantial, 
accounting for an estimated 25 percent of world-wide trade, although it 
is substantially higher for individual countries. To a certain extent, 
therefore, the growth of royalties and licence fees and trade is associ- 
ated with the growth of FDI (UN, 1993a). 
While global FDI outflows, receipts of royalties and fees and exports 
grew at similar rates throughout the early and mid-1970s. those rates of 
growth began to diverge during the 1980s. Since 1986, FDI outflows grew 
about 1.3 times faster than receipts of royalties and fees and about 2 
t imes f a s t e r  than expor t s .  To a  c e r t a i n  e x t e n t ,  t he  growth of r e c e i p t s  of 
r o y a l t i e s  and f ees  r e f l e c t e d  the  rap id  growth of FDI flows. The d ive r -  
gence between the  r a t e s  of growth of FDI and expor ts ,  i n  s p i t e  of t he  
l i n k  between FDI and t r a d e ,  suggests  t he  poss ib l e  ex is tence  of time l a g s  
o r  t he  inf luence  of exchange r a t e s  on expor ts  (UN, 1993a).  
3 . 4  The Country Distribution of FDI 
Figure 3 . 2  d i sp l ays  t h e  flows of F D I  among the  European Economic Area 
(EEA), Japan and North America a s  t hese  have taken place i n  1990 20. 
Figure 3.2 Intra-triad foreign direct investment, 1990 
0 
America 
$2.80.0 b i o n  / A/;  
$7.0 billion 
S: 17.0% 
Note: Dollar f igu res  show estimated values of s tock of FDI based on data  on inward and outward 
investment from North America and the  European Economic Area (EEA), excluding Iceland and 
Liechtenstein.  Intra-North American investment and intra-EEA investment have been ne t t ed  
out. Percentages show average annual growth r a t e s  f o r  s tocks  (1980-1990) and flows (1985- 
1991). North America includes Canada and t h e  United S ta te s .  The European Economic Area 
includes t h e  European Community (EC) and t h e  European Free Trade Association, excluding 
Iceland and Liechtenstein.  
Source : UN (199313). 
20 The European Economic Area (EEA)  inc ludes  the  member s t a t e s  of t he  
European Union ( E U )  and of EFTA. The da t a  i n  Figure 3.2 exclude 
those f o r  I ce l and  and L iech tens t e in .  
By far the largest flows of FDI are between the EEA and North America. 
T'he total amount of FDI between these two regions was 505 billion dollar 
in 1990, far more than between Japan and North America with 107 billion 
dollar and between the EEA and Japan with 26 billion dollar. However, the 
growth of FDI flows between the EEA and Japan was very high with more 
than 45 percent per annum in the years 1985-1991 in both directions. The 
growth of FDI flows from North America to the EEA was much lower in these 
years with 14 percent per annum and even negative in the opposite 
direction, with minus 7 percent per annum. From Japan to North America 
the flow of FDI increased with only 7 percent per annum in the same 
period but decreased sharply in the opposite direction with minus 23 
percent per annum. 
The outflows of FDI originate almost completely in the developed market 
economies. The figures in Table 3.2 indicate that in the 1980s only 2 to 
3 percent of FDI outflows originated in the developing countries, with 97 
to 98 percent originating in the developed countries. On the other hand 
the developing countries accounted for some 25 percent of the inflow of 
t.ota1 FDI. 
Develloped 
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a) based on preliminary estimates 
Bi l l ions  o f  dollars 
Source: UN (1993b). 
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Within the group of developed market economies some important changes in 
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Share i n  t o t a l  (percentage) 
the relative position of individual countries regarding FDI have taken 
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place during the last decades. Table 3.3 indicates that in 1967 the USA 
accounted for 50 percent of the total stock of outward FDI; this percen- 
tage had dropped to 30 by 1988. This decline in the US position was 
counterbalanced by the rise in the position of Japan and Germany whose 
shares in world stock of outward FDI increased from 1 and 3 percent in 
1967 to 10 and 9 percent respectively in 1988. The Netherlands continue 
to have an important position in outward FDI, having a share of 10 
percent in 1967 - representing a third place among countries - and a 
share of 7 percent in 1988 - representing a fifth place. Throughout the 
period 1967-1988 the developing countries accounted for a mere 3 percent 
in the total stock of outward FDI. 
















































































































































































1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, South Africa and Spain. 
2 Including a small amount of outward FDI by centrally planned economies, especially 
in 1980 and 1988. 
Source: Dunning (1993a) 
To a large extent, the relative decline in the US'S position as an 
international direct investor was inevitable. It primarily reflects the 
reinstatement of the continental European countries as leading outward 
investors and the emergence of Japan as a major global player. In 1988, 
the four main European investors (the UK, Western Germany, the Nether- 
lands and France) and Japan accounted for 46.9 percent of the accumulated 
stock of foreign direct investment compared with only 26.3 percent in 
1960. More particularly, between 1980 and 1988, the net increase in the 
foreign capital stake of the UK, Western Germany and Japan rose by 125 
billion dollar (Dunning, 1993a). 
In general, over the past 25 years, there has been a gradual convergence 
between the share of outward direct capital stake of the leading indus- 
trial countries and their share of the exports of manufactured goods and 
services. In 1960, for example, the ratio between the US'S share of the 
world stock of FDI and that of her export of goods and services was 2.74. 
The corresponding ratios for the UK, France, West Germany and Japan were 
2.01, 0.99, 0.12 and 0.20. By 1988, the ratios were 1.92, 2.54, 0.79, 
1.05 and 1.57 respectively (Dunning, 1993a). 
With respect to the period 1967-1988 Table 3.4 displays the developments 
in the t o t a l  s t o c k  o f  inward F D I .  It appears that the USA increased its 
share threefold during these years, with a share of 9 percent of the 
total stock of inward FDI in 1967, and of 27 percent in 1988. Two decades 
after World War I1 Western Europe accounted for 30 percent of the total 
stock of inward FDI, a share that had risen to 37 percent by 1988. 
Germany doubled its share from 3.4 to 6.8 percent, the share of Japan 
remained very small, never exceeding 1 percent. 
The developed market economies as a whole have attracted 70 percent of 
the total stock of inward FDI in 1967, a share that had risen to nearly 
80 percent by 1988. Consequently the share of developing countries  in the 
total stock of inward FDI dropped from 30 to 20 percent in the same 
period. However, the experiences of various groups of developing coun- 
tries have been diverse. Of the total stock of inward FDI the share of 
Africa halved from 5 percent in 1967 to 2.5 percent in 1988, that of 
Latin America nearly halved from nearly 18 to somewhat more than 9 
percent, while Asia grew somewhat from 8 to 9 percent. In the five 
leading industrializing countries in South-East Asia, that is Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, the inward foreign direct 
investments increased 4.2 times between 1980 and 1988, almost double the 
2.2 times rise in GDP. 
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1 Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa. 
2 Fiji, Papua New ~uinea, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Kuwait and United Arab 
Emirates. 
na not available 
Source: Dunning (1993a). 
The figures in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 can be combined to calculate the rates 
of outward to inward foreign capital formation. The results are repre- 
sented in Table 3.5. The figures for the USA indicate that its position 
has changed considerably from a mainly outward oriented investor country 
to a country where outward and inward foreign investment balances. In 
Western Europe the figures for the UK show a similar though less out- 
spoken pattern. Germany has a ratio of 0.56 in 1960 indicating that 
inward investment was almost twice as large as outward investment. The 
ratio reached its highest value of 1.67 in 1985, being somewhat lower in 
1988. The ratio for Japan rose from 3.7 in 1960 to nearly 15 in 1988 
indicating a continuing and increasing strong outward orientation. The UN 
(1993b) mentions four main reasons for the strong outward orientation in 
foreign investment of Japan. Historically, the Government of Japan has 
had a sustained preference for licensing over FDI for technology acquisi- 
tion in Japan. Secondly, the liberalization of inward FDI policies 
started in 1967, still excluded some industry groups - agriculture, oil 
exploration and leather and leather products. Also, as a third factor, 
merger and acquisition activities were institutionally difficult until 
1990, as prior notification was required. Finally, anti-competitive and 
exclusive business practices decrease the transparency of business 
t.ransactions and would place foreign firms in a disadvantageous position. 
However, FDI into Japan is increasing. Inflows in the first half of 1992 
were almost double those of the same period in 1991. Moreover, the 
Government of Japan has recently committed itself to stimulate inward 
foreign investment (UN, 1993b). Finally, the strong position of the Yen 
and protection against exports from Japan have provided important 
stimulants for outward FDI of Japan. 
However, it should be realized that it is not necessarily better for a 
country to be a net outward investor than to be a net inward receiver of 
EDI. There are benefits from FDI both for the home country and for the 
host country 21. 
2 I An analysis of the issues involved can be found in Dunning 
(1993a). 
Table 3.5 Ratio of outward to inward direct capital stake, 
' 1962, I 
na n o t  a v a i l a b l e  
Source : Dunning (1993a).  
3.5 The Sectoral Composition of FDI 
Even i n  t he  r e l a t i v e l y  sho r t  per iod  of time of two decades (1970-1990) 
t h e  s tock  of FDI underwent important changes wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  s e c t o r a l  
composition. Table 3.6 i n d i c a t e s  t h e  outward s t o c k  o f  FDI i n  t he  primary 
s e c t o r  ( a g r i c u l t u r e  and mining) halved i t s  share  from 23 t o  11 percent  
between 1970 and 1990. I n  t he  same period t h e  share  of t h e  secondary 
sector (manufacturing) decreased from 45 to 39 percent. As a result the 
share of the tertiary sector (services) increased considerably from 31 to 
50 percent. Therefore, the services sector by 1990 accounted for not less 
than half of the outward stock of FDI. Since the figures relate to the 
stock of FDI, the changes recorded would be even more considerably when 
expressed in FDI flows. 
As the developed economies absorb three-quarters of outward FDI, the 
sectoral composition of the stock of inward FDI in developed economies 
follow the general pattern of the stock of outward FDI set out above; the 
figures are represented in Table 3.6. 
The figures in Table 3.6 reveal also that the sectoral composition of the 
stock of inward FDI has followed a different pattern in the developing 
countries. Here the primary sector held its share of some 20 percent in 
the whole period 1970-1990, with the secondary sector declining in share 
from 56 to 49 percent and the tertiary sector increasing its share from 
24 to 30 percent, far less than in the developed economies. 
Table 3.6 Sectoral distribution of foreign direct investment stock for the Largest developed home countries and the largest developed and 
developing host anmtries, 1976-1990 
Group of countries and 
sector 
A. Outuard stock 





B. Inward stock 











































































a Australia, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom 
and the United States; together these countries accounted for almost 90 percent of outward FDI 
stock in 1990. 1970 data and 1971-1975 growth data exclude Australia and France. 
b Australia, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, United 
Kingdom and the United States; together these countries accounted for approximately 72 percent of 
total inward FDI stock in 1990. 1970 data and 1971-1975 growth data exclude Australia, France and 
Spain. 
c Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand and Venezuela; 
together these countries accounted for 68 percent of total inward FDI in developing countries. 
Source: UN (1993b) 
prospects: The Primary Sector 
m e  UN (1993b) observes that FDI associated with the mergers and acquisi- 
tions of petroleum and mining companies is being replaced by a retreat to 
core business activities. This leads the UN (1993b) to expect a reduction 
in FDI flows to developed countries, as the developing countries and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States offer the best opportunities for 
privatization and new activities. In many regions of the former Soviet 
Union experts have concluded to a high probability of discovering large 
new oil and gas fields. Secondly, prospects for FDI in the oil industry 
depend on conditions in the world energy markets. Capacity constraints in 
the more mature fields will move the large transnational corporations 
(TNCs) away from the North Sea and North America (where production costs 
are high) in search for oil and gas into regions in Asia, Latin America 
and Eastern Europe. The attractiveness of these regions f0.r inward FDI 
can be enhanced by government policies on privatization, liberalization 
and contractual reliability. 
Prospects: The Manufacturing Sector 
Since the mid-1970s the important industries for inward FDI in manufac- 
turing have been: chemicals, food (including beverages and tobacco), 
electrical equipment, metals and mechanical equipment. In the developed 
countries the largest share of FDI still' goes to natural-resource based 
and labour-intensive industries, although the share steadily declined 
from 73 to 60 percent between 1975 and 1990. The stock of inward FDI in 
developed economies in capital- and technology-intensive industries rose 
correspondingly from 27 to 40 percent (UN, 1993b). 
It is noteworthy that between 1980 and 1990 the share of capital- and 
technology-intensive industries in FDI rose faster in developing econ- 
omies than in the developed countries. This development is particularly 
significant in the newly industrialized economies such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand (UN, 1993b). 
These trends in manufacturing FDI are likely to strengthen over time. 
Many developing countries and economies in trans ition pursue policies to 
upgrade their economies and to attract TNCs in the technology-intensive 
industries (UN, 1993b). 
Prospects: The Services Sector 
The rapid growth of FDI in services has not come only from transnational 
service corporations (TSCs) but also from substantial investment in 
service activities by transnational industrial corporations. Within the 
services sector, finance- and trade-related activities account for two- 
thirds of the FDI stock in services in developed economies and the 
majority in developing countries. Banks, insurance companies, and trading 
companies are among the most prominent TSCs. Furthermore TNCs tend to 
establish their own finance-related foreign affiliates and have invested 
in wholesale and marketing facilities (UN, 1993b). 
At present some capital- and technology-intensive service industries are 
opening up to FDI. 
Airlines 
Deregulation has provided a major stimulus for the airline industry to 
open up to FDI. Deregulation in the USA in the late 1970s and further 
liberalization in 1991, deregulation in the EU surrounding the Internal 
Market 1992-programme and the negotiations in the framework of the 
uruguay Round have led to increasing competition among airlines for 
market shares and have led in consequence to many strategic alliances 
through FDI. The most active investors are airlines from Western Europe, 
with the USA as the major host country of this type of FDI (UN, 1993b). 
Telecommunications 
As with the airline industry, the impetus for FDI in telecommunications 
is likely to intensify. In the USA where overall outward FDI has been on 
the decline, the outward stock of FDI in telecommunications increased in 
two years not less than 8-fold from 560 million dollar in 1989 to 4.4 
billion dollar in 1991 (UN, 1993b). 
Until recently, the telecommunications industry has been fenced off from 
FDI. Recently however, technological developments have been a major 
factor in the implementation of regulatory changes. These include 
privatization and liberalization, leading to increased access to FDI in 
previously sheltered markets. New technologies - such as satellite 
transmissions - have been decentralizing in nature, and have therefore 
undermined the monopoly status of these industries and the governments 
ability of control. The availability, price and quality of telecommunica- 
tions services are essential to many economic activities, leading to 
pressures for deregulation and efficiency , as well. In developed coun- 
tries large public and private telecommunications companies are increas- 
ingly competing among each other, and in developing countries the 
privatization of telecommunications monopolies has accompanied the 
liberalization of FDI rules especially in Latin America. 
The limited tradability of many services has been a major factor for the 
rapid growth of FDI in services. The convergence of computer and telecom- 
munication technologies eases this constraint considerably, because 
transborder flows of data permit instantaneous, long-distance, interac- 
tive transactions. These developments render it possible for certain 
services to be produced and consumed in different locations. The 
increased transportability of some services, especially those that are 
information-intensive, may therefore reduce in time the need for FDI as 
tradability increases. 
3.6 Explaining International Production 
In explaining international production Dunning (1993a) distinguishes 
three factors : 
1. Ownership advantages of the firm, providing a cost advantage of 
its products over those of its competitors. 
2. Internalization advantages, rendering it more efficient to carry 
out the production within the own firm rather 'than by other, for 
instance by subcontracting. 
3. Locational advantages, making it profitable for a firm to engage 
in value adding activities in another country. 
Within the context of the present study, the third factor, that of the 
locational advantages, will be described in some detail. Dunning (1993a) 
mentions the following location specific variables: 
- Spatial distribution of markets. 
- Spatial distribution of natural and created resource endowments. 
- Input prices, quality and productivity (e.g. labour, energy, 
materials, components, semi-finished goods). 
- International transport and communication costs. 
- Investment incentives and disincentives provided by the government 
(including performance requirements, etc.). 
- Artificial barriers (e.g. import controls) to trade in goods and 
services. 
- Societal and in£ rastructure provisions (commercial, legal, educa- 
tional, transport and communication). 
- Economic system and strategies of government: the institutional 
framework for resource allocation. 
- Cross-country ideological, language, cultural, business, political 
differences. 
The factors of location may vary in relevance, of course, with the type 
of international production (Dunning, 1993a): 
Types of international production Location advantages 
Market seeking Material and labour costs; market 
size and characteristics; government 
policy (e.g. with respect to regula- 
tions and to import controls, invest- 
ment incentives, etc.) 
Efficiency seeking 
(a) of products (a) Economies of product special- 
ization and concentration 
(b) of processes (b) Low labour costs; incentives 
to local production by host 
governments 
Trade and distribution Source of inputs and local markets; 
(import and export merchanting) need to be near customers; after- 
sales servicing, etc. 
Support services Availability of markets, particularly 
those of 'lead' clients. 
Dunning (1993a) also observes a change in the relative importance among 
locational advantages over time. 
In the period 1945-60, the overriding and unique variable that influenced 
the locational choice of value-added activity by international firms was 
the world shortage of US dollars. Furthermore, anxious to be the leaders 
h exploiting their new technological and marketing advantages in foreign 
markets, US oligopolists in the motor vehicle, pharmaceutical, electrical 
goods, computer, industrial instrument and other industries were quick to 
establish branch plants in Europe, Canada, Australia and in some 
wealthier Latin American countries. 
Much early post-war European direct investment was also of this kind and 
there was a certain pattern to it. First, a sales and services facility 
was set up to promote exports, then came local production using imported 
materials and components, followed by production with a higher local 
value-added content. 
T'he rapid growth in industrial output following the end of the Second 
World War led to an unprecedented demand for raw materials to sustain 
that output, so increasingly the main industrial countries were forced to 
seek new sources of supply. For reasons exactly parallel to those 
prompting backward vertical integration in the 19th century, large firms 
purchasing primary products for processing and fabrication sought to 
internalize their sources of supply. 
Dunning (1993a) therefore concludes, that the significance of the 
variables influencing the 'where1 to produce vary with the type of FDI 
and the stage of development of both the investing and recipient coun- 
tries. The one exception is the political and economic stability of the 
recipient country. Almost invariably this is a necessary, though not a 
sufficient, condition for TNC activity. 
3.7 International Investment, Trade and Commercial Policies 
Ekaluating the Uruguay Round 
Tfie extent of the market was identified in sections 3.1 and 3.2 as the 
nraj or constraint on specialization and its benefits. In this perspective 
the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December 1993 is of 
great importance. 
ZIhe outcome of the Uruguay Round can be seen as instrumental to enlarging 
the extent of the world trade market. By including for the first time 
a g r i c u l t u r e ,  t e x t i l e s  and c lo th ing ,  and se rv i ces ,  an a d d i t i o n a l  36 
percent  of t o t a l  world t r a d e  i s  now within GATT. The number of p a r t i c i -  
p a t i n g  coun t r i e s  i n  the  Uruguay Round was eventua l ly  117, l a r g e r  than  the  
99 of t h e  Tokyo Round. A f u r t h e r  reduct ion i n  t a r i f f s  and above a l l  t he  
replacement of  quota and o the r  forms of non- t a r i f f  b a r r i e r s  by t a r i f f s  
have been agreed upon i n  t h e  Uruguay Round. These t h r e e  elements t e s t i f y  
t o  t h e  success  of t h e  Uruguay Round i n  keeping the  world market f o r  t r a d e  
and investment a s  open a s  poss ib l e .  
That t h e  openness of t he  world market matters  with respec t  t o  growth i n  
t h e  world economy, cannot be proven f o r  a  f a c t .  There a r e  however two 
important  i n s i g h t s  t h a t  p o i n t  t o  a pos i t i ve  r e l a t i o n s h i p :  
1. The f i r s t  one i s  t h e  i n s i g h t  of Adam Smith t h a t  d i v i s i o n  of labour  
i s  a  powerful f a c t o r  i n  s t imula t ing  economic growth, bu t  t h a t  t he  
d i v i s i o n  of labour  i s  l imi t ed  by the ex t en t  of the market.  Enlarg- 
i n g  t h e  ex t en t  of t h e  world market a s  i n  t he  Uruguay Round agree-  
ment supports  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d iv i s ion  of labour and a s  a  r e s u l t  
economic growth i n  t he  world economy. 
2 .  I n  economic h i s t o r y  the  experience i s  t h a t  i n  t imes of t r a d e  
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  (1953-1972) t h e  growth f igu res  f o r  world t r a d e  and 
world output  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  higher  than i n  per iods of increas-  
i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  (1930-1938, 1973-1980). The f i g u r e s  i n  Table 3.7 
t e s t i f y  t o  t h i s  and show a l s o  t h a t  i n  times of t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z -  
a t i o n  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  growth r a t e s  of world t r a d e  and world 
output  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  l a r g e ,  i nd ica t ing  increased interdependence 
between na t ions  and increased  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n  of labour .  
I F  World output and world trade, 1930-2005 (Annual growth 









In this perspective, Bhagwati (1991a, 1992a) recently discussed four main 
threats to the world trade system, as this has been functioning under 
GATT : 
1. The Focus on Fair Trade 
Successful ,exporting countries meet suspicion from their less successful 
trade partners, who attribute the former's success to dumping, too low 
wages, unacceptable working conditions and too loose standards on health 
and the environment. Revealed comparative advantage becomes suspect, as 
the sources of it get immediately questioned. 
The threat to the world trade system is that each importing country sets 
rules for proper trade practices by itself, instead of such issues being 
settled multilaterally under GATT. 
2. The Menace of Managed Trade 
The obsession with 'Fair Trade' finds its logical consequence in success- 
ful exporters being forced to conclude so-called Voluntary Export 
Restraints to limit their exports, or become subject to other forms of 
managed trade. 
The threat to the world trade system is that managed trade fragments the 
world market, limiting in turn the scope for the international division 
of labour. 
3. The Upsurge of Unilateralism 
The attention for fair trade and the application of managed trade have an 
ally in the increasing unilateral approach to trade relations. For 
instance Section 301, Super 301 and Special 301 of the Trade and Tariff 
Act enable the USA to threaten individual trade partner countries, whose 
behaviour in trade issues is not agreeable to the USA 22. The EU is 
likely to follow suit in this respect 23. 
The threat to the world trade system from these unilateral threats and 
actions is, that they invalidate the settlement of trade frictions in the 
multilateral setting of the GATT and furthermore undermine the credibil- 
ity of commitments to this multilateral setting of nations pursuing such 
unilateralism. 
4. The Rise of Regionalism 
The impression is that regional economic integration is fragmenting the 
world economy into three internally coherent trading blocs: in the 
Americas, in Europe and around the Pacific. Empirical evidence however 
indicates that an increasing focus on internal trade is only a clear 
tendency in the EU, not so much in the NAFTA countries and certainly not 
in the Pacific area (Schott, 1991). Moreover regional economic integra- 
tion is welcomed under GATT. 
The threat to the multilateral trade system from regionalism would only 
arise if economic liberalization within the region would be complemented 
with increasing protectionism against the other trading blocs. 
These four threats to the multilateral world trade system present a 
second perspective from which the outcomes of the Uruguay Round can be 
evaluated. 
2 2 For instance, measures have been announced toward Brazil, India 
and Japan in case these countries would not meet US demands 
regarding import restrictions, foreign investment requirements, 
and market access, respectively. For an extensive treatment of 
these issues see Bhagwati and Patrick (eds.) (1991). 
23 Financial Times, 16 April 1994. 
Olf course the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round will not keep in 
check completely these tendencies towards bilateralism and regionalism, 
but certainly these tendencies would have had more leeway, had the 
Uruguay Round failed. In this respect the clarification, streamlining and 
strengthening of GATT rules and dispute settlements is of great import- 
ance. In addition, the agreement on the establishment of the new World 
Trade Organization represents a commitment of all contracting parties to 
the multilateral setting of rules of conduct in international trade and 
investment. 
l7ie FDI-trade relationship 
It has been mentioned before, that a rise in protection may induce the 
exporter to engage in FDI in the increasingly protected market. This 
process is sometimes labelled 'tariff jumping', although non-tariff 
measures (NTMs) are usually more relevant in this respect. The reason is, 
that tariffs only increase the price of the imported good, whereas NTMs, 
such as quotas, limit the imports to a certain quantity. Nevertheless, 
protection as a reason for locating production facilities in the pro- 
tected market through FDI gives the suggestion, that trade and FDI are 
substitutes for each other in international economic activities. The 
relations between FDI and trade are more complicated than that, however. 
In a study 'Foreign Direct Investment: The Neglected Twin of Trade', 
Julius (1991) suggests four subdivisions of trade-related FDI: 
I.. FDI substitutes for international trade 
This represents the case, mentioned above, where foreign investment is 
directed at import substituting activities in the increasingly protected 
market. 
2. FDI promotes international trade 
In this case FDI is meant to set up manufacturing facilities, the 
products of which are to be exported. Usually this form of FDI takes 
place under favourable conditions such as tax exemptions and others. 
3. FDI complements international trade 
FDI may take the form of activities on an export market that are necess- 
ary or desirable in view of an already existing export flow. Examples are 
a service network to support the sales of exported automobiles, and the 
set up of commercial banks and other services in order to facilitate 
export activities more in general. 
4. FDI diverts international trade 
International trade in a number of cases is regulated by preferential 
arrangements, which may take the form of tariff quotas. Such tariff 
quotas are usually specific with respect to the type of products and 
exporter. FDI may shift production from locations, with no or exhausted 
preferential quotas to those where such quotas are yet unfilled. 
Trade Related Investment Measures 
The relationships between international trade and FDI have made it 
necessary .that under GATT the Uruguay Round included negotiations on 
trade related investment measures (TRIMs). Greenaway (1990) provides an 
overview of the issues, distinguishing TRIMs at the input and the output 
side of the production process. 
Input TRIMs 
Perhaps the most pervasive of investment measures are various forms of 
local content requirements. These specify that some proportion of value 
added, or of intermediate inputs must be locally sourced. If local inputs 
have higher costs than their imported counterparts, then this particular 
instrument has obvious trade effects. Trade balancing requirements can 
take a variety of forms. They could for instance link imports of one 
product (e.g. an input) to a specified performance on exports of some 
other product, which could be the final good. Again the instrument has 
very clear trade effects. Laws of similars require foreign investors to 
use local substitutes for imported inputs if a 'similar' component is 
manufactured locally. Clearly, if a multinational enterprise (MNE) would 
otherwise import the input, the trade restricting and distorting effects 
are obvious. Limitations on imports, generally by quota, accomplish the 
same end, though by a slightly more transparent route, and are self 
explanatory. Likewise with foreign exchange restrictions. These are often 
directed at constraining an investor in terms of the amount of intermedi- 
ate inputs which can be imported. In practice they operate like an import 
quota, and there is again a clear linkage to trade flows. 
Local equity participation is a very common precondition for investment, 
which like local hiring targets, expatriate quotas and national partici- 
pation in management, is designed to indigenise part of the operations of 
the affiliate. The trade effects of these requirements are less obvious 
than those discussed above. Insofar as they result in the decision making 
process being shifted away from purely commercial criteria, the balance 
between locally produced and traded products will be altered. Both R&D 
requirements and technology transfer requirements distort the type of 
investment undertaken, and the firm's commitment to technology transfer. 
As such they impact directly on the composition of the capital stock and 
its upgrading through time as the firm may be locked into a given R&D 
commitment, or a certain type of technology which would not otherwise be 
chosen. These may reduce import requirements, andlor limit opportunities 
to export. Earnings remittance limits typically restrict the amount.of 
profit which can be repatriated. In turn this can result in a diversion 
of earnings into investment for local production. 
Output TRIMS 
The most frequently reported form of output intervention are minimum 
export requirements. Many host governments insist that a certain propor- 
tion of final output is exported or that a certain value of exports is 
met. Where this intervention is effective, it can have potentially 
serious trade effects - exports would be higher than otherwise, resulting 
in trade deflection elsewhere. Trade balancing requirements can operate 
in a similar fashion by compelling the investor to export more of its 
output than it would do otherwise. A far le-ss common intervention is 
export controls directed at ensuring that exports of specified commod- 
ities are precluded, or restricted. Market reserve policy is applied when 
the local market is reserved for actual, and sometimes even potential, 
producers of a competing product. This condition appears to be especially 
common in connection with investments in export processing zones in Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs). If it locks the affiliate into exporting 
rather than supplying the domestic market, again it has clear trade 
effects. Product mandating requirements oblige the investor to export the 
mandated product from the host country only. Depending upon the level of 
demand to be satisfied globally, and the parent company's global invest- 
ment strategy, this could lock the MNE into exports from higher cost 
locations. These differ from licensing requirements which oblige the 
investor actually to license production of the output in the host 
country. This may mean that the amount of royalties the firm can receive 
is limited, as well as restraining what can be imported from the parent 
company. Finally, technology transfer restrictions can operate on outputs 
as well as on inputs - the potential for distortion of trade has already 
been discussed above. 
From this overview, it is clear that some TRIMs have direct trade 
distorting effects. Local content requirements are a case in point. So 
too are minimum export requirements, trade balancing requirements and 
export controls. Thus even if one accepts that they are measures designed 
to influence investment rather than trade in goods, the fact remains that 
they have a direct impact on the latter. As such, there is at least a 
prima facie case for extending GATT disciplines to cover TRIMs, although 
by reference to the effects of the measure rather than the measure per 
se. However, it is equally clear that the primary impact of most TRIMs is 
not on trade : local equity requirements, expatriate quotas, R&D require- 
ments and technology transfer requirements are all examples of this. Here 
trade flows may be affected indirectly, via, for instance, influencing 
the firm's choice of production technique or location of production, and 
it is not clear that an a priori case for bringing GATT disciplines to 
bear exists. 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 set out those TRIMs where existing GATT provisions 
appear to be applicablelinapplicable respectively. As can be seen in 
those cases where economic theory ascribes direct trade distorting 
effects, existing GATT articles may provide a mechanism for disciplining 
their use - this certainly applies to local content requirements, and 
possibly to export requirements. However, the case for GATT disciplining 
those TRIMs listed in Table 3.9 is less clear. 
Within the framework of the Uruguay Round an agreement on TRIMs was 
reached, that can be summarized as follows (GATT, 1993~). 
The agreement on TRIMs recognizes that certain investment measures 
restrict and distort trade. It provides that no contracting party shall 
apply any TRIM inconsistent with Articles I11 (national treatment) and XI 
(prohibition of quantitative restrictions) of the GATT. To this end, an 
illustrative list of TRIMs agreed to be inconsistent with these articles 
is appended to the agreement. The list includes measures which require 
particular levels of local procurement by an enterprise ('local content 
requirements') or which restrict the volume or value of imports an 
enterprise can purchase or use to an amount related to the level of 
products it exports ('trade balancing requirements'). 
Table 3.8 GATT provisions which may be applicable to TRIMS 
(A) Trade Effect: Reduction of Imports Into the Country Applying 
TRIMs 
TRIM 
Local Content Requirements 
GATT Article 
3.4, 3.5 
11 Trade Balancing Requirements 11.1, 3.4 
Manufacturing Requirements 11, 3.4, 3.5 
(B) Trade Effect: IncreaselDecrease of Exports from the Country 
Applying TRIMS 
TRIM GATT Article 
Minimum Export Requirements 1, 16.4 
II Product Mandate Requirements 1 11 Trade Balancing Requirements 16.4 
11 Domestic Sales Requirements 11 
Source: Greenaway (1990). 
Table 3.9 TRIMS which may have trade effects but to which existing 
GATT articles are inapplicable 
Licensing Requirements 
Technology Transfer Requirements 
Earnings Remittance Restrictions 
Local Equity Requirements 
Expatriate Quotas 
Local Hiring Targets 
National Participation in Management 
Source: Greenaway (1990). 
The agreement requires mandatory notification of all non-conforming TRIMs 
and their elimination within two years for developed countries, within 
five years for developing countries and within seven years for least- 
developed countries. It establishes a Committee on TRIMs which will, 
among other things, monitor the implementation of these commitments. The 
agreement also provides for consideration, at a later date, of whether it 
should be complemented with provisions on investment and competition 
policy more broadly. 
Government Po l i c i e s  
From the previous section it follows that a prudent use of TRIMs provides 
a government of a potential host country the possibility at least not to 
deter FDI. The range of government policies for attracting FDI is however 
much wider (Dunning, 1993a). These include: 
(a) conditions of entry; 
(b) operating requirements; 
(c> exit conditions; 
(d) achieving cost effective FDI. 
It is outside the scope of the present study to discuss these policy 
elements in detail. In general, Dunning (1993a) observes: 
The opening up of national economies to the winds of global competition, 
and the role which MNEs play both as actors in global markets and as 
brokers in the allocation of economic activity between nation states, has 
meant that host governments are now evaluating inward investment less for 
the new resources it provides and more for the way in which it can 
integrate their economies into the global market place and help upgrade 
the quality of indigenous human and physical capital. At the same time, 
to promote the right kind of MNE activity, governments have had to 
reappraise the efficiency of the markets under their jurisdiction and, 
where necessary, to help create the conditions under which they might 
work to the social good. 
Creating a stable political and economic environment is one of the main 
necessary conditions for attracting FDI. 
3.8 Globalization and Employment 
Recently the OECD (1994a) studied the situation of unemployment in the 
OECD countries. It concludes that unemployment is probably the most 
widely feared phenomenon of our times, and furthermore that the present 
level of unemployment of some 9 percent of the OECD labour force repre- 
sents an enormous waste of human resources, that it reflects an important 
amount of inefficiency in economic systems, and causes a disturbing 
degree of social distress. 
The OECD (1994b) presents an overview of developments in unemployment in 
the OECD area over the period since 1950. The results are represented in 
Figure 3.3. 
In North America, unemployment rates were relatively high in the 1950s 
and 1960s. But there has been only a modest trend increase since 1970, 
albeit with large cyclical fluctuations. Unemployment peaked at just over 
7.5 percent in 1992 - well below the previous peak of over 9.5 percent in 
the early 1980s - and is currently around 7 percent. 
By contrast, unemployment in both the European Community (EC) and Oceania 
has risen sharply since the mid-1970s. with the unemployment rate in both 
regions currently at record rates of around 10-11 percent. 
The EFTA countries successfully stabilized unemployment in a range of 2 
to 4 percent until 1990. Since then, the rate has risen sharply, to 
almost 8 percent. 
Japan has managed to keep unemployment low, at between 1 and 3 percent, 
throughout the entire post-War period. The current unemployment rate is 
almost 3 percent. 
In addition the OECD (1994a) observes, that for any given rate of 
unemployment the share of long-term unemployment is much higher in EC 
countries, than in North America. In the EC countries it ratcheted up, 
rising sharply during the recession in the early 1980s and declining only 
moderately during the upswing. By contrast, in North America the share of 
long-term unemployment increased much less during the recession, and 
subsequently fell back sharply. By 1989, it had fallen almost to its 1979 
level. 
Figure 3.3 Unemployment rates in OECD regions, 1950-1995 
(As a percentage of t h e  labour fo rce )  
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Source: OECD (1994b) . 
~t is well established (Kuznets, 1971) that with a rising level of 
economic development the share of various broad sectors in an economy's 
GDP changes considerably. A very high share of agriculture in the early 
stages of development is not sustainable in most cases, and the share of 
agriculture goes down with development gradually to very low levels in 
the most advanced countries today. The manufacturing sector first has a 
share growing to about 60 percent of GDP, later to decrease again, its 
most important position gradually being taken over by the services 
sector, that however has a considerably share at practically all stages 
of development in a monetized economy (Chenery and Syrquin, 1975). 
With respect to the OECD, today agriculture accounts for only 7 percent 
of total OECD civilian employment, compared with 14 percent in 1970 and 
almost 50 percent in 1870. The relative importance of employment 
(although not of output) in industry has also decreased, down from nearly, 
40 percent of OECD employment in 1970 to under 30 percent in 1992. The 
counterpart has been a continual rise in the importance of employment in 
the service sector (OECD, 1994a). 
The share of OECD employment in the service sector has risen, from less 
than 50 percent in 1970 to around 65 percent in 1992. Most of the new job 
growth during the 1980s occurred in services such as finance, insurance 
and business services, and community and personal services. 
These shifts in the sectoral composition of jobs are driven by many 
forces for change, including, international trade and technology. 
International trade has generally grown faster than GDP. Most trade flows 
are between OECD countries, and consist to a large extent (70 to 80 
percent in the EU countries) of trade in similar products within sectors, 
commonly labelled as intra-industry trade. Trade with non-OECD regions, 
such as the East Asian NICs and China, while growing fast, is still 
comparatively small. 
Imports from non-OECD countries are in substantial part labour-intensive 
manufactured products and primary materials, whereas exports by OECD 
countries very often have a relatively high skill content. Trade in 
manufactured goods with non-OECD countries remains in surplus, albeit 
diminished during the 1980s due to: a sharp contraction of the OPEC 
market; stagnating demand in debt-ridden developing countries; and a 
movement into trade deficit with the industrializing countries in Asia. 
Earlier, the deterioration was concentrated in a few labour-intensive 
sectors, notably textiles, clothing and footwear. Over the last 10 years 
the pattern changed with some non-OECD trading partners: in particular 
the East Asian NICs increased their market shares in knowledge-intensive 
sectors such as office equipment and telecommunications. 
Technological change continues to alter the nature of jobs. The main OECD 
countries, with their large domestic markets, have generally had the 
highest share of employment in high-technology manufacturing. But the 
rapidly growing international market for new technology products makes 
high-tech production feasible even for small countries. Thus not only 
Japan, but also some smaller countries (notably Ireland, Australia, 
Finland and Norway), have been particularly successful in strengthening 
their competitiveness in high-tech industries. Many other European 
countries have a relatively poor record in shifting to high-tech exports. 
The only large Ed country that strengthened its comparative advantage 
significantly in high-tech products, the United Kingdom, did so not by 
increasing its market share for high-technology commodities, but through 
a large loss of market share for low- and medium-tech products in the 
early 1980s (OECD, 1994a). 
With respect to job creation there is a striking difference between Japan 
and the USA on one side and the EC and EFTA on the other. Job growth in 
the United States and Japan has taken place largely in the private 
sector. By contrast, some two-thirds of the 10 million jobs created in 
the EC and EFTA since the early 1970s have been in the public sector. 
During the 1980s, however, the pace of public sector job growth slowed 
considerably in Europe, and private sector employment, which had fallen 
between the mid-1970s and early 1980s, picked up. Private sector employ- 
ment gains over the past decade were largest in Germany, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom (OECD, 1994a). 
Public sector discussion on the causes of high and rising unemployment 
usually runs along the following lines (OECD, 1994a): 
- Technology causes rising unemployment. This view holds that the 
pace of technological change should be slowed, for example through 
the development of a two-tier economy: one highly productive 
sector and the other, favoured by policy, much more labour-inten- 
sive. 
- 1mpor.t~ from low-wage countries cause higher unemployment and drag 
down wages of low-skilled workers. Proponents of this view regard 
import competition from low-wage countries and regions as unfair 
and support protectionism to curb what they see as social dumping. 
- The intensity of competition is to blame. Competition has inten- 
sified, partly as a result of globalization, obliging firms to 
become ever more efficient through processes such as mergers, 
downsizing or re-engineering - all of which raise the spectre of 
fewer stable jobs in large enterprises. The response would be to 
reduce the intensity of competition, using tools such as anti- 
dumping actions, merger controls and financial regulations and job 
security provisions. 
Evidence from a range of countries and experiences over the past four 
decades and especially over the past few years indicates that none of 
these suggested causes is primarily or even importantly responsible for 
today's unemployment. 
Analyses of trade in goods suggest that there has been a small negative 
effect on demand for unskilled labour in OECD countries due to trade with 
non-OECD countries, but that losses of unskilled jobs have been largely 
offset by jobs gained through trade in goods produced by skilled labour. 
The relation between trade and earnings is less clear, due to difficulty 
in clearly isolating trade from other effects on earnings, and to lack of 
necessary data. The main impact of international investment flows is felt 
in OECD countries, which are the major sources and destinations of 
investment. Net flows to non-OECD countries are small relative to fixed 
investments, and they are unlikely to have had significant impact on 
employment to date (OECD, 1994a). 
Table 3.10 presents a decomposition of developments in employment up to 
the mid-1980s in seven important OECD countries. The change in employment 
has been decomposed into six effects: the expansion of domestic final 
demand, of foreign final demand (exports), of final demand for foreign 
products (imports of final goods), the imports of intermediate goods, the 
changes in the structure of intermediate deliveries (input-output 
coefficients), and the change in labour intensity of production (produc- 
t.lvity ) . 
Table 3.10 Sources of change i n  average anrmal employment growth r a t e s  f o r  high-, medium- and lw- 
Country 
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output. As can be seen from Table 3.10, domestic demand tends to be the 
dominant factor for the high-growth group; domestic demand and exports 
generally have a similar impact on the medium-growth groups; and techno- 
logical changes usually had a positive impact on the employment growth 
rate of the high-growth group, but had a negative effect on the low- 
growth group. The significant change from this pattern is in the low- 
growth group where productivity changes were the dominant factor associ- 
ated with declining employment growth rates, exceeding the impact of 
imports or changes in technology. In nearly every country, the relative 
impact of productivity compared to the other factors was the largest in 
the low-growth group. 
It is noteworthy in particular, that in sectors experiencing low output 
growth, growth of employment was negative in all countries investigated. 
The predominant factor turns out to be the change in productivity. The 
import factor is far less important generally, with the exception of the 
USA. Of course the methodology followed by the OECD (1992) does not 
preclude that the changes in productivity upon closer investigation could 
turn out to be import induced to some extent. However the present 
analysis is perfectly clear in its result that it is not imports per se 
that leads to disappointing employment developments in low-growth 
industries. Besides, the results confirm the common notion that employ- 
ment creation is served best by expansion of high-growth industries 
rather than protecting those with a low-growth, protracting necessary 
adjustments at the same time. 
Difficulties in absorbing technology have been handled differently in 
different countries. Japan, Germany and Sweden are considered leaders in 
the use of information technologies for advanced manufacturing processes, 
ahead of countries with poorly adapted industrial structures or, more 
importantly, with firms that have been slow to re-design organization and 
production systems. The United States, while behind on information 
technologies use in industrial production, has a computer orientation 
that produces a high rate of information technologies applications, in 
computer-aided design and engineering (OECD, 1994a). 
The basic policy message of the OECD (1994a) is unambiguous: high 
unemployment should be addressed not by seeking to slow the pace of 
change, but rather by restoring economies' and societies* capacity to 
adapt to it. But this must be undertaken in ways which do not abandon.the 
social objectives of OECD societies. Rather, social objectives must be 
met in new, more carefully-designed ways that do not have the past 
unintended and undesirable side effects. 
The OECD (1994b) presents four policy approaches to facilitate adjust- 
ments in the labour market: 
1. Measures to reduce barriers to labour mobility. 
Two important barriers to labour mobility are housing market distortions 
and the non-portability of employer pension plans. 
2 .  Reform of employment protection provisions. 
A certain degree of employment protection is justified in order to 
protect the workers from arbitrary dismissals. However, dismissals which 
are required on economic grounds should be allowed. 
3. Facilitating school-to-work transition. 
There is no single approach for improving the transition from school to 
work that is valid for all countries. In general, evidence shows that a 
smooth transition from the formal education system to the labour market 
depends on partnerships linking the two. 
4. Improving investment in further education and training. 
Upgrading of knowledge and competences later in working life is impeded 
by the lack of incentives for employers and individuals to invest in 
further training. Governments can act to reduce the uncertainty surround- 
ing investment in further training by among others improving the trans- 
parency of the costs and benefits of training. 
3.9 Economic Developments in Central and Eastern Europe 
3.9.1 Introduction 
The focus of foreign trade relations of the countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) on Western Europe was identified in section 2.8 as a 
major recent development. In view of the importance of East-West economic 
relations both from the perspective of the CEE and of the EU, the present 
section will examine these relations in more detail. 
The foreign trade position of the Central and Eastern European countries 
has changed since the transition from central planning economies to 
market economies around 1989. As a result of this transition trade 
between the CEE countries declined substantially, while trade with the 
developed market economies increased. These movements in overall exports 
and imports caused trade surpluses to drop or even become trade deficits 
(United Nations, 1994). 
This section examines recent economic developments in the CEE transition 
economies. Section 3.9.2 reviews foreign trade of Central and Eastern 
Europe, focusing on trade between the CEE economies and the European 
Union. Section 3.9.3 analyses the trade policies of Central and Eastern 
Europe and of the EU. Finally, in section 3.9.4 recent developments of 
FDI in central and Eastern Europe are presented. 
3.9.2 Foreign Trade of Central and Eastern Europe 
After the transition from central planning economies to market economies 
around 1989, total exports and imports of the CEE countries declined 
considerably. Table 3.11 shows that both total exports and total imports 
of the 6 CEE countries studied in this section (Bulgaria, former 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the former USSR) halved 
between 1989 and 1992. However, the trends in exports and imports vary 
considerably among the different countries. 
A considerable decline in exports of Bulgaria, Romania and the former 
USSR during the period 1989-1992 can be observed. Exports of Poland 
remained stable, while Hungary increased its exports in the period 
mentioned. The decline of exports in former Czechoslovakia is reversed in 
1.992 . 
A slightly different pattern can be observed for imports. Imports of 
Bulgaria and the former USSR declined substantially, while imports of 
Eungary and Poland increased. Imports of Romania and former 
Czechoslovakia show a modest decline. 
In five of the CEE countries mentioned an overall trade surplus in 1989 
has changed into an overall trade deficit in 1992. Only in the former 
USSR a trade deficit reversed into a trade surplus. 
It 
- - - -- 
Table 3.11 Central and Eastern Europe: exports, imports and trade 









Hungary Exports 9584 
Imports 8803 
Trade Balance 781 
Poland Exports 13155 
Imports 10085 











Total Exports 172851 
Imports 171049 
Trade Balance 1802 
Source: UNCTAD (1994). 
Af te r  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t r ade  flows of the  CEE coun t r i e s  were d i v e r t e d  from 
i n t r a - t r a d e  wi th  o t h e r  CEE coun t r i e s  towards Western market economies 
(European Commission, 1994).  Table 3.12 shows t h e  geographical p a t t e r n  of 
fo re ign  t r a d e  of Cen t r a l  and Eastern Europe and the former USSR i n  1970, 
1980 and 1992. 
The share  of intra-CEE t r a d e  i n  t o t a l  expor t s  of t he  CEE coun t r i e s  
dec l ined  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  (from 60 percent  of t o t a l  exports i n  1970 t o  19 
percent  i n  1992) ,  while  the share of intra-CEE t r ade  i n  t o t a l  imports of 
t h e  CEE coun t r i e s  dec l ined  even more (from 64 percent  of t o t a l  imports i n  
1970 t o  17 percent  i n  1992).  
For t h e  CEE c o u n t r i e s  t he  importance of t h e  EU a s  a  market of d e s t i n a t i o n  
increased  i n  the  per iod  1970-1992. The share  of t o t a l  CEE exports  
d i r e c t e d  t o  t h e  EU increased  from 1 2  percent  i n  1970 t o  45' percent  i n  
1992. Looking a t  t h e  t r ade  flow from the  EU t o  the CEE coun t r i e s  a  
s i m i l a r  conclusion can be drawn. The EU a s  a  source of o r i g i n  f o r  imports 
increased  i n  importance f o r  t he  CEE coun t r i e s  from 13 percent  of  t o t a l  
CEE imports i n  1970 t o  43 percent  i n  1992. 
From t h e  EU pe r spec t ive  the share of t o t a l  EU imports o r i g i n a t i n g  from 
Cen t r a l  and Eas t e rn  Europe has decreased from 3 .4  percent i n  1970 t o  2.,9 
percent  i n  1992 and t h e  share of EU expor ts  going t o  t he  CEE coun t r i e s  
decreased from 3.4 percent  i n  1970 t o  3 . 1  percent  i n  1992. 
For t h e  former USSR a s imi l a r  p a t t e r n  can be observed a s  f o r  t h e  CEE 
c o u n t r i e s  a s  a whole. The share of former USSR exports  d i r e c t e d  t o  the EU 
rose  from 11 percent  i n  1970 t o  45 percent  i n  1992 and the  share of 
former USSR imports o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  the  EU increased from 12 percent  i n  
1970 t o  33 percent  i n  1992. Simultaneously the  share of t r a d e  with 
Cen t r a l  and Eas te rn  Europe i n  t o t a l  t r a d e  of t he  former USSR decreased 
( f o r  expor t s  from 53 percent  i n  1970 t o  14 percent i n  1992 and f o r  
imports from 58 percent  i n  1970 t o  1 5  percent  i n  1992).  
Table 3.12 Direc t ion  of fo re ign  t r a d e  of Cent ra l  and Eas t e rn  
Europe, 1970-1992 
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Source: UNCTAD (1994).  
There a r e  marked d i f f e rences  i n  t he  s t r u c t u r e  of exports  of the  former 
USSR and the  o t h e r  CEE count r ies  t o  t h e  EU. From Table 3.13 can be seen 
t h a t  f o r  the  former USSR exports  t o  t h e  EU cons i s t  mainly of primary 
goods, wi th  a  share  of 75 percent  of t o t a l  exports  i n  1992 (of which 
f u e l s  r ep re sen t  around 60 pe rcen t ) .  The o the r  CEE coun t r i e s  mainly export  
manufactured products  t o  the EU, with a  share  varying between around 
111 
60 percent  ( f o r  Poland and Bulgaria)  and almost 90 percent  ( f o r  Romania) 
of  t h e i r  t o t a l  expor t s  i n  1992. 
brchandise exports of Central and Eastern Europe and tha former USSR to the EU by product 
group. 1990-1992 ( i n  percentages) 
Czecho- 
slovakia 
( former) Hungary Romania 
USSR 
(former) Year Bulgaria Poland 
(Source: GATT, 1993a) .  
Although t h e r e  a r e  v a r i a t i o n s  between the  ind iv idua l  CEE c o u n t r i e s ,  
w i t h i n  manufactured products the main export  c a t e g o r i e s  t o  t h e  EU inc lude  
c l o t h i n g ,  machinery and t r anspor t  equipment, chemicals ,  and i r o n  and 
s t e e l .  
3 . 9 . 3  Trade P o l i c i e s  i n  Cent ra l  and Eas te rn  Europe and t h e  EU 
Trade p o l i c i e s  i n  Central  and Eastern Europe 
Recently the  IMF (1992) presented an overview of t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  i n  
Cen t r a l  and Eas te rn  European (CEE) coun t r i e s ,  a g a i n s t  the background of 
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  before  t he  t r a n s i t i o n .  
A f t e r  World War I1 t h e  CEE c o u n t r i e s  were reorganized under t h e  inf luence  
of t h e  former USSR system of c e n t r a l  planning. 
The coord ina t ion  of imports and expor ts  was an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  of the  
c e n t r a l  planning process .  The composition and l e v e l  of t r ade  were 
inf luenced  by a  number of c o n t r o l  mechanisms including c e n t r a l  a l l o c a t i o n  
of fo re ign  exchange and l i c e n s i n g .  Foreign t rade  organiza t ions  were 
e s t a b l i s h e d  and had a  s t a t e  monopoly on foreign t r a d e .  Firms d i d  not  
t r a d e  d i r e c t l y  wi th  t h e i r  f o r e i g n  counterpar t s  or  face  world p r i c e s ;  they 
exported and imported products  through fore ign  t r a d e  organiza t ions  a t  
r u l i n g  domestic p r i c e s  w i th  the  d i f f e r ence  between i n t e r n a t i o n a l  and 
domestic p r i c e s  being absorbed ( i n  t he  case of l o s s e s )  o r  taxed ( i n  the  
case  of p r o f i t s )  by the  government budget. Thus, although t a r i f f s  were 
gene ra l ly  low, cen t r a l -p l an  t o o l s  and exchange con t ro l s  provided a  high 
l e v e l  of p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  domestic product ion (IMF, 1992).  
Trade wi th  o t h e r  c e n t r a l l y  planned economies and market economies 
involved d i f f e r e n t  arrangements.  The former was l a r g e l y  undertaken i n  
non-convert ible  cur renc ies  w i th in  t h e  arrangements of t h e  CMEA 2 4 .  This 
t r a d e  was based on f ive -yea r  b i l a t e r a l  agreements with annual negot i -  
a t i o n s  t o  agree on p r i c e s  and o the r  d e t a i l s .  A b i l a t e r a l  surp lus  with one 
country could n o t  be used t o  f inance a  b i l a t e r a l  d e f i c i t  with another  
country.  Trade wi th  market economies was undertaken mainly i n  conve r t ib l e  
cu r r enc ie s  and was sub jec t  t o  s t a t e  con t ro l .  
Tlie commodity composition of  CMEA t r a d e  with s o c i a l i s t  coun t r i e s  (mostly 
in t h e  CMEA a r e a )  d i f f e r e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  from t h a t  with the  market 
economies. Machinery and t r a n s p o r t  equipment were the  most important 
expor t s  t o  s o c i a l i s t  coun t r i e s ;  while food, crude ma te r i a l s  and manufac- 
t u r e d  a r t i c l e s  gene ra l ly  were the most important expor t s  t o  i n d u s t r i a l  
c o u n t r i e s .  The CEE coun t r i e s  exported mainly machinery equipment and 
o t h e r  manufactures t o  the  former USSR i n  exchange f o r  f u e l s  and raw 
m a t e r i a l s .  
2 4 The CMEA was founded by Bulgaria ,  Romania, former Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Hungary and t h e  former USSR i n  1949. 
The overall terms of trade of CEE countries were quite favourable 
compared with what they would have been without the CMEA arrangements; it 
has been estimated that moving to world market prices would involve a 
terms of trade deterioration in the range of 20 to 30 percent for Central 
and Eastern Europe 25. 
Some CEE countries had undertaken partial economic reforms prior to the 
political revolution that swept Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. 
In the past few years CEE countries have initiated and in some cases 
accelerated comprehensive reform programmes designed to transform their 
economic systems rapidly into market-based economies 26. Liberalization 
of the trade and exchange system is an important component of these 
reforms. All six countries have eliminated the stave monopoly of foreign 
trade, substantially reduced quantitative restrictions, and moved towards 
a trade regime in which price-based measures (tariffs and exchange rates) 
are the main trade policy instruments. Export subsidies, except those on 
some agricultural products, have been removed, and export licensing has 
been reduced significantly. In parallel with the removal of trade 
restrictions, all six countries have established the essential elements 
of convertibility for current international transactions although some 
restrictions remain in place (IMF, 1992). 
Notwithstanding these reforms, the CEE countries are not yet fully 
integrated into the multilateral trade system. Further progress in this 
area will depend, inter alia, on (i) the continuation of the systemic 
reforms; and (ii) sufficient access to foreign markets, particularly 
those of industrial countries. The latter is of particular importance 
given the collapse of trade among former members of the CMEA, and the 
rapid deterioration in economic conditions in most of Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
Kenen (1991). 
26 The countries covered in this section include Bulgaria, the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic (former Czechoslovakia), Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. 
In all countries reforms are being supported by financial resources and 
technical assistance provided by the IMF and the World Bank. 
A move towards currency convertibility and more open trade regimes are 
important components of reform in all CEE countries. 
In Hungary and Poland convertibility is largely limited to the enterprise 
sector, and most countries have maintained limits on travel allowances. 
All countries permit inward foreign investment and repatriation of 
dividends and profits (IMF, 1992). 
The elimination of most implicit and explicit non-tariff barriers and the 
liberalization of exchange controls means that tariffs and exchange rates 
have become the principal trade policy instruments in these countries. 
Measures have also been taken to liberalize exports. Most export sub- 
sidies have been removed and export licensing has been significantly 
reduced in most countries. However, some restrictions remain in place in 
all CEE countries, in particular, to comply with VERs and quotas applied 
by trading partners in sectors such as textiles and clothing, agricul- 
ture, steel, and coal. In addition, temporary export bans were introduced 
(Bulgaria in 1990) and licensing retained (former Czechoslovakia) to 
ensure adequate domestic supplies of products such as foodstuffs and raw 
materials during the adjustment process and to prevent the export (or re- 
export) of products that are subject to domestic price controls or 
imported at the official exchange rate (Romania). 
In addition, partly in response to access difficulties in industrial 
country markets and EU export subsidies, some of the CEE countries have 
introduced measures to protect their agricultural sectors. 
Issues in the design of trade reform 
A broad consensus has emerged both on the need for a rapid and comprehen- 
sive reform in Central and Eastern Europe and on the main elements of 
such a reform package. The latter include macroeconomic stabilization and 
control, liberalization of trade and establishment of convertibility for 
current account transactions, price liberalization and the development of 
a competitive private enterprise sector, the creation of efficient 
financial institutions and the liberalization of financial markets, 
deregulation of labour markets, and the establishment of a social safety 
net. Reform programmes must be credible and specify the long-term 
objectives and transaction path at the outset of the reform (IMF, 1992). 
Within this context, there is a broad consensus that trade liberalization 
should be implemented early in the reform process. The well-documented 
experiences of other countries, such as Korea, might provide useful 
guidelines (World Bank, 1992). 
An accelerated pace of trade liberalization in reforming socialist 
economies is considered essential because, compared with market econ- 
omies, relative prices are highly distorted, factor markets function 
poorly, domestic production is more highly concentrated, the extent of 
state ownership is much greater, and trade has been distorted by arrange- 
ments among former CMEA members 2 7 .  Notwithstanding the above consider- 
ations, it has been suggested that temporary tariff protection might be 
provided in the short run to avoid the move to world prices being 
disruptive. 
This approach would partly negate the positive contribution trade 
liberalization can make toward eliminating distortions due to monopolis- 
tic market structures (IMF, 1992). 
CEE countries have negotiated or are seeking new bilateral trade and 
barter agreements with the former USSR or the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (and in some cases with other former CMEA countries) as a way of 
cushioning the impact of the collapse of CMEA trade. In the current 
circumstances, with the collapse of trade due to the shortage of foreign 
exchange and disorganization in the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
these arrangements are considered necessary to maintain a certain level 
of trade and avoid unnecessary enterprise closure. In most cases, barter 
trade appears to involve inter-enterprise arrangements. These agreements 
tend to sustain the distorted production structures and trade flows and 
to delay the process of adjustment (IMF, 1992). 
2 7 Havrylyshyn and Tarr (1991). 
Integration into the multilateral trade system 
The full integration of the CEE countries into the multilateral trade 
system will depend - as mentioned before - on (i) the continuation of the 
systemic reforms; and (ii) sufficient access to Western markets. 
During the last few years industrial countries have taken a number of 
steps to improve the access of Central and Eastern Europe to their 
markets. The United States extended MFN status to former Czechoslovakia 
in November 1990 and to Bulgaria in April 1991. In addition, the United 
States has increased the quantities of steel products subject to VERs 
that may be imported from Hungary and Poland. 
Major changes in EU relations with Central and Eastern Europe have 
occurred recently. This issue will be taken up more extensively below. 
Membership in GATT on normal terms is essential to provide Central and 
Eastern Europe with greater security of access to markets of other 
Contracting Parties. At the same time, acceptance of the full obligations 
ad GATT membership may enable CEE governments to lock in trade reforms 
and to resist protectionist pressures that may arise to backtrack on 
reforms. 
Trade policies of the European Union towards Central and Eastern Europe 
CEE countries were subject for a long time to a very restrictive import 
regime by the EC, based on a tight quantitative regulation of flows. 
Until 1989 EC imports from the state-trading countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (with the exception of Romania) 28 were governed by 
Regulations No. 1765182 and No. 3420183. The former set the trade regime 
applicable to products not subject to quantitative restrictions, includ- 
ing the safeguard measures. The latter dealt with products not liberal- 
ized at the Community level and with the administration of the special 
hport arrangements that applied to them (Grilli, 1995). 
Recently, the European Union (EU) implemented a programme of trade 
Liberalization towards the CEE countries. The process of reduction of EU 
281 Romania has been a (partial) GSP beneficiary since 1974. 
trade barriers started in 1990 with the unilateral abolition of the 
specific quantitative restrictions that applied to state-trading coun- 
tries and the suspension of quantitative restrictions applying to all 
countries; it continued in 1991 with the concession of GSP status to five 
of the CEE countries, and culminated in the five Association or Europe 
Agreements signed between the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1993, 
which established a differentiated schedule for further trade liberaliz- 
ation between the signatory countries and the EU, having as the final 
objective the establishment of a free-trade area between them at the end 
of a transitional period having a maximum duration of 10 years. These 
agreements, first signed with Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak 
Republic (December 1991). and subsequently with Bulgaria and Romania (in 
February and March 1993 respectively), commit the EU to eliminate import 
tariffs over a 2 to 5 year period (6 years for tariffs on textiles and 
clothing) and the CEE countries to do the same in 4 to 9 years. They also 
commit the EU to phase out its quantitative restrictions on imports of 
textiles over a period of 5 years. The agreements do, in addition, 
improve market access for agricultural products from Central and Eastern 
Europe and extend GATT consistent anti-dumping rules to these countries. 
Further improvements in the access to EU markets of these countries was 
pledged by the European Council held in Copenhagen in June 1993 (Grilli, 
1995). 
Yet, the Europe Agreements contain numerous protectionist escape clauses. 
There are safeguard provisions built into them in case of both serious 
injury to EU producers and of serious sectoral difficulties leading to a 
significant deterioration of economic conditions in a region of the EU. 
There are specific safeguard clauses concerning textiles, and the 
possibility of a return to managed trade in specific sectors (such as 
steel) is in no way diminished by the content of the Agreements. 
At present EU tariffs are relatively high on, among others, chemicals and 
food, both products of particular interest to CEE countries' exports. 
With respect to non-tariff measures (NTMs), the EU concluded voluntary 
export restraints and took anti-dumping and other NTMs for steel and 
chemicals from Central and Eastern Europe. Between 1986 and 1990 however, 
CEE countries only accounted for 13 percent of total anti-dumping actions 
initiated by the EU. In addition five MFA type of arrangements were 
concluded with CEE countries; in 1993 quotas by member states were 
substituted for however by EU-wide restrictions. The liberalization of 
imports from Central and Eastern Europe, especially in the textile and 
clothing sectors, has also contributed to the reduction of the number of 
import quotas and VERs in force in the EU (Grilli, 1995). 
According to recent estimates (Kaminski, 1994) the industrial product 
provisions of the Europe Agreements cover about 80 percent of the 
signatory countries' exports to the EU and improve significantly access 
to its market. In 1992, their first year of application for Hungary, 
Poland and former Czechoslovakia, the Agreements freed about 50 percent 
of the. exports of these countries to the EU. The equivalent share for 
Bulgaria and Romania in 1993 is estimated at 54 percent and 39 percent 
respectively. Over the first five-year period of their application, the 
Agreements are expected to let free trade with the EU increase 80 percent 
in former Czechoslovakia, 60 percent in Hungary and 70 percent in Poland. 
The recent considerable reduction in the use of tariffs and NTMs towards 
imports from Central and Eastern Europe represents an important change in 
EU trade policies. As Table 3.14 illustrates, the trade performance of 
CEE countries 2 9 ,  lackluster for many years, began to improve in the 
aggregate at the very end of the 1980s, in concomitance with the gen- 
erally improving access of their exports to European markets. The overall 
share of these countries in extra-EC imports, which had fallen to about 2 
percent by the end of the 1970s, remained unchanged at such a low level 
until 1989. Since then it rose steadily to over 4 percent in just three 
years. In EC markets these countries did better as exporters in practi- 
cally all product categories, both when directly competing (food products 
and manufactures) and when not competing (crude materials, non-ferrous 
metals) with EC domestic producers. The only exception was fuels, whose 
market share remained unchanged. Liberalization of imports by the EU 
appears to have helped particularly in textiles, clothing, footwear, 
furniture, steel and metal manufactures. These are mostly labour-inten- 
sive export products on which the labour cost advantages enjoyed by the 
29 The aggregate is here defined as the summation of Poland, Hungary, 
former Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. 
CEE countries weighed very strongly, once access to the EU market became 
less encumbered. For these countries broad based improvements in market 
positions correspond in time and product composition to broad based 
liberalization of imports implemented by the EU since 1990 (Grilli, 
Table 3.14 Share of imports from Central and Eastern Europe in EC 
imports by sector, 1976-1992 (in percentages) 
I 
Competing food and agricultural products 
Crude materials (excl. fuels) 
Fue 1 s 
Chemicals 
Footwear and leather goods 
Rubber, cork and paper products 










Total imports exclude intra EC-trade 
Source: Grilli (1995). 
3.9.4 Foreign Direct Investment and Central and Eastern Europe 
In the World Investment Directory 1992 the UN (1993a) in collaboration 
with the UN Economic Commission for Europe presented an overview of 
developments of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Inward and outward FDI are dealt with separately. The present 
subsection provides a summary of the main findings by the UN (1993a) 
emphasizing inward FDI. 
Inward FDI 
The reintegration of the long isolated Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
economies into the world economy began in the late 1960s. This long-term 
trend was greatly accelerated in the late 1980s by the collapse of its 
regional organizations and initiated the longer-term transformation of 
the CEE economies and societies 30. 
One important dimension of the process of CEE reintegration into the 
world economy is FDI, both inward and outward. In their post-war isola- 
tion the CEE countries remained on the sidelines as the role of trans- 
national corporations (TNCs) grew rapidly in importance in the global 
economy and annual flows of FDI increased to 225 billion dollar in 1990. 
Then gradually over the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, the CEE countries 
began to develop a more open environment towards FDI. At first, outflows 
of FDI from CEE economies expanded faster than inflows of FDI. During the 
second half of the 1980s, however, inward FDI began to grow rapidly, both 
in terms of number of investments and value of foreign equity participa- 
tion, as the reforms in the CEE countries served to open their relatively 
closed economies to an unprecedented degree (UN, 1993a). 
By October 1991, committed foreign equity participation in about 34,000 
aff filiates of foreign-based TNCs in CEE economies (excluding former 
Yugoslavia) was an estimated 9 billion dollar. On the other hand, total 
capital invested in foreign affiliates of TNCs based in CEE (excluding 
former Yugoslavia) was 1.2 billion dollar, a negligible share of global 
outflows. In spite of the small size of investment flows, the potential 
benefits that such investments carry for the host country can have a 
significant impact on the economic restructuring and the reintegration of 
CEE countries into the world economy over and above what the magnitude of 
the flows might suggest. Estimates are that cumulative investment flows 
30 In the publication by the UN (1993a) Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) cover 25 economies: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, former Czechoslovakia, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian 
Federation, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbeki- 
stan and Yugoslavia. All of these countries were long ruled by 
communist parties, and their economies were based on principles of 
state or collective (as opposed to private) ownership and adminis- 
trative (as opposed to market) allocation of resources. All are 
former members of the now defunct Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), with the exception of former Yugoslavia, which 
was an associate member. 
to the countries of the region could surpass 50 billion dollar by the end 
of the 1990s (UN, 1993a). 
The dismantling of their old centrally planned and controlled systems 
will greatly facilitate the commercial and financial integration of the 
CEE economies into the world economy. The traditional institutions of the 
state monopoly of foreign trade served to limit the scope for interaction 
between domestic enterprises and foreign markets. The shift to a market- 
price system is also creating conditions that are more familiar and 
favourable to foreign investors, and that are, at the same time, opening 
up many new investment opportunities to them. 
Major developments at the international level also help to explain the 
acceleration of FDI into the area. The end of the Cold War has seen the 
beginning of ambitious bilateral and multilateral programmes to assist 
their transformation. The collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization has led their former 
members to look westward to establish new ties. The transformation of the 
CEE economies and the abandonment of the preferential system for their 
mutual trade has greatly increased the need to be reintegrated into the 
world economy. The reorientation of the external relations has been 
especially towards Western Europe, with the unified European Union (EU) 
market from 1993 on adding to the attractions of geographical and 
cultural proximity. All of the Eastern European countries (with the 
exception of Albania) have signed new trade and cooperation agreements 
with the EU, and the Central European countries have negotiated second- 
generation agreements of association with the EU. All of the CEE coun- 
tries now belong to the major international economic organizations, or 
have indicated a desire to join. The new policy developments were 
accompanied by various measures to strengthen incentives and guarantees, 
including the negotiation of bilateral investment protection treaties 
(UN,  1993a). 
The unsettled conditions of the post-Communist transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe have, however, created difficulties in attracting the 
desired FDI inflows. These conditions also explain why the volume of 
actual investment in most countries of the region has been fairly limited 
so far. The investment climate in the CEE countries is complex and 
varied. The common problem areas can be briefly identified, however (UN, 
l993a) : 
* Legallregulatory conditions. The rapidly changing circumstances in 
which policy makers in the CEE countries had to work out a new 
legal framework and, with respect to the regulation of FDI, have 
resulted in a typically ad hoc, piecemeal approach, in particular 
in the former USSR. This in turn has led to a stream of legislat- 
ive measures governing FDI. The instability in the legal condi- 
tions for FDI (including the matter of property rights) has in 
itself constituted a major deterrent to foreign investors. 
Economic conditions. The CEE economies are passing through an 
economic crisis, reflected in declines in industrial output, the 
collapse of traditional export markets, unprecedented unemployment 
and strong inflationary pressures. The Central European economies 
may recover sooner, but the deep structural roots of the crisis 
suggest that it will be of a prolonged nature for all. Pending 
restructuring, underdeveloped areas of the economy - especially in 
business services and telecommunications - impede the FDI process. 
A heavy burden of external debt has added to traditional scarc- 
ities of hard currencies. Limited foreign exchange reserves have 
made it difficult to liberalize conditions on currency converti- 
bility, although considerable progress towards the common goal of 
convertibility has nevertheless been made in some countries, 
typically with some external financial assistance. 
Political conditions. From monolithic, one-party rule, CEE coun- 
tries have shifted to fractured, multi-party politics. Governments 
face daunting economic and social problems. The collapse of 
communist rule has initiated processes that have led to the 
disintegration of federal structures in some countries of the 
region (e.g. in the former USSR and former Yugoslavia). Foreign 
investors often find themselves confronted with jurisdictional 
conflicts among competing authorities. 
Institutional conditions. The transformation of CEE societies 
involves changes that, when carried out, will remove the long- 
standing institutional obstacles to FDI. The processes of marketi- 
zation, privatization and reintegration into the world economy 
will inevitably be long and difficult. Meanwhile, the institu- 
tional legacies of the centrally planned system create obstacles 
for FDI: underdeveloped markets (especially capital markets), a 
dominant but inefficient state sector, weak domestic currencies 
and foreign exchange controls, a fledgling commercial banking 
system, insufficient telecommunication facilities and management 
and accounting practices that differ significantly from interna- 
tional standards. 
The national regulatory framework 
Regulations concerning FDI were liberalized in many countries during the 
late 1980s. Such has been the extent of this liberalization, that purely 
legal barriers to the establishment and operation of foreign enterprises 
have virtually been removed (although other factors continue to hinder 
FDI). Nevertheless, the promulgation of these laws is still recent, and 
it will inevitably be some time before lawyers and judges and the civil 
services of the countries involved acquire the necessary experience in 
their practical application. Thus, in this period of transition, foreign 
investors may not be able to expect from the local courts the same degree 
of protection and guarantees for their various business activities that 
they are accustomed to elsewhere. 
Of equal importance to TNCs in the CEE economies are the laws regulating 
the transfer of ownership of state-owned enterprises and their assets 
from the state into private hands (UN, 1993a). Since the beginning of the 
1990s ambitious privatization programmes have been pursued in the CEE 
countries in which FDI is likely to play an important role. All the 
countries have introduced various laws to guide the privatization 
process, including the creation of government agencies to overview the 
process and to facilitate the technical procedures of the transfer. These 
laws principally authorize TNCs to acquire majority stakes in former 
state-owned enterprises, although restrictions can be found in areas 
considered sensitive by governments, such as defence and mining. 
Geographical distribution 
Western Europe has traditionally been and still is the principal source 
of FDI in CEE economies, as measured by the number of enterprises and the 
124 
w l u e  of investments (Table 3.15). Transnational corporations from 
Western Europe account for three-quarter to four-fifth of all FDI 
Cdisregarding the case of Bulgaria, for which the numbers of instances of 
m>I for which the source is unknown is very high, and the case of 
Romania). Geographical proximity, historical links and strategies of TNCs 
are the main factors behind this trend. The sources of FDI in the former 
USSR are distinctly more diverse, with about 20 percent of the value of 
FDI being accounted for by developing or CEE countries. The proximity of 
several republics of the former USSR to dynamic Asian economies has been 
a contributing factor, with a number of TNCs from the Republic of Korea 
and other Asian countries investing there. 
Table 3.15 Geographical breakdown of sources of inward FQI by rmmbar of investments and 
Country I Eu 
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b'Data for 228 operational foreign affiliates as of 25 March 1991. 
Data for 1,006 operational foreign affiliates as of January 1991. 
d . ~ s  of 17 January 1992; cumulative flows since 1987. 
Sburce: UN (1993a). 
S e c t o r a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
Table 3 . 1 6  summarizes data on the distribution by sector of FDI in the 
CEE economies. The following sectoral pattern emerges: 
*: Because of the limited data available, the sectoral distribution 
is shown by two measures, the number of investments and the total 
value of capital committed (but not necessarily actually 
invested). There is a considerable variation in the pattern 
1 2  5  
according t o  t he  two measures. This i s  because t h e  t y p i c a l  i nves t -  
ment i n  the primary and secondary sec to r s  i s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  g r e a t e r  
than  i n  the t e r t i a r y  sec to r .  
~r The r e l a t i v e  shares  of FDI i n  t he  secondary and t e r t i a r y  s e c t o r s  
vary considerably among coun t r i e s .  The secondary s e c t o r  i s  c l e a r l y  
dominant i n  Bulgar ia ,  Czechoslovakia and Poland. For Hungary, t he  
t e r t i a r y  s e c t o r  has  been the  p r i n c i p a l  t a r g e t  f o r  fo re ign  
i n v e s t o r s .  For the  former USSR, and e spec i a l ly  f o r  former Yugo- 
s l a v i a ,  FDI has been more evenly d i s t r i b u t e d  between t h e  two 
s e c t o r s .  
Table 3.16 Inward fo re ign  d i r e c t  investment by s e c t o r ,  end-1990 
former 
Czecho- 




a For 117 ope ra t iona l  a f f i l i a t e s  only.  
former 
USSR 
As of 25 March 1991, 228 ope ra t iona l  a f f i l i a t e s  only. 
former 
Yugo- 
s l a v i a  
e 
As of January 1991, 1,006 ope ra t iona l  a f f i l i a t e s  only. 
As of end-1989. 
Cumulative flows 1985-1988. 
Source: UN (1993a) .  
The sha re  of FDI i n  the  primary s e c t o r  i s  l e s s  than 10 percent  of t h e  
va lue  of c a p i t a l  committed. It i s  not  su rp r i s ing  t h a t  it i s  h ighes t  i n  
Poland, given the  importance of t h a t  s e c t o r  f o r  t he  Po l i sh  economy. It i s  
s u r p r i s i n g ,  t h a t  t h e  propor t ion  of the  primary s e c t o r  i n  the  former USSR 
i s  r e l a t i v e l y  low, given i t s  v a s t  r e se rvo i r s  of o i l  and o t h e r  n a t u r a l  
resources  and the  i n t e r e s t  expressed by seve ra l  TNCs i n  exploring 
investment possibilities in that sector. This reflects limitations on FDI 
in resource exploitation which are currently being relaxed, and the need 
for TNCs to re-negotiate agreements with Governments of newly formed 
States following the disintegration of the former USSR. 
Outward FDI 
At the end of the 1980s, and extending into the new decade, there was an 
increase of outward FDI from some of the more important CEE countries, 
associated with their new external and domestic reform programmes. It is 
not clear whether this increased pace of investment activity will 
persist, given the political and economic difficulties that those 
countries face in the 1990s. The need for an infrastructure to support a 
higher level of trade with developed and developing countries creates 
continued pressure to expand transnational operations. Many of the state- 
sector TNCs that have hitherto played a dominant role are in financial 
difficulties and face restructuring. The evidence to date suggests that 
restructured or privatized state enterprises will retain most of their 
foreign affiliates, since they are essential to their international 
operations. Meanwhile, new private enterprises are entering the field. 
Although immediate problems linked to the transition may well result in a 
deceleration of outward investment activity in the short-term, this is 
likely to be a temporary phenomenon. In the longer run, the closer links 
now being forged with Western Europe and the reintegration of the CEE 
economies into the world economy will require the direct presence abroad 
of CEE enterprises on an enlarged scale (UN, 1993a). 
3.10 Globalization of Financial Markets and Policy Coordination 
3.10.1 Introduction 
The end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 implied a shift from pegged 
exchange rates to a system with more flexible exchange rates. Since then, 
according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), two other key 
structural changes in the international financial system can be observed 
(Mussa et al., 1994): 
1. the rapid expansion of private international financial markets 
2. the removal of capital account restrictions in the industrial 
countries. 
These changes in international finance reflect various underlying 
tendencies (Mussa et al., 1994): 
- the growing commitment by many countries to current and capital 
account convertibility, 
- the large expansion in the scale of net and gross capital flows in 
the major industrial countries, 
- the globalization and integration of offshore and major domestic 
markets, 
- the dominant role of private flows in the financing of fiscal and 
current account imbalances, 
- the growing importance of institutional investors in cross-border 
securities transactions, and 
- the sharp increase in the use of derivative financial instruments. 
The next subsections present an overview of the main structural changes 
in the international financial system (3.10.2) and will discuss the 
policy implications (3.10.3). 
3.10.2 Structural Changes in the International Financial System 
P r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  f lows played only a limited role in financing fiscal and 
current accokt balances in the 1950s and 1960s. However, for developing 
countries in the 1970s and again in the early 1990s, and for industrial 
countries since 1970, private capital flows provided most of the cross- 
border financing of these countries ' financial imbalances 31. The abil- 
ity of international financial markets to respond to the financing needs 
associated with adjustments to unanticipated shocks was demonstrated in 
the early 1990s following the re-unification of Germany. In the three 
years prior to German re-unification, Germany was a net exporter of 
capital to the rest of the world, with a current account surplus of about 
50 billion dollar per annum. Following the re-unification, the German 
current account balance switched to deficits of 20 billion dollar or more 
per annum; and although German outward FDI declined, the current account 
3 1 An overview of recent developments is furthermore presented in the 
IMF study by Goldstein et al. (1993). 
dkficit was financed principally by sharp increases in inflows of 
portfolio investment and by the banking sector (Mussa et al., 1994). 
The growth of private international financial markets has been accom- 
panied by an ongoing expansion of current and capital account converti- 
b,ility 32. In the industrial countries the capital account convertibil- 
ity has led to a large expansion of net and gross capital flows between 
these countries, as well as increased participation by foreign investors 
and foreign financial institutions in major domestic financial markets. 
For example the net capital inflow into the USA rose from an average of 2 
billion dollar per annum (0.1 percent of GNP) in the period 1970-1972 to 
139 billion dollar a year (3 percent of GNP) in 1985-1988. Since then it 
dropped again to 65 billion dollar in the early 1990s (representing 1.25 
percent of GNP). (Mussa et al., 1994) 
An even more rapid expansion occurred in gross capital flows, reflecting 
hcreased cross-border banking transactions and flows of securities, the 
development of offshore (Eurocurrency) markets, and the entry of foreign 
financial institutions into domestic markets. For example, the stock of 
international loans (net of redepositing by banks) rose from 175 billion 
dollar at the end of 1973 (representing 5 percent of industrial coun- 
tries' GNP) to 3.6 trillion dollar at the end of 1993 (19 percent of 
industrial countries' GNP) (Mussa et al., 1994). 
Another aspect of the structural changes in international financial 
markets has been the growing importance of institutional investors in 
cross-border capital flows, especially in securities transactions. In the 
early 1970s. large institutional investors, such as pension funds, 
insurance companies, and mutual funds, played only a limited role in 
cross-border capital flows, owing to both official restrictions and the 
high costs of acquiring and managing diversified international port- 
folios. In the 1980s, however, the role of institutional investors in 
channelling funds between savers and investors increased, reflecting the 
3 z In 1975 only about one-third of all IMF members had accepted the 
obligations to allow current account convertibility, whereas by 
mid-1994 over one-half had done so, even as IMF membership had 
increased from 128 to 178 countries (Mussa et al., 1994). 
lower transactions costs for institutional investors relative to individ- 
ual investors, the increased willingness of individual savers to allow 
their portfolios to be managed by agents, and, in some countries, the tax 
advantages enjoyed by contractual savings plans (Mussa et al., 1994). 
The Group of Thirty published a study on the interdependence of capital 
markets, underlining two major aspects in recent globalization. 
Emergence of Japan 
The arrival of Japan as a key player on global capital markets was 
inevitable, but in its timing it can be construed as a response to macro- 
economic policies adopted in the 1980s. The decision early in the 1980s 
to reduce the Japanese fiscal deficit led, in the economic conditions of 
the time, to a large Japanese export surplus. Otherwise, full employment 
could not have been maintained in the face of a growing surplus of 
domestic saving. 
Japan's domestic financial institutions had to be given the opportunity 
to shift surplus domestic saving into foreign markets, to provide 
financial support to the current account surplus. The emergence of Japan 
has occurred along with the dismantling of exchange and capital controls 
in major industrial countries. This has led to a huge increase in cross- 
border flows, net and gross. Figures published in the latest annual 
report of the Bank for International Settlements show that net long-term 
capital outflows into securities from residents of 13 industrial coun- 
tries rose from an annual average of 17.5 billion dollar in 1975-79 to 
269 billion dollar in 1989, with almost 45 percent of that rise coming 
from Japan. Direct investment outflows showed a similar though somewhat 
less spectacular rise over the same period - from 34 billion dollar to 
174.5 billion dollar, with about 30 percent of the increase coming from 
Japan (Axilrod, 1990). 
Implications of Modern Financial Technology 
The enlargement and greater interconnectedness of international capital 
markets has been intensified by the revolutions in communications and 
computer technology. Financial technology advances are also the basis for 
the burgeoning worldwide markets for derivative instruments. The enhanced 
capacity of computers makes it easy to devise and to implement sophisti- 
cated strategies involving the futures, options and cash markets. All of 
this makes for great increases in overall trading volumes as market 
participants, drawn into arbitrage and hedging operations, take advantage 
of opportunities to bet on volatility or on price ranges (Axilrod, 1990). 
Developments in the international financial markets in the 1980s and 
early 1990s have stimulated furthermore the use of a variety of exchange- 
traded derivative instruments, mainly futures, options, and swaps. For 
example, at the end of 1992, the principle value of outstanding interest 
rate and currency swaps was 5.6 trillion dollar, five times the value at 
the end of 1987. The principal amount of exchange-traded derivative 
instruments increased twelve times since 1986 to arrive at 7.8 trillion 
dollar in 1993 (Goldstein et al., 1993). 
3.10.3 Policy Implications of Structural Changes in International 
Financial Markets 
The structural changes that have occurred in international capital 
markets since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system have clearly 
increased the international linkages between major domestic and offshore 
financial markets, particularly in the industrial countries. The capital 
markets of developing countries are also becoming more closely integrated 
with markets in the rest of the world, although they have progressed far 
less in that direction than industrial countries. It is still premature 
to speak of a single, global market where most of the world's savings are 
auctioned to the highest bidder and where a wide range of assets carry 
the same risk-adjusted return. However, access to international financial 
markets has become an increasingly important determinant of the share of 
global savings that is likely to accrue to a particular country (Mussa et 
al., 1994). 
Experience since the debt crisis has demonstrated that creditworthiness 
considerations play a dominant role in determining both the cost and 
availability of credit from international financial markets. While there 
is considerable debate about how well the markets evaluate the willing- 
ness and the ability of borrowers to service their debt obligations, it 
is clear that the perception that a borrower's creditworthiness has 
deteriorated or is about to deteriorate can lead to an abrupt curtailment 
of funding, which may be difficult - even in the medium term - to 
reverse. The evaluation of a country's creditworthiness is done on a 
continuing basis and is influenced by the market participants' perception 
of the quality of a country's macro-economic and financial policies. 
Creditworthiness is evaluated most explicitly by credit-rating agencies, 
which characterize the investment quality of a country's external debt 
(Mussa et al., 1994). 
These tighter connections between access to major domestic and offshore 
financial markets and the market's evaluation of a country's policies 
have reduced in some respects the authorities' autonomy in conducting 
macro-economic policies. It has become difficult to resist private 
markets when they have reached the concerted view that the outlook for a 
particular security or currency has changed. Thus, perceptions that a 
country is following weak or inconsistent policies can have an immediate 
impact on not only its cost of funds and access to international credit 
but also its ability to sustain a particular exchange rate or monetary 
policy (Mussa et al., 1994). 
The evaluation of a country's creditworthiness described above implies an 
important incentive for governments to adopt macro-economic and monetary 
policies that are considered appropriate from that perspective. As a 
consequence, there will be a tendency for individual countries' policies 
to converge. 
With respect to the members of the European Union (EU), the conditions 
for joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) provide a further stimulus 
for economic policy convergence 3 3 .  
3 3 IMF (1993) provides a recent overview of these conditions. 
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31.11 Globalization and Economic Convergence 
In a recent report the Group of Thirty addressed the question of globali- 
zation and its impact on the convergence of economic policies among 
countries (Ostry, 1995). 
Globalization is defined as the increasing economic linkage among 
countries by trade, by financial flows and by FDI. As an illustration of 
the process, it is observed that by the end of the 1980s worldwide sales 
of foreign affiliates of firms from all countries were nearly twice the 
value of world exports of goods and services. 
The process of globalization is believed to continue. The main reasons 
are that firms face competitive pressures to capture global economies of 
scale and scope and to have access to leading technologies, whereas 
developments in information technologies will allow the process of 
globalization to continue and to gain further importance. 
Pt is argued (Ostry, 1995) that firms opt for locations that are most 
harmonious in terms of communications, transportation and other infra- 
structural facilities, and furthermore in terms of access to markets and 
od the policy environment. In turn, as international firms become 
increasingly footloose, governments become fearful that their countries 
might diminish in locational attractiveness. The activities of Trans- 
national Corporations (TNCs) therefore put pressure on governments for 
more extensive coordination and harmonization of domestic policies, 
institutional arrangements and practices, especially in areas that relate 
to the attractiveness of a country as a location for investment. 
INfferences in tax regimes might serve as an example. As TNCs tend to 
exploit such differences by transfer pricing practices, a tendency to 
harmonize tax regimes would consequently follow in time. 
Another consequence is that a number of policy issues have entered the 
agenda of international negotiations on trade and investments, that 
lnitherto would have been considered as economic policies of domestic 
relevance only. Such issues include regulations regarding domestic 
subsidies, government procurement, technical standards, barriers to entry 
and competition policy, and policies to protect the environment and 
regarding labour rights and social standards. As these issues play an 
increasing role in the developments of trade and investments it is 
advocated that international negotiations within the framework of the 
OECD and the WTO would address these policies. Where bilateral or 
regional negotiations provide an appropriate start, it is advocated that 
a mechanism would be found by which the outcomes of such negotiations 
could be made to apply multilaterally. 
4. FRAGMENTATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
4.1 Fragmentation and Economies of Scale 
In a seminal article Young (1928) expanded the notion of the division of 
labour among workers as developed by Adam Smith to specialization among 
firms and industries. Young (1928) observed that it would be wasteful to 
make a hammer to drive a single nail. There are economies of scale that 
might be called of secondary order. How far it pays to go in equipping 
factories with special appliances for making hammers or for constructing 
specialized machinery for use in making different parts of automobiles 
depends ( . . . ) upon how many nails are to be driven and how many automo- 
biles can be sold. Again, the profitable use of machinery and even more 
the efficiency of setting up factories producing specialized machinery, 
the second order of division of labour, depends on the extent of the 
market. 
Young (1928) gives the following example. Industrial differentiation has 
been and remains the type of change characteristically associated with 
the growth of production. Notable as has been the increase in complexity 
of the apparatus of living, as shown by the increase in the variety of 
goods offered in consumers ' markets, the increase in the diversification 
of intermediate products and of industries manufacturing special products 
or groups of products has gone even further. The successors of the early 
printers are not only the printers of today, with their own specialized 
establishments, but also the producers of wood pulp, of various kinds of 
paper, of inks and their different ingredients, of type metal and of 
type, the group of industries concerned with the technical parts of the 
producing of illustrations, and the manufacturers of specialized tools 
and machines for use in printing and in these various auxiliary indus- 
tries, observes Young (1928) in a concrete example, that reflects the 
situation at the time. 
Young (1928) concludes, that over a large part of the field of industry 
an increasingly intricate nexus of specialized undertakings has inserted 
itself between the producer of raw materials and the consumer of the 
final product. This division of labour among industries is a vehicle of 
increasing returns and an adjustment to a new situation created by the 
growth of the market for the final products of an industry. It permits 
furthermore a higher degree of specialization in management and lends 
?fself to a better geographical distribution of industrial operations; a 
better combination of advantages of location, with a smaller amount of 
compromise in this respect. 
4 -2 Fragmentation and Location of Production 
4..2.1 The Textiles and Clothing Industry 
The textiles and clothing industries are the most geographically dis- 
persed of all industries across both developed and developing countries. 
They are changing very rapidly in their geography, their organization, 
and their technology and these changes are causing many frictions, 
particularly in trade relations between developed and developing econ- 
omies. Figure 4.1 reveals the many differences between the production 
characteristics of each sub-sector of the textiles-clothing production 
sequence. Whereas in clothing manufacture capital intensity is generally 
low, labour intensity is high and the technology used relatively unsoph- 
isticated, the reverse is true for the textiles industry. This difference 
helps to explain the survival of the textiles industry in the industrial- 
ized countries, while the clothing industry is being largely relocated to 
developing countries. 
~fgure 4.1 Variations in production characteristics between major 
components of the textiles-clothing production sequence 
Product ion 
characteristics 
Capi!al  in tensi ty 
La b o w  intensity 
Ma-teriel costs 
Average size of 
production unit 
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(synthet ic)  
Clothing 
High Low 
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Large ' - Sma!l 
Technology Sophisticated - = Simple 
Source: Dicken (1992). 
The global pattern in production and trade in the textiles and clothing 
sector has been one of relative decline in the older established centres 
of production in Western Europe and a rapid growth in a number of 
developing countries. In the developed market economies textiles produc- 
tion grew very little overall, although production growth in North 
America was considerable (12 percent between 1980 and 1987). In the EU, 
the best overall performance was achieved by Italy and the United 
Kingdom. France, Germany and the Netherlands all performed poorly 
(Dicken, 1992) . 
Like textiles, the manufacture of clothing is very widely spread geo- 
graphically, although there is a greater dispersion of clothing-exporting 
countries. The worldwide production of clothing increased at the same 
rate as textiles manufacture. In the case of the clothing industry, 
however, the developed economies fared far worse than in textiles. 
Between 1980 and 1987, clothing production in the developed economies 
decreased with 6 percent. Within the EU, the production of clothing in 
Germany decreased with 23 percent, in the Netherlands with 25 percent, 
and in France with 10 percent. Conversely, the United Kingdom did 
relatively very well, with a production increase of 11 percent between 
1980 and 1987 (Dicken, 1992). Clothing production increased very substan- 
tially in the developing countries as a whole (24 percent between 1980 
and 1987). 
From the viewpoint of the changing global distribution of these indus- 
tries the most important consideration is the extent to which individual 
production factors are geographically variable in either cost or avail- 
ability. The textile industry is considered as capital-intensive, while 
in the clothing sector labour remains the major means of production. 
Therefore, for the clothing industry labour costs are the most signifi- 
cant production element of total costs. 
Although EU textiles manufacturers transferred part of their activities 
towards low-wage countries, they remained competitive by increasing their 
flexibility, by raising the productivity through increased automation, 
and by diversifying their product ranges (European Commission, 1994). 
These developments in the technologies of production have increased the 
intensity of capital in the textiles industry. Other factors, however, in 
particular the orientation to specific markets and the space-shrinking 
technologies of transport and communications have also played a role in 
the location of textiles production (Elson, 1988). 
Although the textiles and clothing industries have long been involved in 
foreign operations in developing countries, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) was never significant. A growing number of companies can earn 
attractive returns from certain of their tangible or intangible assets - 
for example, technological, managerial, or international marketing 
capabilities - without having to own or finance investment projects in 
developing countries (Oman, 1989). 
For clothing - one of the most labour-intensive industries in the world 
economy today - labour costs are an important factor of location. Figure 
4.2 shows how much the labour costs in spinning and weaving vary between 
different countries. The spread is very large, from 14.60 dollar per hour 
in Switzerland to less than 25 dollar cents per hour in Indonesia. All 
the high-cost producers are in Europe, North America and Japan. Even 
allowing for productivity differences the developing countries have a 
large labour-cost advantage over the developed market economies, particu- 
larly in the production of staple items of clothing, which sell largely 
on the basis of price, rather than in fashion garments in which style is 
more important. 
Investment in the EU textiles industry fell in 1992, but is likely to 
rise again. The industry has now become very capital-intensive, and has 
seen large rises in productivity. In the long term its growth will depend 
partly on future high-'tech developments, which may give little incentive 
for the industry to delocalise production to low-wage countries (European 
Commission, 1994). 
Figure 4.2 International variations in labour costs in the textiles 
industry 
Hourly labour costs. 1989 (5)  
Source: Dicken (1992). 
4.2.2 The Electronics Industry 
The electronics industry can be described as manufacturing those products 
or systems that use electronic circuits handling small currents which 
incorporate active components capable of modifying the flow of electric- 
ity (Cable and Clarke, 1981). The electronics industry is not a homogene- 
ous industry, however; it can be divided into three subsectors: elec- 
tronic components, electronic equipment and consumer electronics (Figure 
4.3). This section will concentrate on two main subsectors of the 
electronics industry: the semiconductor industry and the television 
receivers industry, which are important branches in representing the 
electronic components and consumer electronics, respectively. In addi- 
tion, both branches have a large presence of transnational firms (Dicken, 
1992). 
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Figure 4.3 The electronics industry 
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Semiconductors 
The US has dominated world production of semiconductors for nearly two 
decades, after which Japan took over. In 1992 the world semiconductor 
market amounted to 60 billion dollar, a 9.6 percent increase over 1991. 
Japan accounted for 32 percent of the world total sales, the US for 31 
percent, and the whole of Europe for only 19 percent. In the late 1980s, 
world sales increased with an average of 3 percent per year, resulting in 
a recovery of production in Europe and the US, from 1991 onwards. 
However, as illustrated in Table 4.1, no such recovery took place in 
Japan, where sales declined in 1992. Outside these three core areas the 
mdjor centres of production are in East and South Asia, with a combined 
share in production of 18 percent. The world's ten leading semiconductor 
firms accounted for almost 54 percent of the world production in 1992. 
There is only one European producer in the top ten of firms in the 
production of semiconductors (Philips) (UNIDO, 1993). 
Table 4.1 World semiconductor sales, 1991 and 1992 














Source: UNIDO (1993). 
As illustrated in Table 4.2, a division can be made between the different 
stages of the production process of the semiconductors industry. In 
general, the manufacture of semiconductors .is highly capital- and 
research-intensive, but a distinction can be made between the design and 
fabrication stage, requiring high-level scientific, technical and 
engineering personnel, and the assembly stage, which is carried out by 
low-skilled labour. The research- and capital-intensive stages of design 
and production have tended either to remain in the firm's home country or 
to be established in other developed countries where the necessary labour 
skills and physical infrastructure are more readily available. The 
assembly of semiconductors is carried out by low-skilled labour and, 
given the low-weightlhigh-value characteristics of semiconductors, this 
stage of the semiconductor production process has been relocated to' low- 
labour cost countries. 
Whereas offshore production in most developing countries is aimed at 
cost-minimization, the dominant factor for overseas location in developed 
countries is market access. In the 1980s, the Asian region has also 
become an important market for semiconductors, thus causing semiconductor 
firms to establish regional headquarters in this region as well as 
assembly plants. 
Stages in integrated circuit production 
Stage 
II 1. Design of a new circuit The precise location of each element in the circuit and the connec- 
II tions between them. 
2. Production of masks 
Each mask represents an individual circuit layer and contains hun- 
dreds of identical images next to one another. 
3. Fabrication of wafers 
(a) Production of pure silicon crystal. 
(b) Slicing into wafers roughly 0.5 mm thick. 
(c) Etching of the patterns contained on the masks on to the 
silicon wafer using photolithography techniques and a variety 
of chemical 'dopants'. The complete device is built up in 
layers. 
(d) Separation into individual chips and mounting into separate 
package. 
4. Assembly of integrated circuit 
(a) Bonding or wiring of circuits to external electrodes using 
extremely fine wires. 
(b) Sealing of packages. 
5. Final testing and shipping 
Source: Dicken (1992). 
Television receivers 
The manufacture of consumer electronics, part of which are television 
receivers, is more concentrated than that of semiconductors. In 1988, the 
ten leading consumer electronics manufacturers together accounted for 
almost 80 percent of world TV production (Dicken, 1992). Eight of the ten 
leading firms in consumer electronics are Japanese, while in 1978, only 
five of the top ten firms were Japanese. Besides, there is not a single 
US firm in the top ten and the presence in consumer electronics of the 
European producers is more substantial than in semiconductors (European 
Commission, 1994). 
The production process of television sets consists of three related 
stages. As in semiconductor manufacture each stage has rather different 
characteristics which have important organizational and locational 
implications. The design stage is highly research-intensive, as efforts 
are made to develop new functions for TVs and to improve the efficiency 
of the production process. The manufacture of components is highly 
capital-intensive with significant economies of scale. Finally, the 
assembly stage is more labour-intensive, employing large numbers of low- 
skilled workers and can therefore find a potential advantage in the low 
labour-cost areas (Dicken, 1992). 
Employment decline in the past decades, particularly in the production of 
television sets, can be explained by a number of reasons. Apart from the 
global economic recessions, reductions in the number of components used 
in a television set and increased automation of the production process 
have reduced the need for various types of labour. In general, fewer 
skilled workers are now needed to manufacture a television set. In 
addition, in North America and Western Europe the consumer electronics 
sector as a whole has been adjusting to the competition from lower-cost 
producers. 
Besides, two other factors - technological change and corporate rational- 
ization - are particularly involved in reducing the need for labour. A 
major effect of the technological change has been to increase greatly the 
productivity of the labour force and, thus, greatly reducing the number 
of workers required for a given level of production in the manufacturing 
of both semiconductors and television sets (Dicken, 1992). 
Japanese electronics exports to the EC have been the cause of trade 
frictions between the EC and Japan for almost two decades. In the 1970s 
it mainly concerned colour TVs. In the 1980s, the rising exports of Japan 
caused trade imbalances between Japan, the US and the EC for other 
electronics products as well. Trade ,frictions between these regions 
mounted together with the lobbies within the US and the EC for protec- 
tionist measures against Japanese imports. To circumvent protectionist 
pressures so-called 'tariff jumping FDI' from Japan in the EC occurred. 
The increased investments of Japanese electronics firms in Europe can 
indeed be partly explained by this type of FDI. Furthermore, sales 
opportunities in the US market decreased, thus causing Japanese firms to 
shift their attention to the EC market. 
Production and export figures reveal only where the commodities orig- 
inate, but can not answer the question which nationality the firm has 
that produces these commodities. In fact, a substantial proportion of 
European production in the electronics industry is in foreign-owned 
plants, primarily Japanese and other Asian firms. The United Kingdom was 
the most important location of Japanese subsidiaries in 1989 in the EC. 
The factors behind the attractiveness of the UK for Japanese firms are 
well known. English forms the least important language barrier for 
Japanese firms, business attitudes and culture are quite similar to those 
in the US, where Japanese firms have built up experience in running 
factories, and the UK government has been actively inviting Japanese 
investments to help fight unemployment in depressed areas and to revive 
local industries (Belderbos, 1994). 
4.2.3 Services 
A significant development in the global economy during the last few 
decades has been the growing internationalization of the service indus- 
tries. Services account for the largest share of countries' gross 
domestic product ( G D P ) ,  are a major source of employment and have a 
significant share in international trade and foreign direct investment 
( F D I ) .  However, the services activities involved vary between country 
groups. Much of the service sector in the developing countries consists 
of low-skilled, low-technology activities (including wholesale and retail 
trade), whereas in the developed economies high-skilled, high-technology 
services (including finance) are more important. 
As Table 4.3 shows, services are the main sector contributing to GDP, 
with a share varying between 40 percent in low-income countries and 65 




Source: based on World Bank (1994). 
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Table 4.3 The contribution of the service sector to gross domestic 
product in developed and developing economies ' (in per- 
centages of GDP) 
Industry 
1965 1992 
The services sector is the major source of employment in all the devel- 
oped market economies. The service sector accounts for over 60 percent of 
total employment in the OECD countries in 1992, and in many developing 
countries as well. By 1990, half of the total employment in the OECD area 
was in the private services sector, representing an average annual 
increase of 3 percent since 1971. The financial services sector was a 
main source of employment within the service sector and has experienced a 









International trade in commercial services has increased to 1000 billion 
dollar in 1992 representing 21 percent of total world trade in goods and 
services. Trade in services is concentrated in a number of OECD coun- 
tries. The ten leading OECD countries in world trade in commercial 
services accounted for 63 percent of world exports and 64 percent of 
world imports in 1992. The United States account for 16 percent of the 
export in commercial services, followed by the four main EU-countries 
with a total share of almost 29 percent. Japan ranks sixth in the list of 
leading exporters with a share of 5 percent. Japan is a substantial net 
importer of commercial services (GATT, 1993a). 
- 
Within commercial services, 'other services ' , which includes all the 
major financial and business services, contributed both in 1982 and 1991 
around 40 percent to the total exports of commercial services of the USA 
and the EU. In Japan the share of 'other services' in exports increased 
considerable from 32 percent in 1982 to 50 percent in 1991 (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 The composition of trade in services: EU, USA and Japan, 
Ishare in exports of Ishare in exports of 
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Source: Eurostat (1994). 
EU USA Japan 
For many service industries the initial stimulus to their international- 
ization was the rapid growth and global spread of transnational corpor- 
ations (TNCs) in manufacturing industries. As manufacturing TNCs have 
proliferated globally, so, too, have the major banks, insurance com- 
panies, credit card enterprises, legal firms, travel chains etc. Con- 
versely, the existence of an extensive global network of the familiar 
business service corporations helps to guide the further evolution of 
transnational manufacturing activities. Furthermore, as these business 
services have become internationalized they have also acted as a stimulus 
for the internationalization of other service activities (Dicken, 1992). 
EU USA Japan 
The growing importance of services in production has been mirrored in FDI 
and in the activities of the TNCs. Some 50 percent of the world stock of 
FDI and 50 to 55 percent of annual flows are in services. Table 4.5 shows 
that, for six major industrialized countries, services accounted for a 
larger share in total FDI than both the primary and the manufacturing 
sector in 1989190. 
Table 4.5 The sectoral distribution of outward FDI from six major 







Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Totals do not add to 100 because of residual categories 
For the UK, 1981 and 1987 
Source: United Nations (1993a). 
Table 4.6 gives the composition of outward FDI within the services sector 
for six major industrialized countries in 1980 and 1989190. For five 
countries the share of financial services in FDI has increased in the 
period mentioned. Furthermore, for all six countries, the financial 
services have a large share in total services ranging from close to one 
third in Japan to over 70 percent in the Netherlands and Canada in 
1989190 (United Nations, 1993a). 
Within the services sector in developed countries the financial services 
are of growing importance. The progressive deregulation of financial 
markets is the most important current development in the internationaliz- 
ation of the financial system (European Commission, 1994). Especially in 
the EU, there is an increase in inward FDI, caused by, among others, the 
rising yen and the 1992-programme for completing the internal market 
(Dunning, 1993b). The reduction of intra-EU transaction costs, and the 
perceived need of non-EU firms to be insiders in the single market, can 
lead to a substantial increase in both intra-EU investment in services 
and a stepping up of investment by other European investors (Dunning, 
1993b). Although the technology is available, the organizational struc- 
ture andlor the national regulatory environment remain obstacles for the 
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Recently, the relocation of economic activities to relatively low-wage 
countries has also taken place in the services sector. In particular, US- 
based airlines and insurance companies are shifting their low-skill 
administration work towards the Philippines and to countries in the 
Caribbean. Infrastructure, such as telecommunications, roads, energy, 
ports and airports, is an important factor for these US companies. 
Similar developments have been reported with respect to the software 
services transferring high-skilled programme development and debugging 
towards countries such as India. India has relatively cheap high-skilled 
engineers, who can supply Western companies with the services they need. 
Companies like General Electric, Nestle and Holiday Inn all use the 
services of software companies located in Bangalore (India). Financial 
services companies are also relocating their activities, e.g. to Hong 
Kong to be able to provide China with the financial services it will need 
in the near future (Financial Times, 30 March, 5 May and 12 September 
1994). 
4. 3 Unilateralism in World Trade 
The previous sections 4.1 and 4.2 discussed fragmentation in the world 
economy from the viewpoint of different stages in the production process. 
An increasing extent of the market would allow an increasing complexity 
of intermediate deliveries and roundabout methods of production, accord- 
ing to the view of Young (1928) (section 4.1). Furthermore an increasing 
extent of the market would allow the location of various stages of the 
production process to be implemented with less compromise regarding the 
differences of locational advantages (section 4.2). These aspects of 
fragmentation would - seen from an international perspective - represent 
an increasing interdependence between countries. From the viewpoint of 
the present study these phenomena would therefore represent integrating 
forces in the world economy. 
The present section presents two phenomena from the area of trade 
policies that in its implementation would imply a tendency towards a 
fragmentation of the world market: 
- unilateralism, 
- anti-dumping measures. 
4.3.1 Unilateralism 
The implementation of US trade law to open foreign markets was inten- 
sified after 1988. Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act gives the President 
the right to take action against trade practices deemed unreasonable, 
unjustifiable, or discriminatory and burdensome or restrictive for US 
commerce. It covers practices related to trade in goods and services, to 
US foreign investment, and to the protection of US intellectual property 
rights. The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act strengthens 
Section 301 in several ways: inter alia, it transfers authority to 
initiate unfair cases from the President to the US Trade Representative 
(USTR); it requires the USTR, under the 'Super 301' provision, which 
expired in 1990, to identify priority countries and practices and 
establish a timetable for the investigation and resolution of identified 
practices; and it requires the USTR under 'Special 3011, to identify 
countries that violate the US intellectual property rights. The 1988 Act 
also requires identification of countries and practices that restrict the 
US exports of telecommunication equipment and services and US access to 
foreign government procurement (IMF, 1992). 
Actions taken under the Super and Special 301 provisions of the 1988 Act 
are summarized in Table 4.7. In 1989, three countries - Brazil, Japan and 
India - were identified as priority countries under Super 301; issues 
were resolved with Brazil and Japan, but India was identified again in 
1990. After consultations with India, USTR decided not to take action 
since the practices under investigation, which relate to investment 
measures and access to the insurance market, were being addressed in the 
Uruguay Round. No priority countries were identified under Special 301 in 
either 1989 or 1990 because of progress made in ongoing negotiations; 
however, in 1991, three priority countries were identified for violating 
US intellectual property rights: China, India and Thailand. Under the 
telecommunications provision of the 1988 Act, the EC and Korea were 
designated as priority foreign countries in 1989 and agreements on market 
access were reached in subsequent negotiations. No countries have been 
identified as discriminating in government procurement and, thus far, no 
retaliatory measures have been taken under the Super and Special 301 
provisions of the 1988 Trade Act (IMF, 1992). 
Bhagwati (1991b) provides a further analysis of the Section 301 legisla- 
tion. 
At the outset, it is useful to distinguish among three ways in which 
'301' is intended to establish new trade obligations: 
(i) opening markets in sectors where GATT already operates, e.g. 
getting foreign countries to make additional concessions in 
manufactures; 
(ii) opening markets andlor establishing new rules or disciplines in 
new sectors, e.g. in services and agriculture; and 
(iii) establishing new rules that may apply to old as well as new 
sectors, e.g. prohibition of export targeting, prescribing wor- 
kers' rights, and enforcing intellectual property rights. 
These objectives are driven mainly by two underlying motivations: first, 
to eliminate unfair trade practices by others; second, to open foreign 
markets. 
Table 4.7 Determinations under t h e  1988 Amendments t o  Sect ion 301 o f  the 1974 Trade 
Act o f  t h e  United S t a t e s  
Super 
301 




A p r i l  1990 
May 1989 
Apr i l  1990 
Apr i l  1991 
Countries and Regions Affected 




Braz i l ,  China, I n d i a ,  Rep. Korea, 
Mexico, Saudi Arabia,  Taiwan, Thai- 
land 
Braz i l ,  China, I n d i a ,  Thailand 
Argentina, Canada, Chile,  Colombia, 
Egypt, Greece, Indonesia,  I t a l y ,  
Japan, Rep. Korea, Malaysia, Paki- 
s t a n ,  Phi l ippines ,  Saudi Arabia, 
Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, Venezuela, 
Yugoslavia 
China, India ,  Thailand 
Austra l ia ,  B r a z i l ,  European Commun- 
i t y  
Argentina, Canada, Chile,  Colombia, 
Cyprus, Egypt, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Indonesia,  I t a l y ,  Japan, 
Rep. Korea, New Zealand, Pakis tan ,  
Phi l ippines ,  Saudi Arabia, Spain, 
Taiwan, Turkey, United Arab Emir- 
a t e s ,  Venezuela. Yugoslavia 
P rac t i ces  o r  Measures 
Quan t i t a t ive  import r e s t r i c -  
t ions 
Procurement of s a t e l l i t e s  and 
supercomputers 
Technical standards on f o r e s t r y  
products 
Export performance requirements 
Protect ion i n  insurance markets 
Export performance requirements 
P ro tec t ion  i n  insurance markets 
Designation on a P r i o r i t y  Watch 
L i s t  
Designation on a P r i o r i t y  Watch 
L i s t  
Designation on a Watch L i s t  
I n i t i a t e d  inves t iga t ion  of 
a l leged v i o l a t i o n s  of i n t e l l e c -  
t u a l  property r i g h t s  
Designation on a P r i o r i t y  Watch 
L i s t  
Designation on a Watch L i s t  
Source: Off ice  of t he  United S ta t e s  Trade Representative (USTR); IMF (1992) 
Sect ion 301 of the  1974 Trade Act g ives  the  President broad au thor i ty  t o  r e t a l i a t e  aga ins t  
a l l eged ly  u n f a i r  r rade  p rac t i ces  of o t h e r  countr ies .  Since 1974, j u s t  over 100 complaints aga ins t  
developing and i n d u s t r i a l  countr ies  have been f i l e d  ( t h i s  excludes ac t ions  under Super and Specia l  
301) of which approximately 25 percent  were r e j ec t ed  and l e s s  than 10 percent l e d  t o  t r ade  
r e t a l i a t i o n .  Of the  remainder, some cases  l ed  t o  r rade  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  ac t ion  by t r ad ing  pa r tne r s ,  
but t he  major i ty  had indeterminate r e s u l t s .  I n  seve ra l  cases ,  Section 301 ac t ions  have been 
followed up through GATT dispute se t t l emen t  procedures. * Super 301, which expired i n  1990, r equ i red  the  USTR t o  (i) iden t i fy  US t r ade  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  
p r i o r i t i e s  i n  terms of countr ies  and p r a c t i c e s ;  and (ii) i n i t i a t e  Section 301 inves t iga t ions  with a 
view t o  seeking the  e l iminat ion o r  reduct ion of the  p rac t i ces ,  o r  compensation from them. The case 
aga ins t  B r a z i l  was dropped i n  1990. The Japanese cases were d e a l t  with wi thin  the  wider context  of 
t he  S t r u c t u r a l  Impediments I n i t i a t i v e .  I n d i a  was redesignated i n  1990, but no r e t a l i a t o r y  ac t ion  
has been taken s o  f a r .  
Specia l  301 r equ i re s  USTR t o  iden t i fy  fo re ign  countr ies  t h a t  deny adequate i n t e l l e c t u a l  property 
p ro tec t ion  o r  f a i r  and equi table  market access t o  US persons t h a t  r e l y  upon i n t e l l e c t u a l  property 
p ro tec t ion ,  and t h a t  a r e  not enter ing i n t o  good f a i t h  negot ia t ions  o r  making s i g n i f i c a n t  progress 
i n  improving i n t e l l e c t u a l  property p ro tec t ion .  The 1989 and 1990 Watch L i s t s  d id  not  require  
f u r t h e r  ac t ion .  I n  1991, f o r  the f i r s t  t ime,  inves t igat ions  were i n i t i a t e d  under Specia l  301. 
Unfair trade 
The question of unfair trade lies behind virtually all of the three 
objectives distinguished above. Thus, demands for reciprocity may lead to 
objective (i). For example, even though the access by South Korean 
automakers to the US market is greater than US access to the Korean 
market, by way of tariffs as a result of obligations adopted earlier 
vhich are GATT-legal, it is now considered unfair, as evident from 
Congressman Gephardt's campaign pronouncements in the 1988 presidential 
campaign, and is fair game for 301 pressures on South Korea. Then again, 
the notion that it is unfair that countries with comparative advantage in 
manufactures, covered by GATT, have GATT-defined access to foreign 
markets in these sectors, is another potent force fueling objective (ii). 
Finally, objective (iii) is most explicitly focused on the unfairness of 
foreign traders: e.g. the South Koreans get unfair advantage by violating 
workers' rights that the United States supports, whereas the Japanese 
resort to export targeting that destroys US industry (Bhagwati, 1991b). 
Opening Foreign Markets 
There is also the distinct sense that the United States is opening 
foreign markets through '301' actions. This focus on exports is somewhat 
novel, compared to traditional preoccupations with regulating or managing 
imports in trade policy. In fact, this is seen as reflecting a benign 
aspect of '301' policy, as securing freer world trade is seen as a 
desirable goal (Bhagwati, 1991b). 
Of course, not all '301' actions can be interpreted as opening foreign 
markets and, therefore, trade augmenting. Thus, for instance, the 
proposed restraints on export targeting would reduce exports and trade. 
So would workers' rights prompted wage increases if they make exports 
more expensive, as intended. These are areas of '301' actions and 
intentions that reflect unfair trade concerns but are trade reducing, not 
trade expanding, in their effects. 
In conclusion, Bhagwati (1991b) observes that the use of Super 301 and 
Special 301 provisions represents, overall, a forceful use of US power 
pith a view to obtaining foreign trade concessions, often one-way and 
unrequited, and always on a US time schedule. 
Now, if the United States retaliates, as it did in earlier '301' actions 
and as it might as a consequence of present Super 301 actions, with its 
typical 100 percent ad valorem tariff applied selectively to the goods of 
the targeted country, the GATT illegality is at several levels. The 
discriminatory nature of such tariffs violates Article I, which imposes 
the MFN obligation. Also, since the tariff is likely to be bound at a 
lower level in practice, the 100 percent punitive tariff will generally 
be in violation of Article I1 as well. 
As '301' and Super 301 actions are undertaken, unilaterally accusing 
others of unfair trade practices and demanding their removal, the notion 
is also reinforced that others are unfair traders, creating a poisoned 
atmosphere that conventional protectionist can hope to exploit to their 
own advantage. 
The world trading regime should not be built on the assumption that any 
one player, no matter how dominant, can impose its own rules, unilateral- 
ly claiming social legitimacy for them. 
4.3.2 Anti-Dumping Measures 
Under GATT rules, anti-dumping and countervailing duties can be imposed 
by countries to protect their domestic producers from injury owing to the 
dumping of goods by foreign suppliers or to trade-distorting subsidies. 
The use of such measures has been cited as a form of selective protec- 
tion; it has been argued that countries find it easier to use anti- 
dumping and countervailing measures, which involve a weaker injury test, 
when a safeguard action would be more appropriate, that is, when the 
nature of the problem is injury from trade, not unfair trade. Question- 
able practices and vague rules and definitions for determining injury, 
dumping margins, and subsidies provide considerable scope for variations 
in domestic legislation and the application of unfair trade laws. In 
examining the use of unfair trade remedies in the EU and the United 
States, it was found that they often led to the introduction of more 
secure non-tariff barriers, such as VERs or quantitative restrictions 
(steel, electronic products, and textiles and clothing), or they became 
the main tool of protection (chemicals, abrasives) (IMF, 1992). 
The pat tern and volume of anti-dumping and countervailing actions lend 
support to the view that these measures respond to pressures for protec- 
tion by import-competing firms. In the early 1980s, in the wake of a 
second round of oil price increases and a severe world-wide recession, 
the demand for relief from import competition through anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures increased. Since the mid-1980s, the number of 
investigations initiated has declined significantly; although, the trade 
coverage ratios suggest that the proportion of trade affected by anti- 
dumping and countervailing actions has increased somewhat since 1988. The 
sectors most affected by these measures are motor vehicles, steel, 
textiles and clothing, and leather products, the same sectors that are 
protected by other non-tariff measures (IMF, 1992). 
The United States, the EU, Canada, and Australia account for nearly all 
anti-dumping investigations initiated by industrial countries. In the 
United States, the sharp rise in anti-dumping cases in the first half of 
the 1980s has been attributed to the real appreciation of the dollar and 
structural problems in the international steel industry. While the number 
of anti-dumping investigations initiated declined during the second half 
of the 1980s. the stock of outstanding cases continued to rise until 
1989190, when it declined slightly. At the end of 1990, Japan, China, 
Korea, and Taiwan Province of China accounted for 83 of the 195 outstand- 
ing cases; developing countries accounted for most of the rest. The iron 
and steel sector accounted for most (54 percent) of the anti-dumping 
cases initiated in 1980-87, followed by chemicals (11 percent) (IMF, 
1992) . 
The EC has been a frequent user of anti-dumping procedures; its stock of 
outstanding cases rose from 124 in 1983184 to 170 in 1988189, but 
declined to 152 in 1989190, partly because of a reduction in cases 
involving Central and Eastern Europe. Measures against these countries 
have accounted for more than half of the total cases. EFTA countries, 
Japan, China, Hong Kong, and Korea have also been frequently investi- 
gated. The principal sectors initiating cases in 1980-87 were chemicals 
(42 percent), iron and steel (11 percent), non-electrical and electrical 
machinery (15 percent) (IMF, 1992) . 
Both the EU and the United States have widened the provisions of their 
anti-dumping legislation to address the circumvention of anti-dumping 
duties, although the EU has been the main user of anti-circumvention 
measures (all directed against Japan). The EU legislation was challenged 
in the GATT and found inconsistent with GATT rules. As a result, the EU 
has suspended the use of its anti-circumvention legislation. The ongoing 
globalization of investment and production and the increase in regional 
arrangements is likely to increase trade frictions related to rules of 
origin. 
Reviewing recent tendencies in industrial countries' trade policies, the 
IMF (1992) concludes, that the salient feature is the threat of reduced 
reliance on the multilateral approach in relations with trade partners. 
Issues of fair trade and market access are often dealt with bilaterally, 
outside the scrutiny of the GATT Contracting Parties and in ways that are 
at variance with GATT rules or the principles of non-discrimination and 
transparency that underlie the GATT. 
4.4 Bilateralism in World Trade 
The League of Nations (1936) observed an increasing tendency towards the 
elimination of bilateral trade imbalances in the years preceding the 
publication by attempts to equalize as far as possible the imports and 
exports exchanged between any two individual countries. 
To assess this tendency empirically, the foreign trade of 22 countries 
was partitioned into three components: 
1. Bilateral trade. 
2. Balance of total trade. 
3. Triangular trade or Multilateral balancing. 
The first component, bilateral trade, comprised all foreign trade where 
exports and imports with each of the trade partner countries balanced. 
The second component represented the overall deficit or surplus of 
foreign trade. The third component contained the remainder, being the sum 
of bilateral balances as far as they were cancelled and thus not 
reflected in the total trade imbalance. 
m e  League of Nations (1935) described two reasons which a t  l e a s t  account 
f o r  t he  tendency towards b i l a t e r a l i s m  a s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  the f a l l  i n  the  
va lue  of world t r a d e  i n  t he  e a r l y  t h i r t i e s .  F i r s t ,  measures taken by any 
country i n  o rde r  t o  reduce i t s  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  wi th  another  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  
inf luence  no t  only the  t r ade  of t h e  p a r t n e r  country but  of a  whole s e r i e s  
of coun t r i e s .  With p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  expansion of t r a d e  being small ,  t he  
a f f e c t e d  country may be forced t o  curb  i t s  own imports from t h i r d  
c o u n t r i e s  r a t h e r  than  expanding i t s  expor t s  t o  them. A move i n  t he  
d i r e c t i o n  of b i l a t e r a l i s m  may thus  cause a  reduct ion i n  world t r ade  many 
times g r e a t e r  than  t h a t  i n  t he  t r a d e  between t h e  two p a r t i e s  o r i g i n a l l y  
involved.  Secondly, t he  f a l l  i n  demand f o r  t he  products ,  which the  
v i c t ims  of t h i s  po l i cy  can no longer  a f f o r d  t o  buy t o  the  same e x t e n t ,  
causes a  reduct ion  o r  prevents  an inc rease  of world market p r i ce s .  
The League of Nations (1936) repor ted  t h a t  the methods of b i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  
po l i cy  have been extremely var ied .  P r a c t i c a l l y  a l l  t r ade  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  
however genera l  t h e i r  cha rac t e r  may appear ,  have discr iminatory e f f e c t s  
and had been employed i n  the  e a r l y  t h i r t i e s  a s  a  means of promoting 
r e c i p r o c i t y  i n  t r a d e .  Yet, the  most e f f e c t i v e  methods a r e  repor ted  t o  
have been q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  t h e  form of quotas and b i l a t e r a l  
arrangements f o r  t h e  se t t lement  of fo re ign  payments. 
The League of Nations (1936) presented t h e  fol lowing r e s u l t s  regarding 
t h e  degree of b i l a t e r a l  and m u l t i l a t e r a l  balancing i n  t r ade  of 22 
c o u n t r i e s  r ep re sen t ing  71 percent  of t o t a l  world t r a d e  i n  1935. 
1929 1934 1935 
1 B i l a t e r a l l y  balanced 71.7 71.9 74.2 
2. M u l t i l a t e r a l l y  balanced 18.4 15.1 13.8 
3. Overa l l  t r a d e  balance 9.9 - 13.0 12.0 
Tota l  t r a d e  100.0 100.0 100.0 
The f i g u r e s  above r ep resen t  percentages i n  t o t a l  t r a d e .  Between 1929 and 
8935 a  cons iderable  dec l ine  i s  recorded f o r  t he  share  of m u l t i l a t e r a l l y  
balanced t r a d e  i n  t o t a l  t r a d e .  T i l l  1934 t h i s  has  mainly be accompanied 
by a  r i s e  i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  t r ade  balances r e l a t i v e  t o  t o t a l  t r ade ,  bu t  from 
1.934 t o  1935 i t  i s  r a t h e r  the  degree of b i l a t e r a l l y  balanced t r ade  t h a t  
has  increased .  
The League of Nations ( 1936 )  commented t h a t  t h i s  increase  may be p a r t l y  
accounted f o r  by the  f a c t  t h a t  1935  was the  f i r s t  f u l l  year  during which 
t h e  c l e a r i n g  and payment agreements were i n  operat ion t h a t  Germany had 
concluded with 18 count r ies  i n  1934 ,  i n  view of i t s  t r a n s f e r  moratorium 
and inc reas ing  fore ign  exchange d i f f i c u l t i e s .  
The League of Nations ( 1934 )  published i n  the  Review of World Trade 1933 
t h e  e x t e n t  of b i l a t e r a l  and m u l t i l a t e r a l  balancing i n  t r a d e  f o r  22 
c o u n t r i e s  f o r  1929 and the  e a r l y  t h i r t i e s .  For t h ree  of these  years  these  
r e s u l t s  regarding Japan, t h e  United Kingdom and the  United S t a t e s  a r e  
repea ted  i n  Table 4 . 8  complemented by t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  1985 3 4 .  
Table  4 . 8  B i l a t e r a l  and m u l t i l a t e r a l  b a l a n c i n g  i n  t r a d e  f o r  Japan,  
t h e  UK and t h e  USA, 1929-1985 
Japan 
1 .  B i l a t e r a l  balancing 
2 .  M u l t i l a t e r a l  balancing 
3 .  Trade balance 
U n i t e d  Kingdom 
1. B i l a t e r a l  balancing 
2 .  M u l t i l a t e r a l  balancing 
3 .  Trade balance 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
1 .  B i l a t e r a l  balancing 
2 .  M u l t i l a t e r a l  balancing 
3 .  Trade balance 
i n  percentages of t o t a l  t r a d e  
Figures  may no t  add t o  100 e x a c t l y  due t o  rounding. 
Sources: League of Nations ( 1 9 3 4 )  ( f o r  1929,  1931  and 1 9 3 3 ) ,  UN ( 1986 )  
( f o r  1 9 8 5 ) .  
3 4  I n  the  League of Nations ( 1934 )  t he  inquiry was confined t o  t he  
t r a d e  of each country with i t s  p r i n c i p a l  import and export  markets 
i n  most cases  represent ing  more than  90 percent  of t he  e n t i r e  t r ade  
of  the  country concerned. For 1985 t rade  with a l l  pa r tne r  coun t r i e s  
i s  included. 
Comparing the figures in Table 4.8 for 1929 and 1933 it can be seen that 
in Japan and the UK the amount of bilateral balancing decreased somewhat, 
with the overall trade balance increasing. For the USA no substantial 
changes are recorded. 
Including the figures for 1985, Japan has still the largest degree of 
multilateral balancing of the three countries considered. Furthermore, 
the overall trade balance of Japan is considerably larger in 1985 than in 
the thirties, while the degree of bilateral balancing declined. The 
amount of multilateral balancing in the UK in 1985 is considerably larger 
than in the thirties, while the overall trade balance is much smaller. 
The opposite development is reflected in the figures for the USA. 
5. STRATEGIC TRADE POLICIES 
5.1 Traditional Trade Theories 
According to the traditional theories, international trade results from 
differences among countries. These differences refer mainly to the 
technologies used in production processes and endowments with factors of 
product ion. Making use of these differences in technology and endowments 
leads to international trade that can be proven to be of mutual benefit 
to the partner countries. From a global point of view it implies that 
this type of international specialization maximizes output given the 
availability of resources. Consequently, the policy recommendation of 
free trade follows as a logical implication 35. 
The traditional trade theories are based on a number of assumptions of 
which two essential ones are: 
- constant returns to scale in production, and 
- perfect competition on product- and factor-markets. 
However, it is economies of scale next to imperfect competition that 
together with differentiated products, intra-industry trade and high- 
technology industries provide the essential elements of the new interna- 
tional economics (Baldwin, 1992; Salvatore, 1993; Smith, 1994). 
5.2 The Scope for a Strategic Trade Policy 
In a number of industries larger firms produce at lower costs than 
smaller enterprises: such industries have internal economies of scale. 
Because of these internal economies of scale there will be a tendency in 
the industries concerned towards domination by one or a few large firms. 
In other words, these industries will be characterized by imperfect 
competition. 
Internal economies of scale are in particular of importance in high- 
technology industries where fixed costs are a high proportion of total 
costs of production. 
35 For an overview of these issues see, among others, Falvey (1994) 
and Salvatore (1993). 
These new elements suggest that there exist opportunities for an active 
interventionist trade policy, which may lead to an increase in welfare 
for a country, compared to a situation of free trade. These opportunities 
can best be analyzed in connection with the concepts of 'rent' and 
'external economies ' 3 6 .  
The new international economics open up the possibility that there may be 
'strategict sectors, where labour and capital receive a higher return 
than they get elsewhere. Such a rent may provide an intellectually 
correct argument for a country to raise its national income by interven- 
tionist policies at the expense of other countries 37. 
There is another justification for activist trade policies: external 
economies. This time it is not the case that capital and labour in the 
sector concerned will themselves obtain exceptionally high returns, 
rather, they will yield high returns to society because in addition to 
their own earnings they provide benefits to capital and labour employed 
in other activities. The point here is that there may be good reason to 
protect certain high-technology sectors which generate large technologi- 
cal spill-overs to the rest of the economy. 
Wle above reasoning means that the extreme pro free-trade position has 
become theoretically invalid. There is, however, a large difference 
Between showing that free trade is not always optimal and formulating a 
specific policy alternative. The practical application of the new and 
theoretically valid arguments for policy intervention are beset with 
difficulties 38.  
Firstly, identifying strategic sectors is extremely difficult; there are 
no reliable methods available for this purpose. Secondly, the precise 
nature of the intervention to be used critically depends on the nature of 
36 For a detailed discussion see Grosman and Richardson (1985) and 
Krugman (1986). 
A detailed analysis of such situations can be found in Brander and 
Spencer (1983, 1985), and Laussel and Montet (1994). 
" For an extensive survey of counter arguments see Krugman (1987), 
Bhagwati (1988), Baldwin (1992) and Laussel and Montet (1994). 
the strategic interaction between the oligopolistic firms. It follows 
that the information requirements for an effective interventionist policy 
will, in general, be far above what is feasible. 
There are some more dangers to mention. It is not at all excluded that 
powerful lobbies will interfere in the decision making process, leading 
to policies that are not likely to benefit the nation as a whole. 
Finally, there is the very likely possibility that other countries will 
retaliate. This may, in the end, lead to trade wars and a considerable 
reduction of world trade and welfare. 
For these reasons it should be concluded that free trade - though not 
being an optimal policy - should be maintained as practical guideline. 
5 . 3  The Case of Airbus and Boeing 
One of the cases that has attracted attention in the area of strategic 
trade policies is the Airbus aircraft industry and the subsidies chan- 
nelled towards it. Pomfret (1991) has analyzed this case in particular. 
Much has been written about the Airbus project and the conflict between 
Boeing and Airbus, but most of the literature is either descriptive or 
polemical. There have been attempts to estimate the amount of subsidies 
given to Airbus by European governments, but no convincing test of 
whether these were a strategic policy successfully switching rents from 
Boeing to the European firm. Part of the problem is that Airbus does not 
publish accounts, and even Boeing's profits on individual planes are 
difficult to assess. Economic studies have thus focused on modelling the 
industry and having the welfare impacts of Airbus's subsidised entry fall 
out of the model. 
Which is the right model? Krugman (1987) labelled the firms in the game 
in Table 5.1 Boeing and Airbus and, although he warned that these names 
were just for illustration, his example has been frequently reprinted. It 
is, however, clearly not a model of the real world. Apart from the 
numbers being pure invent ion ,  the  r e a l i t y  was t h a t  Airbus en tered  but  
Boeing d id  no t  e x i t  - con t r a ry  t o  Krugman's model. 
The two most s e r ious  a t tempts  t o  a s se s s  t h i s  case  (Baldwin and Krugman, 
1988; and Klepper, 1990) work i n  t he  s p i r i t  of Brander and Spencer by 
modelling the  indus t ry  a s  a Cournot duopoly. They a r e ,  however, n o t  
analyzing t h e  use of po l i cy  t o o l s  t o  change the  na ture  of competit ion 
among e s t a b l i s h e d  duopo l i s t s ,  but  r a t h e r  asking whether a  subs id ised  
e n t r a n t  bene f i t ed  t h e  EC. Since the  USA remains a  n e t  expor te r ,  i t  
c l e a r l y  l o s e s  from Airbus e n t r y .  The lower p r i c e  i n  a duopoly i s  equival-  
e n t  t o  a  terms of l o s s  and the  USA a l s o  lo ses  r e n t  on t h e  l o s t  s a l e s ,  i f  
t h e  p r i c e  i s  above Boeing's marginal c o s t .  The r e s t  of t he  world 's  
consumers b e n e f i t  from the  lower p r i c e .  The Airbus count r ies  ga in  p a r t  of 
t h i s  consumer su rp lus ,  p lus  any r e n t  snatched from Boeing - o r  minus 
Airbus l o s s e s  i f  i t s  average c o s t  i s  above the  duopoly p r i c e .  Whether t h e  
world a s  a  whole ga ins  o r  l o ses  from Airbus en t ry  depends upon t h e  
r e l a t i v e  s i z e  of t h e  consumer surp lus  on the  added s a l e s  a t  t he  lower 
p r i c e  and of t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  l o s s  ( o r  d i s s i p a t e d  r e n t )  from Airbus being 
l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  than  Boeing. 
Baldwin and Krugman (1988) and Klepper (1990) adopt a  s i m i l a r  approach. 
They both assume the  indus t ry  i s  a  Cournot duopoly, der ive  some cos t  and 
demand parameters from t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  and then  c a l i b r a t e  t he  o the r  
parameters t o  reproduce t h e  a c t u a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  a  base yea r .  They can 
then  s imulate  a l t e r n a t i v e  scenar ios ,  of which the c e n t r a l  case  i s  a 
Boeing monopoly. The main r e s u l t s  a r e  summarized i n  Table 5 . 2 .  Klepper 
ob ta ins  l a r g e r  e f f i c i e n c y  c o s t s ,  perhaps because he includes economies of 
scope whereas Baldwin and Krugman's s i n g l e  model comparison (A300 and 
B767) only has economies of s c a l e .  Both exe rc i se s  produce a  n e t  g loba l  
wel fare  l o s s  from Airbus e n t r y ,  but  Klepper f i n d s  a  n e t  welfare  gain f o r  
Europe. I n  Baldwin and Krugman's paper the  n e t  welfare  e f f e c t  on Europe 
i s  c l o s e  t o  zero ,  bu t  Katz and Summers (1989) have extended the  model t o  
inc lude  r e n t  t o  labour  and t h i s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  produce a  n e t  welfare  
ga in  f o r  Europe. Thus both models can show Europe bene f i t i ng  from 
subs id ised  Airbus e n t r y ,  a t  t h e  expense of t he  USA (Pomfret, 1991).  
How reliable are these exercises? Calibrated models are not testable, and 
all that can be done is to ask what drives the models and are these 
assumptions reasonable. Both models assume a Cournot duopoly and strong 
learning effects, assumptions which are likely to produce a European 
welfare gain and a net welfare loss to the world. If the average cost of 
Airbus is above the duopoly price, which both studies assume to be true 
(because Airbus is subsidised and costs are measured without subsidy), 
then the likelihood of European net gains is greater the higher the 
price; Cournot behaviour is relatively restrictive (in the sense of 
leading to a higher price) among non-collusive outcomes. Assuming strong 
learning effects imposes a significant cost differential between an 
incumbent with a large cumulative output and a new entrant, so that rent 
dissipation is likely to be high and the global welfare effect negative. 
In sum, these models' conclusions follow from their assumptions (Pomfret, 
1991). 
In Table 5.l(a) a monopolist makes a large profit, but if both firms 
produce they both make losses. If firm B has a head start, then firm A 
will not enter. In Table 5.l(b) firm A receives a subsidy of 10 units. 
This induces A to produce and B to exit. The subsidy allows firm A 
therefore to snatch the monopoly rent from firm B. 
Table 5.1 Krugman's Boeing-Airbus game 
- - -- 
(a) Hypothetical Pay-off Matrix 
after European Subsidy 
Note : Each firm's choice is to produce (p, P) or not produce (n, N) ; 
the pay-off depends upon both firms' decisions. 
Source : Krugman (1987). 
HOW realistic are these assumptions? Cournot behaviour, where Airbus 
decides how many planes to sell assuming Boeing's sales as given, does 
not capture the active price competition in the industry. Klepper 
justifies the Cournot assumption with the Kreps-Scheinkman argument that 
capacities are fixed, which also does not capture production decisions in 
the aircraft industry. There are large fixed costs before a new model can 
be produced, but these fixed costs do not entail any quantitative 
capacity; rather the number and pace of deliveries seems to be demand- 
driven within a fairly broad range. If competition is by price, then 
duopoly price will be lower and the USA will lose more and non-producers 
gain more; there is less possibility of a European net gain, but greater 
probability of a global welfare gain. The cost assumptions are more 
difficult to question, but if the competition is in price and Airbus has 
deep pockets then Boeing will price at marginal cost and there will be 
less possibility of rent dissipation dominating the global welfare 
effect. 
Most important of all, the duopoly assumption is inaccurate. McDonnell 
Douglas never did exit and in 1990 they introduced a new model (the 
HD11). Lockheed has exited, but remains committed to re-entering civil 
aircraft production. There are barriers to entry, but for military 
aircraft producers like Lockheed or General Dynamics they are not 
insurmountable. The civilian aircraft industry is a contestable triopoly, 
and life without Airbus would not be a Boeing monopoly, as Baldwin and 
Krugman assert. The larger number plus contestability place limits on 
Boeing's possible monopoly rents, and hence on the extent of rent- 
snatching by Airbus (Pomfret, 1991). 
Table 5.2 Welfare effects of Airbus 
Europe 
Consumers 
Producer & government 




Net welfare effect 
Rest of world 
Consumers 
Baldwin & Krugman * Klepper 
1 Calculated differences between an Airbus-Boeing Cournot duopoly and 
a Boeing monopoly (in billion US dollars). 
2 Net present value in 1974 with a 5 percent discount rate (limited 
to A300 and B767), from Baldwin and Krugman's (1988) preferred 
formulation with intertemporal demand substitution. The figures in 
parentheses are from Katz and Summers (1989) assuming 20 percent 
labour rents at the final stage of production; for consistency the 
negative effect on US producer surplus would also be larger in the 
presence of labour rents, but Katz and Summers do not report this 
calculation. 
3 Undiscounted cumulative totals, 1970-2006, from the base case in 
Klepper (1990). 
In sum, the Katz-Summers and Klepper conclusion that Europe gained from 
subsidising Airbus follows from assumptions that do not capture the real 
world situation. More plausible assumptions about the structure and 
conduct of the industry make rent-snatching subsidy implausible. Boeing's 
risk-adjusted profits are unlikely to be above normal profits, without 
stimulating a response from other US producers. 
Pomfret (1991) concludes that rent-snatching arguments are neither 
sufficient nor necessary to explain Airbus subsidies. The subsidies can 
be explained by more traditional reasons. In a concentrated global 
industry they may have a beneficial anti-trust role, but it is doubtful 
if Boeing was not making significant monopoly profits. If Airbus's 
subsidised entry drives down the world price, then the USA as a net 
exporter will suffer in terms of trade loss, but again this is a tradi- 
tional outcome (familiar, for example, to grain or sugar exporters). In 
sum, analyzing the aircraft industry does not require new trade theories, 
and the industry provides no empirical support for any rent-snatching 
hypothesis. Given that this is an exceptionally highly concentrated 
global industry and in the absence of other plausible cases, this last 
conclusion suggests that rent-snatching arguments for interventionist 
trade policies are theoretical curiosa rather than useful policy guides. 
5 . 4  Strategic Trade Policy and Economic Integration 
Richardson (1989) provides a survey of studies on trade liberalization, 
in which the models are characterized by economies of scale and imperfect 
competition. 
The most important conclusion from the research surveyed is that simulta- 
neous reduction of barriers to international and internal competition 
creates sizeable and mutually reinforcing increases in an economy * s real 
income. As a rule, trade liberalization leads to gains which may be two 
or three times more substantial than those estimated under perfect 
competition; gains are measured by an economy's change in real income. 
It thus follows that precisely the elements of economies of scale and 
imperfect competition provide on the one hand an intellectual argument 
for increased protection in the form of a strategic trade policy and on 
the other hand lead to increased benefits from trade liberalization for 
instance through economic integration (Kol and Mennes, 1990). This is a 
paradox, apparently, the solution of which hinges on the observation that 
a strategic trade policy is designed to benefit the country that pursues 
such a policy at the expense of another country's welfare. This in turn 
implies that external effects are involved and thus the choice of the 
appropriate level of decision making, which is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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6. THE LEVEL OF DECISION MAKING 
6.1 Introduction 
The WRR rightly concludes that the elements of integration and fragmenta- 
tion also apply to the level of decision making. It is observed that the 
globalization of markets should have its equivalent in the area of 
government intervention. At a practical level, the WRR (1994) observes 
that the transfer of real competences from the national to an interna- 
tional level is to be preferred over a process of coordination and 
harmonization of national policies, a process which can be very tedious 
and may well lead to sub-optimal results. 
This chapter analyses the level of decision making from an economic 
perspective. It starts off with an analysis of the discussion on subsidi- 
arity in the European Union (EU) and the contributions to this discussion 
to be made by the economics of the level of decision making (section 
6.2). Some refinements in the analysis are presented as well as the role 
of democratic control (section 6.3). Institutional consequences are 
reviewed next (section 6.4) and the chapter concludes with an evaluation 
of the main findings (section 6.5). 
6 .2  Subsidiarity and the Optimal Level of Decision Making 
In 1975 A. Spinelli reported on the prospects for a European Union and 
within that context defined the concept of subsidiarity as: 'The Union 
only acts for effecting tasks which may be undertaken in common in a more 
efficient way than if member states were to act separately.' 
Delors (1991) rightly comments that the applicability of subsidiarity as 
a concept would be greatly enhanced when it would be relevant to other 
levels of decision making than just the EU and its member states. And one 
could add, the applicability of subsidiarity would also benefit from a 
more precise definition of the term 'more efficient'. 
The criteria for selecting the optimal decision level should indeed not 
be limited to the two levels of the EU and its member states but be 
applicable to the levels of a town, region, country and groups of 
cooperating countries, be it a customs union or some more loose form of 
cooperation, and furthermore also to the world level. 
Two criteria apply for selecting the optimal level of decision making 
(Tinbergen, 1965): 
1. The decision level should be as low as possible, to allow for 
freedom and participation for those concerned, and to minimize 
transaction costs. 
2. The decision level should be high enough to include all those 
affected by the decision envisaged. That is, external effects 
should be incorporated at the decision level chosen, but of course, 
only to a reasonable extent. 
These principles, in combination, steer the choice of the level of 
decision making. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the two 
criteria is that they represent a two-way tendency, namely a tendency to 
Lower levels to save transaction costs and a tendency to higher levels to 
internalize external effects. This is in contrast with the principle of 
subsidiarity which has a downward bias. In contrast, the criteria above 
for choosing the optimal decision level are strictly neutral regarding 
the most appropriate level. And indeed, it is obvious that dealing with 
certain aspects of, for instance, environmental policies and trade 
policies, it is only the world level that is appropriate. 
The efficiency aspect in the two criteria is that costs are minimized. 
That is, the costs of including higher levels of decision making (trans- 
action costs) and the costs of excluding these (the benefits of internal- 
ization) are minimized in combination. 
In this perspective, Tinbergen (1965) distinguishes three classes of 
policy measures: conflicting, supporting and neutral instruments. 
Conflicting instruments are measures that have a negative effect on 
regions and their authorities not included in the process of decision 
making. In terms of measures taken by individual countries, examples are 
a devaluation, a restriction on imports, and also local preference in 
government procurement. Supporting instruments have a positive effect on 
outside territories and include examples such as expanding government 
spending in a recession, reduction of trade barriers and cleaning 
upstream water pollution. Because of the effects the use of supporting 
and conflicting instruments have on outside territories, the appropriate 
level of decision making should include these territories. Neutral 
instruments do not have effects on outside territories. It follows, that 
centralization of supporting instruments will tend to intensify their 
use, whereas centralization of conflicting instruments will tend to 
eliminate or mitigate their use. 
6.3 Refinements 
The exposition in the two previous sections presents the framework for 
assigning public competences to the various levels of decision making. 
This section discusses some refinements: 
1. Types of externalities. 
2. Alternatives for handling externalities. 
3. Assignment of policies and instruments. 
4. The number of decision levels. 
5. Economic criteria versus other criteria. 
Externalities can be geographical and functional. In a geographical sense 
externalities arise when decisions taken in one area affect other areas. 
Functional externalities relate to effects of activities within a 
specific area that are not accounted for. Examples are the pollution of 
the soil by a chemical plant (negative externalities) and beehives near 
an apple orchard (positive externalities). 
Accounting for functional externalities can be done in a social cost 
benefit analysis of the activity concerned. This would make the beehives 
socially more desirable than privately and for the chemical plant the 
opposite holds true. In order to account for functional externalities in 
a private cost benefit analysis, prices should be attached to them by 
law. 
Geographical externalities can be dealt with by choosing a sufficiently 
high level of decision making at which they are included, as set out in 
section 6.2. 
An alternative to government regulation when dealing with externalities 
is provided by Coase (1960), leaving the problem to be solved by the 
market. This of course still requires decision making at a sufficiently 
high level on the item the market should deal with. 
This alternative is present in the shift from Harmonization to Mutual 
Recognition in the strategy of the EU Commission (Delors, 1991). With 
harmonization an EU standard is arrived at by negotiations and government 
decisions, whereas with mutual recognition, competition in the market, 
decides on the outcome, but of course within the boundaries set by the 
authorities. Again, social and private cost benefit analysis will decide 
on the choice between regulation by the government alone or using the 
market. 
Policies as well as instruments have to be applied at the proper level of 
decision making as was the subject of section 6.2. This in turn suggests 
a hierarchy of decision levels, in which the top level designs the broad 
policy and the derived objectives and the use of instruments is left to 
lower - but still appropriate - levels of decision making. 
Public works in infrastructure may provide an example. The choice for a 
certain type of fast train may be taken at the EU level. Whether The 
Hague will be connected to the railway can be decided by the government 
of the Netherlands. The location of the station in Rotterdam can be 
decided by the municipality. In this way a hierarchy of decision levels 
is involved in implementing a certain policy on infrastructure. 
In this sense Delors (1991) also discusses the difference between 
Directives and Regulations in EU policy making: 'The Directive stipulates 
the results to be achieved, but it leaves it up to the States to choose 
how they will be attained. It differs from the Regulation, which is 
directly applicable in all its elements to the States . . . ' .  Again cost 
benefit analysis can be applied to choose from among these the alterna- 
tives. 
This leads to the number of decision levels. In principle, the range of 
conceivable policies and instruments could on the basis of the criteria 
set out in section 6.2, result in a number of decision levels that would 
be unworkable. Obviously, the number of levels of decision making is part 
of the optimum problem itself. 
Economic criteria of efficiency and equity and possibly of other objec- 
tives of society naturally would take the lead, with administrative 
procedures and taxation being derived from it. Democratic control however 
seems to qualify as a necessary condition for transferring authorities to 
another level. This would imply, that a sacrifice in economic efficiency 
is readily accepted for the gain in democratic credibility of decision 
making. 
6.4 Institutions and the Optimal Level of Decision Making 
National policies on trade, by their nature, are designed to affect other 
countries through intervention in foreign trade relations. To avoid the 
fragmentation in the world economy of the 1930s, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created after World.War I1 to set the rules 
of conducting foreign trade on an international scale. A multilateral 
setting of the rules for international trade and trade policies was to 
avoid the tendency towards bilateralism in the 1930s (Wolf, 1988). More 
recently, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1993 will not 
keep in check completely the present tendencies towards bilateralism and 
even unilateralism 39 in conducting international trade, but certainly 
these tendencies would have had more leeway, had the Uruguay Round ended 
in failure (Kol, 1995). On 1 January 1995 the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) was established, which will gradually supersede the GATT and 
assuming more competences (GATT, 1994a). 
The GATT and the WTO provide examples of a transfer of competences from 
the national to the international level, that has proven to be beneficial 
in terms of economic performance. Equally, the transfer .involved is still 
of a too limited nature, especially in enforcing the implementation of 
the outcomes of the dispute settlement mechanism (GATT, 1994a). Similar- 
ly, Tinbergen (1991) argues the case of reforming the United Nations in 
39 See Bhagwati (1992a) for an overview of these tendencies. 
order to create a more and much needed effective supranational decision 
making. 
In the 19th century international integration was consolidated predomi- 
nantly in bilateral agreements. Most treaties were drawn up and imple- 
mented through the usual diplomatic channels, no permanent bodies being 
created. 
Postal services and telecommunication however, were two noteworthy 
exceptions - the need for positive integration in both cases was so great 
to warrant the setting up of an international organization. These 
international organizations were the Universal Postal Union (1874) and 
the International Telecommunication Union (1865). 
The Universal  Pos ta l  Union 
In the 19th century, the rationalization of international postal services 
lagged well behind those within national borders. Transit charges levied 
by countries were far above the actual costs. The consequence was poor 
service at high rates. The most complicated part of the whole process was 
the system of accounting. Incoming and outgoing mail had to be checked in 
such minute detail that there was a long delay in the dispatch and 
delivery of letters. 
It became increasingly clear that national diversity in postal matters 
was too expensive to be retained. To overcome these national differences, 
ft was decided to negotiate international postal services on a suprana- 
tional level. In 1874, the General Postal Union came into being and began 
2ts operations. The name of the organization was changed in 1878 to 
miversa1 Postal Union (UPU). A s  a public international technical 
organization, the UPU has the power to ensure the smooth movement of 
ihternational mail, using its supranational capacities to enact necessary 
postal legislation and to revise the provisions of the UPU Convention 
according to contemporary postal needs (Menon, 1965). 
The contents of the UPU Convention have never been considered to be 
inviolable or immutable. However, the basic provisions of the UPU 
Convention have been drafted so thoughtfully, that they have been 
retained throughout the years. The participating countries to the 
Convention have multilaterally agreed to (Menon, 1965): 
(a) Form a single postal territory, consisting of member countries, for 
the reciprocal exchange of correspondence; 
(b) Standardize charges to be collected by each country for the items 
of mail addressed to the whole of the Union's territory; 
(c) Abolish the sharing of charges between sender country and country 
of destination; 
(d) Permit each administration to keep the entire amount of the charges 
it collects on condition that it remunerates, in conformity with 
the rates laid down, the intermediary administrations carrying out 
the transit of these mails; 
(e) Guarantee freedom of transit within the territory of the Union; 
(f) Set up an arbitral procedure to settle conflicts between adminis- 
trations ; 
(g) Establish a central office under the name of the International 
Bureau, the expenditure for which is borne by all the contracting 
countries ; and 
(h) Hold periodic meetings of a congress of plenipotentiaries of member 
countries to revise the acts of the Union and discuss questions of 
common interest. 
The UPU can be regarded therefore as a successful 19th century implemen- 
tation of a supranational level of decision making dealing effectively 
with cross-border activities with external effects. 
The International Telecommunication Union 
The radio spectrum consists of short, medium and long waves, which are 
used for different transmission purposes. Short waves travel considerable 
distances (thousands of kilometres), while medium and long waves are only 
operational on shorter distances. If two transmitters employing the same 
modulating technology use the same wave lengths to transport information 
at a given moment in time and in the same place, there is jamming or 
interference. The receiver receiving two sets of information simulta- 
neously would be unable to understand the content. The spectrum resource 
is thus wasted to the extent that its use is totally inefficient for both 
the sender and the receiver (OECD, 1993). 
It is necessary to create an administrative system in charge of the 
spectrum, whose authority is exercised in accordance with the physical 
characteristics of radio waves. Given the specific nature of radio waves, 
coordination of radio spectrum management can take place at different 
levels: supranational for short waves, continental for medium waves and 
national for long waves. 
A well-established supranational system of coordination exists through 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), established in 1865, 
which handles the international regulation of the radio spectrum. Since 
the spectrum is an international resource, for short waves there is a 
primary division at world level within a framework of the ITU, the aim 
being to minimise the negative externalities, to guarantee access to 
frequencies for each country and to create economies of scale for the 
equipment used. 
In addition, regarding medium waves, the importance of continental 
bodies, such as the European Radio Committee of the European Conference 
of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), has grown in 
recent years. For example, in the frequency administration field, CEPT 
continues to coordinate the use of frequencies in member countries and to 
establish joint positions at ITU conferences. 
For long waves the spectrum management can be carried out on a national 
level, for example by the Ministry of Transport. The ITU has therefore 
proven to be an international institution, where international decision 
making has been implemented successfully, distinguishing furthermore 
various levels of decision making according to the extent of the external 
effects (OECD, 1993). 
6.5 Evaluation 
Subsidiarity has been called upon to refuse in practice the consequences 
of commitments to common policies in the EU that were formally endorsed 
in the Treaty. 
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This observation by Delors (1991) is also expressed in these words: 
"Frequently, I have the impression that subsidiarity is a fig leaf used 
to conceal unwillingness to honour the commitments which have already 
been endorsed. " 
In such circumstances, a clarification of subsidiarity will assist in 
improving policy making. 
Regarding subsidiarity as an operational principle, applicable in 
practice, the following conclusions have been arrived at: 
The optimal level of decision making follows from two criteria, 
which operate in opposite directions: 
a. the level of decision making is to be as low as possible in 
order to minimize costs and to maximize participation; 
b. the level of decision making is to be sufficiently high so as 
to encompass external effects whether these are negative or 
positive. 
The levels of decision making considered include the town, region, 
country, country group, continent and finally the world level. 
In principle each activity has its own optimal decision level. A 
proliferation of decision levels could follow as a result. It 
follows, that the optimality of decision making includes the choice 
of the number of decision levels. 
A certain policy may include a range of derived objectives and 
instruments leading to a hierarchy of levels of decision making 
involved. 
With respect to the level of decision making economic aspects of 
efficiency and equity dominate aspects of taxation and law. 
It is only democratic control that provides for a necessary condi- 
tion for transferring authority to a certain level. This would 
imply a strong willingness to sacrifice efficiency for a gain in 
democracy. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter gives an overview of the main findings of this study and, 
based on these, presents recommendations with respect to government 
policies. As has been explained in the introduction the background of the 
present study relates to the reformulation of foreign policies of the 
Netherlands. This in turn gives the main focus of this study on interna- 
tional economic relations, namely a description and analysis of ten- 
dencies towards integration and of fragmenting forces in the world 
economy. Both, the conclusions and recommendations reflect this focus. 
The conclusions and recommendations are presented under the headings of 
the chapters to which they relate. 
CHAPTER 2. REGIONALIZATION IN WORLD TRADE: CONCLUSIONS 
The Customs Union Issue i n  the 19th Century 
2.1 In the 19th century the principle of most-favoured-nation had 
become accepted as the general principle governing international economic 
relations. It was recognized that the formation of a customs union would 
violate most-favoured-nation treaties with outsiders. This controversy 
was solved by stipulating that only customs unions were acceptable that 
would be complete rather than liberalizing trade in one or a few prod- 
ucts, that is, would act as a single entity in foreign trade relations. 
Economic Integrat ion and the GATT 
2.2 During the 20th century the most-favoured-nation principle was 
replaced by the more powerful principle of non-discrimination. This 
principle is the main foundation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), providing the multilateral setting of rules for interna- 
tional trade since World War 11. An agreement on economic integration 
extends preferential treatment to the participating countries, and, as a 
consequence, discriminates against outsiders. The GATT in Article XXIV 
has dealt with this controversy - much in the same way as it was done in 
the 19th century - by permitting departures from the non-discrimination 
principle, provided the proposed free-trade agreement would cover 
substantially all trade in all products originating in the participating 
countries. 
The underlying idea is that agreements on free trade and economic 
integration with limited membership can be regarded as a practical route 
towards economic liberalization on a world scale. 
Regionalism and the Multilateral Trade System 
2.3 The threat from regionalism to the multilateral trade system under 
GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO) would arise only if economic 
liberalization within regions would be complemented with increasing 
protectionism to outsiders. 
Bloc Formation in the OECD Area 
2.4 An OECD study on bloc formation among four country groups in the 
OECD area, among which the EC, in the period 1961-1989 concludes that 
there is only weak evidence that the intra-country group shares in total 
group imports have increased; apparently, multilateral reductions in 
trade barriers agreed upon under GATT provide a countervailing influence 
against any bloc formation as defined in the OECD study. 
The Possibility of a Trading Bloc in East Asia 
2.5 The implementation of a discriminatory trading bloc in East Asia is 
unlikely for a number of reasons. Important among these is the dependence 
of East Asian exports on markets outside the region. The countries in 
East Asia have a great interest in supporting the multilateral trade 
system under GATT and the WTO. 
The Concepts of Regionalization 
2.6 The analysis of possible regional concentrations of trade relations 
benefits from the conceptual distinction between 
a) Bloc formation, relating to the relative concentration of trade 
among countries bound by a formal agreement on economic cooper- 
ation; 
b) Regionalization, relating to the relative concentration of trade 
among countries with an informal cohesion, and 
C) Polarization, which can be regarded as a special case of regiona- 
lization, as it relates to a concentration of trade from a group of 
developing countries on a group of industrialized countries with 
geographical proximity. 
The Network o f  World Trade 
2 . 7  I n  the  period 1960-1992 t h e  p a t t e r n  of world t r a d e  has undergone 
some important changes. During t h i s  per iod t h e  share  of Japan i n  world 
t r a d e  rose  from 3 percent  t o  6 percent  of world imports and 9 percent  of 
world expor ts .  The sha re  i n  world t r a d e  of Asia and Oceania (except  
Japan)  rose from 10 t o  17 percent .  On t h e  o the r  hand, t he  share i n  world 
t r a d e  of t he  count r ies  i n  Central and Eastern Europe decl ined  from 1 0  t o  
3 percent ,  and t h a t  of Afr ica  from 4 t o  2 percent .  North America con- 
t i n u e d  t o  hold a  share  of around 17 percent ,  while Western Europe 
cont inued  t o  have by f a r  t he  l a r g e s t  share t h a t  rose  even f u r t h e r  from 40 
t o  45 pe rcen t .  
2 .8  The network of t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  i n  t he  world economy among t h e  8 
count ry  groups d i s t i ngu i shed  d id  not  a t t a i n  a  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  h igher  degree 
o f  cohesion i n  t he  per iod  1960-1992. I n  1960 only 28 of t he  poss ib l e  63 
t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  a t t a i n e d  a  l e v e l  of some importance wi th  more than  0.5 
pe rcen t  of world t r a d e ,  t h i s  f i g u r e  having r i s e n  t o  only 31 by 1992. 
2 . 9  Throughout t he  per iod  Western Europe e n t e r t a i n e d  the  h ighes t  number 
o f  important t r ade  r e l a t i o n s  i n  t he  network of world t r a d e ,  t h i s  number 
having the  maximum value  of 14 ;  second i s  North America with 9 such 
r e l a t i o n s  i n  1992. Asia and Oceania continued t o  have a  t h i r d  p o s i t i o n  
w i t h  8 important t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s .  For Japan t h e  number of important t r a d e  
r e l a t i o n s  increased from 4 i n  1960 t o  7 i n  1992. By 1992 Central  and 
Eastern Europe and Afr i ca  were almost o u t s i d e r s  from the  network of world 
t r a d e ,  having t r ade  r e l a t i o n s  of more than 0.5 percent  of world t r ade  
on ly  wi th  Western Europe. 
2 .10 Between 1960 and 1992 the  t r ade  r e l a t i o n s  between Western Europe 
and North America dec l ined  i n  importance from 11 t o  6 percent  of world 
t r a d e ,  but  these s t i l l  dominate t h e  t r ade  r e l a t i o n s  between North America 
and Japan, represent ing  4 percent  of world t r a d e ,  and those between 
Western Europe and Japan, accounting f o r  3 percent  of world t r a d e .  
P o l a r i z a t i o n  i n  World Trade 
2.11  Foreign t rade  of Afr ica  i s  f o r  more than  50 percent  concentrated on 
Western Europe. And a f t e r  the co l l apse  of i n t e r n a l  t r ade  i n  Central  and 
Eastern Europe, by 1992 also for these countries the concentration of 
trade on Western Europe had risen to well over 50 percent. On the other 
hand, seen from the viewpoint of Western Europe, trade with Africa and 
with Central and Eastern Europe amounts to only a small share of its 
total trade, being 3 percent in both cases. 
A similar situation can be observed in the trade relations between North 
America and Latin America. Trade of Latin America is for more than 40 
percent concentrated on North America; but to North America trade with 
Latin America amounted to only 11 percent of its total trade in 1992. 
In contrast, trade relations of Asia and Oceania are by 1992 evenly 
spread across Western Europe, Japan and North America, each accounting 
for about 16 percent of its total trade. 
By 1992 internal trade of Asia and Oceania amounted to 41 percent of its 
total trade; for Africa and Latin America these percentages were much 
lower, with 6 and 17 percent respectively in 1992. 
Regionalization in World Trade 
2.12 As can be expected the regional concentration reaches higher values 
for the internal trade of the country blocs considered than for trade 
between them. 
The figures for Asia and Oceania show a certain degree of concentration 
in trade with Japan, though it is decreasing. 
The index of regional concentration shows a low level of concentration 
for trade between Western Europe and North America, and is even lower for 
trade between Western Europe and Japan. Trade relations between Japan and 
North America have shown some degree of concentration throughout the 
period. 
BJoc Formation in World Trade 
2.13 With respect to the EC the index for measuring bloc formation in 
trade, rose threefold from 55 to 159 in the period 1960-1992 for all 
commodity trade. For primary products related to the Common Agricultural 
Policy the index increased twice as fast. For textiles and clothing the 
fndex of bloc formation remained constant during the period 1960-1992. 
Pbr road vehicles the index doubled. 
2.14 Although the US-Canada free-trade agreement is of much later date 
(1988) than the agreement on economic integration in the EC (1957), the 
US-Canada economic cooperation dates already back to the previous 
century. 
Comparing the values of the index of bloc formation for the North 
American cooperation (NAFTA) with those for the EC reveals some marked 
differences. 
For all commodity trade bloc formation is much lower in NAFTA than in the 
EC, and moreover declining in the period 1960-1992, whereas it is fastly 
rising in the EC. For textiles and clothing the index is 10 times lower 
for NAFTA than for the EC. For telecommunications equipment the index for 
NAFTA is 5 times lower than for the EC. Regarding road vehicles the 
figures for NAFTA show that the bloc formation index halved since 1960, 
but it doubled for the EC in the same period. 
Policy Evaluation 
2.15 Tendencies towards regionalization and bloc formation in the world 
economy cannot be judged on the basis of an analysis of trade flows 
alone. Important elements in the evaluation are also the policies 
designed and implemented regarding trade relations with trade partners 
outside the region or bloc considered. 
In this perspective it is important to observe that in the three regions, 
the EU, NAFTA and East Asia there are strong tendencies towards liberal- 
ization, deregulation and privatization. With respect to the EU, the 
1992-programme is characterized by liberalization and deregulation. This 
is apparent from the opening up to competition of the supply of util- 
ities, of telecom networks and of public transport; it is also apparent 
in the removal of national quotas especially in consumer electronics, 
footwear, cars, and textiles and clothing. 
NAFTA will liberalize trade also in sectors where tendencies towards 
protection are strong as well as in services. .over, Mexico is bound 
in NAFTA to a programme of trade liberalizati in addition to having 
become a GATT member. In general the US-Canadi rree-trade agreement is 
pro-competitive. 
In East Asia the policy trend is unambiguously towards trade liberaliz- 
ation. The first and second generation of Newly Industrializing Economies 
in East Asia have embarked upon a programme of spreading competition to 
areas and sectors sheltered thusfar. 
CHAPTER 2. REGIONALIZATION IN WORLD TRADE: RECOMMENDATIONS 
2.1 It is recommended that foreign policies of the Government of the 
Netherlands reflect the view, as embedded in the GATT, that an agreement 
on economic integration is predominantly a practical but limited step 
towards economic liberalization on a world scale. 
2.2 Recommendation 2.1 implies that foreign policies of the Government 
of the Netherlands are recommended to support tendencies towards openness 
and non-discrimination in EU trade policies. 
2.3 It is recommended that foreign policies of the Government of the 
Netherlands would continue to support GATT and WTO policies towards 
multilateral trade liberalization, providing a countervailing influence 
against tendencies towards increased protectionism around emerging 
trading blocs. 
2.4 The strong economic performance of countries in East Asia should be 
regarded as an opportunity for EU members rather than a threat. The 
countries in East Asia continue to have an interest in an open multilat- 
eral trade system. The implementation of a discriminatory trading bloc in 
East Asia is unlikely. The Government of the Netherlands would be advised 
to continue to act upon this view also in the framework of EU policy 
making. 
2.5 Western Europe has a pivotal role in the network of world trade. It 
continues to hold a share in world trade of well over 40 percent and 
entertains the maximum possible number of important trade relations in 
the network. It is recommended that this central position is reflected in 
the foreign policies of Western Europe. 
2.6 Given the concentration on Western Europe of well over 50 percent 
of total trade of Africa and of Central and Eastern Europe, it is 
recommended that Western European trade policies reflect the importance 
of the Western European market for the expansion of trade with Africa and 
with Central and Eastern Europe. 
2.7 The index of bloc formation in the EU shows a much faster increase 
for products related to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) than for 
other products. To the extent that the CAP is detrimental for more 
economically efficient supply from outside the EU especially from Central 
and Eastern Europe and from developing countries it is recommended that 
the CAP is revised in this perspective. 
2.8 It is recommended that the Common Agricultural Policy, restrictive 
regulation and interventionism be recognized as being opposite to the 
underlying notion of the 1992-programme of the EU, and consequently be 
liberalized and reduced. EU trade policy practices on voluntary export 
restraints and anti-dumping procedures, as reported by GATT, are recom- 
mended to be modified and brought more in line with the notion of more 
competition inherent to .the 1992-programme of the EU. 
CHAPTER 3. GLOBALIZATION OF PRODUCTION: CONCLUSIONS 
The Division of Labour 
3.1 Specialization is a major force in economic growth. Specialization 
may arise between workers in a factory, between professions, between 
firms in the various stages of a production process, between industries 
and between countries. 
Globalization and Technology 
3.2 The scope for specialization is limited by the extent of the 
market. The size of the market is primarily determined by the amount of 
buying power, that is the-size of the population combined with income per 
capita, and by the costs bridging geographical distances, including costs 
of transportation and communication. 
3.3 The twentieth century and especially the past few decades have seen 
a rapid technological development in transportation and communication and 
a substantial decline in their costs. 
FDI: General Trends and Characteristics 
3.4 One of the important aspects of the globalization of production is 
the development in foreign direct investment (FDI). As a share of GDP the 
outward stock of FDI of the industrial countries rose from nearly 5 
percent in 1967 to 8 percent in 1988. Between 1986 and 1991 the outflow 
of FDI from the industrial countries rose by 24 percent, twice the figure 
for gross domestic investment. These empirical data testify to the 
increasing globalization of production. 
The Country Distribution of FDI 
3.5 Throughout the last 25 years the industrial countries accounted for 
around 97 percent of the total stock of outward FDI, the developing 
economies accounting for the small remainder of around 3 percent. Of the 
total stock of inward FDI the share of the industrial countries rose 
since 1967 from 70 percent to nearly 80 percent recently; the developing 
countries being the location of a share of the total stock of FDI 
correspondingly decreasing from 30 to 20 percent. The changes however 
were not parallel among developing countries; the shares in the world 
stock of inward FDI halved in Africa and Latin America, while the share 
of Asia increased somewhat. 
3.6 In terms of flows of FDI, those between Western Europe and North 
America in 1990 amounted to 505 billion dollar, five times the flows 
between North America and Japan, which in turn outweighed those between 
Japan and Western Europe with a factor four. However, the flows between 
Japan and Western Europe grew very fast since 1985 with 45 percent 
annually, much faster than the growth in FDI flows between Western Europe 
and North America and between Japan and North America. 
3.7 The Netherlands continue to have an important position in outward 
FDI, with a share of 10 percent of total stock in 1967 - representing a 
third place among countries - and still a share of 7 percent in 1988 - 
representing a fifth position. 
The Sectoral Composition of FDI 
3.8 The sectoral composition of the world stock of FDI underwent 
important changes since 1970. The share of the primary sector was halved, 
going down from 23 to 11 percent from 1970 to 1990. In the same period 
the share of the manufacturing sector decreased from 45 to 39 percent; 
the services sector increased its share considerably from 31 to 50 
percent. Since these figures relate to the stock of FDI, the changes in 
flows have been even more considerable. 
3.9 Within the services sector, finance- and trade-related activities 
account for two-thirds of the FDI stock in services. Deregulation and 
liberalization of trade and investment are major factors in this develop- 
ment; the same factors apply to the present opening up to FDI of some capital- 
and technology-intensive services: airlines and telecommunications. 
However, the increased transportability of some services, especially 
those that are information-intensive, may reduce in time the need for FDI 
in these sectors. 
3.10 Between 1980 and 1990 the share of capital- and technology-inten- 
sive industries in FDI rose faster in developing economies than in 
developed countries; this development was particularly significant in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
International Investment, Trade and Commercial Policies 
3.11 The outcome of the Uruguay Round can be seen as instrumental to 
enlarging the extent of the world trade market. By including for the 
first time agriculture, textiles and clothing, and services, an addi- 
tional 36 percent of total world trade is now within GATT. The number of 
participating countries in the Uruguay Round was eventually 117, larger 
than the 99 of the Tokyo Round. A further reduction in tariffs and above 
all the replacement of quota and other forms of non-tariff barriers by 
tariffs have been agreed upon in the Uruguay Round. These three elements 
testify to the success of the Uruguay Round in keeping the world market 
for trade and investment as open as possible. 
3.12 In economic history the empirical evidence is that in times of 
trade liberalization (e.g. 1953-1972) world trade rises considerably 
faster than world output, compared to periods of increasing protection 
(1930-1938 and 1973-1980), indicating that trade liberalization goes 
together with increased interdependence between nations and increased 
international division of labour. 
. 3.13 The relationship between FDI and international trade is not 
straightforward but complicated. FDI may substitute for trade in the case 
of setting up production facilities in a protected market, it may promote 
trade as in export processing zones, it may complement trade as with a 
servicing network to accompany exports of products, and finally FDI may 
divert trade to exploit hitherto unexhausted preferential quota in other 
countries. Trade related investment measures (TRIMS) may relate to the 
input side of the production process, such as local input requirements, 
and to the output side, such as minimum export requirements. From the 
perspective of specialization and the extent of the world market, it is a 
positive development that within the framework of the Uruguay Round an 
agreement on TRIMs was reached. 
Globalization and Employment 
3.14 Unemployment in the European Union (EU) has risen sharply since the 
mid-1970s, with unemployment rates currently around 10 percent of the 
labour force, significantly higher than in Japan with 3 percent and the 
USA with 7 percent. In addition, for any given rate of unemployment the 
share of long-term unemployment is much higher in the EU than in the USA. 
3.15 Evidence from a range of countries suggests that factors of 
technology, of imports from low-wage countries and of increased global 
competition - commonly suggested as causes for unemployment - are not 
primarily or even importantly relevant. In trade with non-OECD countries, 
losses in employment for unskilled labour in the OECD have been largely 
off set by skilled labour employment through exports. In industries with 
declining employment, the developments in productivity have been ident- 
ified as the main factor behind this decline. 
3.16 There is a striking difference between Japan and the USA on the one 
side and the EU on the other. Employment growth in Japan and the USA has 
largely taken place in the private sector, but in the EU mainly in the 
public sector. 
3.17 Evidence confirms that employment creation is best served by 
expansion of high-growth industries rather than by protecting low-growth 
industries and postponing necessary adjustments. 
Economic Developments in Central and Eastern Europe 
3.18 After the transition, trade flows of the countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) became diverted from intra-CEE trade towards the 
industrialized countries, especially Western Europe. From the viewpoint 
of the CEE countries, the importance of the EU as a market of destination 
increased considerably, receiving 12 percent of total CEE exports in 1970 
and 45 percent in 1992. From the EU perspective, the share of total EU 
imports originating from the CEE economies decreased slightly from 3.4 
percent in 1970 to 2.9 percent in 1992. Looking at the trade flows from 
the EU to the CEE countries a similar conclusion can be drawn. The EU as 
a source of origin for imports increased in importance in CEE countries' 
total imports from 13 percent in 1970 to 43 percent in 1992, while the 
share of EU exports going to the CEE countries decreased from 3.4 percent 
in 1970 to 3.1 percent in 1992. 
3.19 There are marked differences in the structure of exports to the EU 
between the former USSR and the other CEE countries. Exports to the EU 
from the former USSR consist mainly of primary goods, with a share of 
around 75 percent of total exports recently, fuels representing 60 
percent. The other CEE countries export mainly manufactured products to 
the EU. Although the product composition of manufactured exports varies 
among CEE countries, the main categories are machinery and transport 
equipment, chemicals, clothing and steel. 
3.20 In the past few years the CEE economies have initiated comprehen- 
sive reform ,programmes designed to transform the economic system into a 
market based economy. Liberalization of the ,trade and exchange system is 
an important component of these reforms. 
Notwithstanding the progress made, the CEE countries are not yet fully 
integrated into the multilateral trade system. Further progress in this 
area will depend, inter alia, on (i) continued domestic reforms, and (ii) 
sufficient access to foreign markets, especially in Western Europe. 
3.21 Recently, the EU implemented a programme of trade liberalization 
towards the CEE countries, embodied in the Association or Europe Agree- 
ments, between the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1993, covering at 
present 80 percent of the signatory countries' exports to the EU and 
improving significantly access to the EU market, and having as the final 
objective the establishment of a free-trade area in 10 years time. 
3.22 One of the important aspects of the reintegration of the CEE 
countries in the world economy is the position with respect to foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Since 1985, inward FDI expanded, estimates are 
that by the end of the 1990s cumulative investment flows to the CEE 
countries could surpass 50 billion dollars. Western Europe is the 
principal source of FDI in the CEE economies, accounting for well over 50 
percent of foreign capital by the end of 1990. The sectoral composition 
of inward FDI varies considerably among the CEE economies, the manufac- 
turing sector attracking 73 percent of total FDI in Poland, and services 
accounting for 64 percent in former Czechoslovakia. 
3.23 Inward FDI is likely to have a significant positive impact on 
economic restructuring in the CEE countries and on their reintegration in 
the world economy. 
The CEE countries could enhance their attractiveness to FDI by continuing 
the improvements in economies, institutional and legal conditions, 
including privatization, liberalization and infrastructural conditions, 
management and accounting practices, a commercial banking system, 
wnership regulations, and above all stability of the legal conditions 
and of the political system. 
GIZobalization of Financial Markets 
3.24 Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system the International 
Monetary Fund has identified two other key structural changes in the 
international financial system: 
1. the rapid expansion of pr iva te  international financial markets, 
2. the removal of capital account restrictions in the industrial 
countries. 
The globalization of financial markets has been stimulated by a range of 
factors including the emergence of Japan since the 1980s as a major 
participant, the developments in communication technologies, liberaliz- 
ation and deregulation of the financial sector in industrial countries, 
and the development of new derivative financial instruments. 
3.25 The globalization of financial markets has led to a more explicit 
international evaluation of the creditworthiness of individual countries. 
This in turn has led to an increased incentive for countries to adopt 
macro-economic and monetary policies that are considered appropriate from 
that perspective. As a consequence, this will strengthen the tendency for 
economic policies of individual countries to converge towards the most 
appropriate policies from the viewpoint of creditworthiness. 
Within the EU the process of convergence is strengthened furthermore by 
the conditions set for participating in the EMU. 
G l o b a l i z a t i o n  and Economic Convergence 
3.26 Globalization of economic activities implies that international 
firms are increasingly less bound by a specific location and opt for 
locations that offer the best conditions in terms of infrastructural 
facilities, market access and policy environment. 
This in turn implies that governments try to improve these locational 
conditions and at the same time are under pressure to coordinate policies 
on domestic subsidies, government procurement, technical standards, 
competition, environmental protection, and labour standards. 
CHAPTER 3. GLOBALIZATION OF PRODUCTION: RECOMMENDATIONS 
3.1 It is recommended that the globalization of production is regarded 
from the perspective of specialization and interdependence among national 
economies; the benefits of this process extend in principle to all 
countries involved. 
3.2 The scope for international specialization is enhanced by the 
extent of the world market and consequently is diminished by tendencies 
to fragment it. A commitment to the multilateral setting of rules of 
conduct in international trade and investment, as presently embodied in 
the GATT and later on in the World Trade Organization, contributes to 
keeping in check tendencies towards fragmentation, such as protection, 
bilateralism and managed trade. The principle of non-discrimination 
underlying GATT and WTO is instrumental and of major importance for 
participation in the world market on equal terms. 
3.3 Government policies are instrumental to the attractiveness as a 
potential host country for FDI. Of importance are infrastructural 
provisions in law, education, transport and communication. Invariably, 
political and economic stability, have proven to be a necessary condition 
for attracting FDI. 
3.4 Unemployment cannot be addressed adequately by attempts to seal the 
economy off from external developments, by protectionist and other 
measures. Rather, adjustments in the labour market are called for, such 
as reducing barriers to labour mobility. Improving investment in further 
education and training and facilitating the school-to-work transition are 
also of particular importance. Without considerable measures regarding 
labour market policies, the scope for low-skilled employment in the OECD 
countries will continue to be diminished. 
3.5 The importance of Western Europe as a market for CEE exports and as 
a source of their imports has important implications from an EU policy 
perspective. The Europe Agreements testify that the EU is improving 
access to its markets for CEE exports. Technical assistance for the 
transformation programme to continue and to further improve the attract- 
iveness for inward FDI in the CEE countries is recommended. 
3.6 The globalization of financial markets has led to an increased 
exposure of individual countries to the international evaluation of their 
creditworthiness , as implied by their macro-economic and monetary 
policies. 
In addition, in the EU the domestic policies are under scrutiny because 
of the conditions set for participating in the EMU. 
It is recommended that the domestic economic policies would reflect the 
increased international exposure of their impact, in view of the globa- 
lization of the financial markets and requirements of participation in 
the EMU. 
3.7 It is advocated that the tendency to coordinate domestic policies 
of relevance for a country's attractiveness as a location for interna- 
tional firms - including subsidy and competition policies - are chan- 
nelled through international organizations such as the WTO and the OECD. 
Where bilateral or regional negotiations provide an appropriate start, it 
is advocated that a mechanism is designed through which the outcomes 
would eventually apply multilaterally. 
CHAPTER 4. FRAGMENTATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 The notion of division of labour among workers being limited by the 
extent of the market was developed by Adam Smith and extended in 1928 by 
Allyn Young. to include specialization among industries and- firms. This 
latter .type of division of labour is apparent from an increasing number 
of specialized undertakings between the producer of raw materials and the 
consumer of the final product. 
4.2 The division of labour among industries is an adjustment to the 
growth of the market for the final product of a particular industry and 
is a vehicle for the exploitation of economies of scale. This fragmenta- 
tion of industrial production processes allows furthermore a better 
exploitation of locational advantages across countries. This process of 
international fragmentation is apparent in a number of industries, which 
is illustrated for textiles and clothing, electronics and services. 
4.3 ,The division of labour among industries represents - in an interna- 
tional context - a process by which a number of countries becomes engaged 
in a particular production process; this type of fragmentation therefore 
represents a tendency towards international integration. 
4.4 Two elements in recent developments in trade policies imply a 
tendency towards a fragmentation of the world market, namely 
- unilateralism, and 
- anti-dumping procedures. 
Section 301 of the 1974 US Trade Act and later provisions such as Super 
301 and Special 301 allow the USA to take unilateral actions against 
policies of a particular country which are deemed unfair or restrictive 
to US commerce. Unilateral actions tend to undermine the multilateral 
trade system as embodied in GATT, by fragmenting the world market into 
bilateral relationships. 
The EU has been a frequent user of anti-dumping procedures. Such pro- 
cedures are usually targeted towards specific suppliers from specific 
trade partner countries, thus contributing to a fragmented world market. 
The EU legislation on anti-dumping procedures was found inconsistent with 
GATT and therefore implies a reduced reliance on the multilateral trade 
system. 
4.5 The League of Nations observed in the 1930s a tendency among 
countries towards bilateral balancing of their trade away from multilat- 
eral balancing. The most effective methods for increasing bilateral 
balancing were quantitative trade restrictions and bilateral payment 
arrangements. In 1933, Japan had a larger share of multilateral balancing 
of its foreign trade than both the UK and the USA. Figures for 1985 give 
the same result. 
Multilateral balancing rather than bilateral balancing is more in line 
obviously with the principle of non-discrimination underlying the 
multilateral trade system. 
CHAPTER 4. FRAGMENTATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 An increasing extent of the market allows the fragmentation of 
production processes into specialized undertakings, firms and industries; 
in an international perspective, this type of fragmentation represents a 
growing interdependence of national economies. On the other hand, present 
day practices in trade policies of unilateralism and measures targeting 
specific suppliers, tend to fragment the world market into bilateral 
trade relations. 
Support for the multilateral trade system under GATTIWTO would support 
the process of fragmentation of production processes and impede the 
tendency to fragment the world market into bilateral trade relations. 
CHAPTER 5. STRATEGIC TRADE POLICIES: CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 The elements of economies of scale and of imperfect competition 
provide a theoretically correct argument against free trade as the 
optimal policy in all circumstances. Instead, a strategic trade policy 
could be followed designed to protect and favour industries, which 
generate important technological spill-overs to the rest of the economy. 
5.2 The practical implementation of such a strategic trade policy is 
however beset with difficulties. Among these are the excessive informa- 
tion requirements, the detrimental interference of lobbies, and the 
possible retaliations by other countries. For these reasons the policy of 
free trade is still to be regarded as the most suitable practical 
guideline. 
5.3 The case of subsidies to Airbus shows that even in the highly 
concentrated aircraft production industry the arguments for a strategic 
trade policy are theoretical curiosa rather than providing a useful 
policy guidance. 
5.4 A strategic trade policy is designed to increase a specific 
country's welfare at the expense of other countries. This leads to the 
recommendation that the issues involving strategic trade policies are to 
be considered from a supranational point of view. This recommendation is 
corroborated by the empirical observation that the essential economic 
characteristics inherent to a strategic trade policy, namely economies of 
scale and limited competition, are precisely the elements enhancing the 
benefits from economic integration. 
CHAPTER 5. STRATEGIC TRADE WLICIES: RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 It is recommended that the Government of the Netherlands withstands 
internal pressures favouring strategic trade policies, while at the same 
time supporting the process of bringing industrial subsidization under 
international agreements, in the EU, the OECD and the GATTIWTO. 
CHAPTER 6. THE LEVEL OF DECISION MAKING: CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 The globalization of markets in itself calls for government 
intervention and policies at a higher than national level. More tradi- 
tionally, economic activities - such as international trade - are in need 
of rules arrived at in a multilateral rather than a bilateral or unilat- 
eral setting. The appropriate level of decision making is also under 
discussion in the EU, with subsidiarity as the leading concept. 
6.2 Economic analysis offers a twofold criterion guiding the choice of 
the optimal level of decision making: 
a) the level of decision making should be as low as possible in order 
to minimize transaction costs; 
b) the level of decision making should be sufficiently high to. avoid 
the costs of external effects - both negative and positive - not 
being internalized. 
6.3 A particular policy may include a range of derived objectives and 
instruments leading to a hierarchy of decision levels being involved. 
6.4 The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) founded in 1865 
and the Universal Postal Union (UPU) founded in 1874 are two examples of 
a successful implementation in the 19th century of supranational decision 
making in order to regulate border crossing activities with external 
effects. In addition, the ITU shows that various levels of decision 
making can be involved (the national, continental and world level) as the 
extent of the external effects require. 
6.5 The clarification of the concept and the implementation of an 
appropriate level of decision making would benefit considerably from the 
application of economic analysis. Yet, democratic control seems to 
qualify as a necessary condition for transferring authority to another 
level. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE LEVEL OF DECISION MAKING: RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 From the perspective of enhancing cohesion and checking disintegra- 
tion in the world economy, the choice of the appropriate level of 
decision making is instrumental and of considerable importance. 
6.2 It is recommended that the Government of the Netherlands gives 
considerable weight in its policies to the issue of the proper level of 
decision making, within the European Union in the context of the dis- 
cussion on subsidiarity, and furthermore at the continental and world 
level as well as within the nation state, taking into account the 
conclusions arrived at above. Of particular importance is that economic 
analysis is given more weight than considerations of political power. 
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ANNEX 2.1 COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION 
In Chapter I1 the network of world trade has been investigated, using 8 
countries and country groups in the world economy. This Annex provides 
details regarding the composition of the country groups. 
1. Western Europe (WE) 
o EU-12 
o EFTA-6 
o Faeroe, Gibraltar 
2. Japan (JPN) 
o Japan 
3. North America (NA) 
o Canada 
o USA 
4. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
o Albania, Bulgaria, (former) Czechoslovakia, (former) GDR (until 
1990), Hungary, Poland, Romania 
o (former) USSR 
5. Africa (AFR) 
o Af rica (excl. South Africa) 
6. Asia and Oceania (ASIA) 
o South and South-East Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Brunei, 
Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Loa, Macau, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand) 
o Socialist countries in Asia (China, North Korea, Mongolia, Viet 
Nam) 
o Oceania 
7. Latin America (LA) 
o South America 
o Central America 
8. Rest of World (ROW) 
o South Africa 
o Israel 
o West Asia (Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, 
Yemen) 
o Malta, (former) Yugoslavia 
ANNEX 2.2 POLARIZATION IN WORLD TRADE 
In section 2.8 the polarization of international trade has been analyzed, 
using percentage distributions of total trade of 7 country groups in the 
period 1960-1992. Section 2.8 presented Figures (2.3.1 to 2.9.2) for 
these country groups for the years 1960 and 1992. In this Annex the 
numerical values of the polarization of international trade are presented 
for all 5 years under consideration in this study: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 
and 1992 (Tables A.2.1-A.2.5). 
Table A. 2.1 Polarization of international trade, 1960 
percentage distribution 




$ 1  
Source: own calculations from UN trade data base 
Note: total trade is represented by the sum of exports and imports 
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11 Table A.2.3 Polarization of international trade, 1980 
percentage distribution 
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